US Embassy in Jakarta, Telegram A 298 to Secretary of State, Secret; Memorandum of Conversation: The Situation in Indonesia After the Coup Attempt and Efforts of Indonesian Moderates to Assist the Army to Destroy the PKI.
National Security Archive
A 1965 U.S. embassy telegram reveals how Indonesian moderates teamed with the army to crush the PKI, while fearing Sukarno’s nationalist backlash.
Source: US Embassy in Jakarta, Telegram A 298 to Secretary of State, Secret; Memorandum of Conversation: The Situation in Indonesia After the Coup Attempt and Efforts of Indonesian Moderates to Assist the Army to Destroy the PKI. Date: Oct 23, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 1-POL 23-9 Rebellion Coup 30 September Movement Oct.20-25, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Moderate Voice in the Aftermath of the 30‑September Coup
The telegram dated 23 October 1965 records a two‑part conversation between Robert G. Rich, Jr., the U.S. Embassy’s second secretary in Jakarta, and A. D. Nasution, an assistant to Indonesia’s attorney‑general. The United States had been monitoring the chaotic weeks after the abortive “30 September Movement” that claimed to thwart a communist plot but instead unleashed a wave of anti‑PKI violence. The embassy’s memorandum of conversation captures a rare glimpse of a self‑identified “moderate” element—Nasution, a legal official with roots in the pre‑1965 Masjumi and PSI parties—offering to cooperate with the army in its campaign against the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).
The document was produced in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, when General Suharto’s forces were already rounding up suspected communists in Jakarta and elsewhere. The United States, still reeling from the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin escalation, was keen to prevent a full‑scale communist takeover in a strategically vital archipelago, yet it was wary of being seen as a puppet of the military. The telegram therefore serves two purposes: it informs Washington that a segment of the Indonesian middle class is willing to back the army, and it warns that any overt U.S. press coverage of army executions could embolden President Sukarno to intervene on behalf of the PKI or to rally nationalist sentiment against “imperialists.”
The Broader Power Struggle and Its Stakes
The period between 30 September and late October 1965 was a turning point in Cold War Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the world’s fourth‑largest country by population, had pursued an aggressive non‑aligned policy under Sukarno, openly courting the Soviet bloc and China while nationalising foreign assets. The PKI, then the largest communist party outside the Soviet sphere, had entered the cabinet and enjoyed a degree of legitimacy. The army’s counter‑offensive, led by Major General Suharto, was not merely a reaction to a coup attempt but a calculated move to eliminate the PKI as a political force and to re‑orient Indonesia toward the West.
Nasution’s remarks, as recorded in the telegram, reveal how Indonesian moderates perceived their role: they saw the crisis as a fleeting opening to “redirect the course of the country’s fortunes.” By invoking the legacy of Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), Nasution positioned himself as a bridge between the old parliamentary elite and the new military‑dominated order. His public editorials in the army newspaper Angkatan Bersendjata—calling on all societal groups to purge “agitators” and “sycophants”—illustrate a coordinated propaganda effort that blended civilian legitimacy with military force.
What the Telegram Reveals Between the Lines
Several nuances emerge that are not obvious from public histories. First, the conversation underscores the army’s conscious secrecy about extrajudicial killings. Nasution tells Rich that executions of communists are “very closely held” and that even foreign radio reports of such killings have shocked the officers. This indicates an early awareness within the embassy that the death toll would soon swell into the hundreds of thousands, a fact the United States later struggled to reconcile with its anti‑communist narrative.
Second, the telegram highlights the diplomatic tightrope the United States walked. The embassy explicitly notes that Washington was “making every effort to avoid stimulating press speculation” that could aid Sukarno’s propaganda. Yet it concedes that the U.S. government “has no control over its press,” foreshadowing the later leakage of graphic images and reports that would inflame both domestic and international opinion.
