Letter from Norman Hannah, CINCPAC to Marshall Green, Secret

Source: Letter from Norman Hannah, CINCPAC to Marshall Green, Secret Date: Oct 23, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 5 pol 23-9 Sept 30th Mvt Nov 10-19 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017

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Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Quiet Diplomatic Jockeying After the 1965 Coup

Norman B. Hannah’s October 23, 1965 letter to Ambassador Marshall Green is a window onto the United States’ tentative, behind‑the‑scenes contingency planning in the immediate aftermath of Indonesia’s violent power shift. The document was drafted at the headquarters of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) in San Francisco, a theater‑level command that oversaw U.S. naval and air forces across the Pacific basin. Hannah, the political adviser to CINCPAC, writes to Green, the newly appointed American ambassador in Jakarta, probing how Washington might respond if the Indonesian army—still reeling from the failed September 30 coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung—asked for direct assistance against a possible resurgence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

The letter follows a rapid cascade of events: on September 30, 1965, a faction of the army attempted a coup, killing several senior generals. In the chaotic days that followed, General Suharto seized control of the army, blamed the PKI for the plot, and unleashed a wave of mass killings that claimed an estimated 500,000 to one million lives. Colonel Untung, a key conspirator, was captured and executed, effectively “undoing” the coup’s leadership. By early October, the army was consolidating power, while President Sukarno’s authority was waning. The United States, already wary of a communist foothold in the strategic archipelago, was monitoring whether the PKI would transition from a political party to an armed insurgency.

The Strategic Calculus of Contingency

Hannah’s memo is less a report than a series of “what‑if” scenarios. He references Green’s earlier telegram (no. 1098) that assessed the PKI’s latent capacity for guerrilla warfare, noting the absence of concrete evidence that the party intended to launch an insurgency but acknowledging the existence of contingency plans. Hannah asks whether the United States should pre‑emptively outline a response package—ranging from covert operations to logistical support—should the army formally request aid.

The language reveals the cautious posture of Washington’s senior officials. Hannah repeats Green’s advice against “taking soundings” at the moment, indicating a deliberate avoidance of overt overtures that could be perceived as interference. Yet the very act of drafting such a speculative brief signals that U.S. policymakers were already mapping out the parameters of a possible military partnership, a step that would later culminate in the 1967–68 “Operation Dignity” and the broader U.S. support for Suharto’s New Order regime.

Actors, Intentions, and Ambiguities

Both Hannah and Green occupy pivotal diplomatic‑military nodes. Hannah, as CINCPAC’s political adviser, bridges naval strategy and Southeast Asian politics; Green, as ambassador, is the primary conduit between Jakarta’s military elite and Washington. Their exchange underscores a shared perception that the Indonesian army might soon become a de‑facto U.S. ally against communism, provided it could demonstrate a clear, organized insurgency.

Hannah’s reference to a “possible early August raid” is cryptic but suggests intelligence chatter about a planned army operation against PKI strongholds—perhaps an allusion to Suharto’s “Operation Merdeka” that began in early 1966. The letter also hints at internal skepticism: Green’s later telegram (1169) “casts doubt on the reliability of the Army’s gloom,” implying that Jakarta’s military leaders might be exaggerating the PKI threat to solicit American aid.

Why the Letter Matters Today

The correspondence is a micro‑cosm of the Cold War’s “silent wars” in which the United States calibrated assistance not through public declarations but through private contingency memos. It demonstrates how Washington’s strategic calculus in 1965 already anticipated a shift from diplomatic pressure to direct military support, a shift that would later legitimize Suharto’s authoritarian rule and entrench U.S. influence in Indonesia for decades.

Moreover, the document illuminates the moral ambiguity of U.S. policy during the Indonesian mass killings. By contemplating logistical and covert aid, Hannah’s letter reveals that American officials were prepared to facilitate a counter‑insurgency that would inevitably involve large‑scale violence against suspected communists—an episode that remains a scar in Indonesian collective memory.

In declassifying this memo, the National Security Archive provides scholars with concrete evidence of the United States’ pre‑emptive planning mindset. It bridges the gap between high‑level policy statements—such as the Kennedy administration’s public condemnation of communism—and the operational groundwork that enabled the New Order’s rise. The letter is a reminder that diplomatic archives often contain the “what‑ifs” that shape historical outcomes, and that the language of speculation can be as consequential as the language of action.

Legacy of the 1965 Contingency Planning

The Hannah‑Green exchange set a precedent for future U.S. engagement in Indonesia: a willingness to supply arms, intelligence, and covert assistance in exchange for anti‑communist alignment. This template resurfaced during the 1970s anti‑communist campaigns in Southeast Asia and again in the early 2000s as Washington sought to counter radical Islamism. Understanding the origins of that template in the 1965 letter helps explain the continuity of U.S. strategic behavior in the region, underscoring how a single, seemingly tentative memo can echo through decades of foreign policy.

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