Finally, Nasution’s assessment of Sukarno’s psychological hold—“irrevocably shattered… yet still pre‑eminent”—captures the paradox of a charismatic leader whose popular legitimacy was eroding while he retained enough authority to threaten the army’s agenda. The moderates feared that Sukarno, perhaps in concert with Foreign Minister Subandrio, could pivot the narrative toward an anti‑imperialist rally, accusing the United States of meddling. This fear explains why the embassy was so eager to keep army actions under wraps.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The telegram is a micro‑cosm of the larger, often under‑examined, Indonesian “mass murder” of 1965‑66, where estimates of the dead range from 500,000 to over a million. It shows that the United States was not a passive observer; it was actively engaged with local actors who sought to harness the anti‑communist purge for political ends. The document also illustrates how U.S. diplomatic channels attempted to shape the narrative, a practice that resurfaces in modern conflicts where strategic communication is as vital as kinetic action.
Understanding this telegram helps explain why Indonesia emerged from the 1960s as a staunch anti‑communist ally, a trajectory that shaped U.S. policy throughout the Cold War and continues to influence Jakarta’s security posture today. The interplay of military force, civilian moderation, and foreign diplomatic pressure captured in this single embassy memo offers a concise lens on how a nation can be steered from a pluralist experiment to an authoritarian, anti‑communist regime in the span of weeks.
POL 23-9 [This document consists of 5 pages. Copy 3 of 6 copies. Series A]
A-298 SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO : MEDAN, SURABAYA GROUP 4 Downgrade each 3 years; auto- matically declassified after 12 years
PLEASE PASS USIA
Ambassy DJAKARTA October 23, 1965
Efforts of Political Moderates to Help the Army Destroy the PKI and Pitfalls in the Current Political Situation.
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
The enclosed memorandum of conversation with Mr. A. Bujung Nasution, an assistant to the Indonesian Attorney General, conveys some of the flavor of the current post-September 30 political atmosphere in Indonesia as viewed by an Indonesian moderate who has actively entered the fray. Perhaps its greatest significance is the indication it gives that a part of Indonesia's able middle class which in recent years has been politically inert is coming forward at this time to challenge the leftward course of Indonesian events.
In addition to the enclosed comments by Mr. Nasution, there is public evidence of his active involvement. On both October 20 and 21 the armed forces newspaper, Angkatan Bersendjata, carried by-line articles by Nasution calling upon all organizations in the society to cleanse themselves of those who helped prepare the ground for the September 30 movement. The articles state that the time has come for every person to take a stand. No longer can people await orders or wait and see which way the wind is blowing. He recalls how agitators and their sycophants in government offices even had arrested band musicians for playing music the people wanted and had destroyed phono- graph records. In the field of justice, a high official had issued instructions that officials must take the side of the "farmers and workers" in any dispute whatever its merits. (Note: An obvious reference to crypto-Communist Justice Minister Astrawinata). Such persons served to pave the way for the September 30 movement with their
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POL: RGRichJr:ds 10/21/65 E.E. Masters
SECRET Page 2; A-298 From Djakarta
accusations, demonstrations and distortions, Nasution wrote, and there should be no more place for them either in government or private enter- prise.
For the Ambassador:
Edward E. Masters Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation.
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
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Encl. 1; page 1 A-298, Djakarta
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Subject: The Situation in Indonesia after the Coup Attempt and Efforts of Indonesian Moderates to Assist the Army to Destroy the PKI.
Participants: Mr. A. Dujung NASUTION, S.H., Assistant to the Attorney General of Indonesia.
Robert G. Rich, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy
Place: Djakarta, Indonesia
Dates: October 15 and 19, 1965
Mr. Nasution, who has been an acquaintance of the reporting officer for two years, but previously has refrained from discussing internal Indonesian politics, contacted me at his initiative and asked for a meeting to discuss the current situation. The following details emerged in two successive conversations on October 15 and 19, 1965.
Nasution said that the present situation offered a unique and perhaps not to be repeated opportunity for the moderate elements in Indonesia to stand up and make an effort to redirect the course of the country's fortunes. He repeatedly used the pronoun "we" in the ensuing discussion but declined to specifically identify the group he referred to. However, the reporting officer had the impression that Nasution represents the intellectual legatees of the former Masjumi and PSI segment of the Indonesian population. His position as an assistant to the Attorney General is apparently being directly utilized and he spoke of being in contact with the Army leadership concerning the continued round-up of communists in the Djakarta area.
Nasution emphasized that the outcome of the present power struggle is still far from being determined. These are very critical times. The important thing for the moment is to continue to crack down on the Communist organizations in order to break the back of PKI power before Sukarno had begun to successfully paper over recent events on the political level. Nasution said that the Army had already executed many Communists but that this fact must be very closely held. He had
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been shocked several days previously to hear Radio Malaysia refer to possible Army executions of Communist cadres. He emphasized that the key to the present situation remained Sukarno. Sukarno was always ready to grab on to foreign press reports and use them against those forces in the country which were currently trying to crush the PKI. The extent of Army repression of the PKI was being carefully kept from Sukarno. While Sukarno would probably hear reports to this effect, it was very important that he not be able to cite particular sources such as foreign radio and press reports since emphasis on these aspects in the foreign press would not only incite Sukarno to crack down on the Army's activities but also encourage him to wrongfully accuse military leaders of aiding and abetting Nekolim. Mr. Nasution particularly stressed the delicate position of Indonesian moderates at this time. They currently have the initiative, but need more time to break the back of PKI strength. To do this Sukarno must not be handed ammunition from abroad which he can turn against the Army and its supporters.
The reporting officer stressed that the US Government was fully aware of the sensitive nature of current events and was making every effort to avoid stimulating press speculation which would redound to the detriment of moderate forces in Indonesia at this time. It was noted, however, that the USG has no control over its press.
Nasution spoke of Sukarno as a man whose image in the country was irrevocably shattered for the long run and yet who still held a pre-eminent psychological position which the Army could not challenge directly. A distinct danger foreseen by the moderates at present was that Sukarno and Subandrio might yet be able to divert public attention to an alleged Nekolim threat and blame the US and "imperialists" in general for attempting to set Indonesians against themselves in early October. He noted the difficulty, and even impossibility, of pursuing a course of denials and refutations of spurious charges which might arise in this connection and recalled the effectiveness with which the PKI in the past had been able to utilize false documents and fabricated charges, resulting in Sukarno even turning against a long term friend, Bill Palmer. Rather than be placed on the defensive by such charges, he said, "we" are placing all our efforts in getting the true story of what happened to the Indonesian people in its fullest extent. By repeated emphasis on what really happened, little opening would be permitted for PKI fabrication. In searching for evidence of Subandrio's connection in the 30th September movement, however, the Army and moderate groups had thus far been unable to turn up firm useable evidence of Subandrio's
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Encl. 1; page 3 A-298, Djakarta
participation. He asked specifically whether the American Embassy could provide any firm evidence of Subandrio's links with the PKI or with Communist China.
- Nasution stated that some elements in the Army had raised the possibility of freeing former Masjumi and PSI leaders who had been in jail since the PRRI rebellion. "We" have told the Army, Nasution said, that the important thing at present is to protect these moderate figures where they are, in jail, and preserve their safety for the future. The political scene is still too delicate to consider their overt release at this time and they are perhaps safer in jail than any where else.
Biographic Note
- Mr. Nasution is an intelligent and soft spoken young lawyer who did some university study in Australia. Throughout the reporting officer's two-year acquaintance with him he has deplored the leftist trend of Indonesian politics. Until the September 30 coup attempt, however, he had never indicated any overt political participation himself. He has worked in the intelligence and security sections of the Attorney General's office prior to being appointed a special aide to the Attorney General in 1964. He was in charge of security arrangements for U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy during the latter's 1961 visit to Indonesia and has frequently spoken of his considerable admiration for the Kennedys as a result of that experience. Up until 1963 Nasution had for some time also been a member of the Indonesian Film Board Censor Committee for foreign films but had been removed from this group when it became more leftist oriented. Nasution is a Moslem Mendailing Batak from the same part of Sumatra as his famous namesake at the head of the Indonesian Armed Forces.
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