US Embassy in Jakarta, Telegram 1168 to Secretary of State, Secret
National Security Archive
A 1965 Jakarta cable shows U.S. diplomats watching labor protests, army intimidation, and a cabinet minister’s PKI ties as Indonesia teetered between coup and crackdown.
Source: US Embassy in Jakarta, Telegram 1168 to Secretary of State, Secret Date: Oct 23, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 1-POL 23-9 Rebellion Coup 30 September Movement Oct.20-25, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Jakarta on the Edge of a Coup
The telegram dated 23 October 1965 is a routine‑looking diplomatic cable, but its timing and content place it at the heart of Indonesia’s most violent political rupture. Within weeks of the failed “30 September Movement” that assassinated six senior generals, President Sukarno’s government was teetering between two starkly opposed forces: the communist‑aligned PKI and its labor umbrella SOBSI on one side, and a rapidly consolidating army under General Suharto on the other. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, still operating under the Cold‑War lens of “containment,” was monitoring how the civilian bureaucracy and mass‑based unions would react to the army’s push to purge communist influence.
The cable reports a series of mass demonstrations by “progressive revolutionary workers” on 21 October, demanding the dissolution of the PKI and its trade‑union arm SOBSI. It lists a litany of unions—SARBUMUSI, SOKSI, GASBIINDO, among others—who marched to the Ministry of Labor (LabDept) and presented their demands to Minister Sutomo. The embassy’s source notes that the army was called in, yet the demonstrators “voluntarily disbanded,” suggesting a careful choreography that allowed the military to appear in control without overt repression. The message also flags the Ministry’s internal dilemma: Sutomo, a cabinet minister, is personally tied to SOBSI through his own union background and his loyalty to Foreign Minister Subandrio, a known PKI sympathizer. The cable therefore interprets the ministry’s hesitation as a symptom of lingering communist influence, even as the army prepares to move against it.
The Actors and Their Calculus
Minister Sutomo (officially Sutomo Kusuma Djajasaputra) emerges in the telegram as a bureaucrat caught between two masters. The embassy’s intelligence portrays him as “reluctant to ban SOBSI because his department is under SOBSI control and because his cabinet post depends on SOBSI support.” This assessment reflects a broader U.S. reading that the PKI’s power was not merely ideological but institutional, embedded in ministries, state‑owned enterprises, and the labor movement. The cable also mentions Colonel Chaerul Basri, the army’s liaison to the Labor Ministry, who warns the union representatives that any further pressure could result in “them being ‘picked up.’” Basri’s veiled threat illustrates the army’s willingness to use intimidation, a prelude to the mass arrests and extrajudicial killings that would follow.
The document further identifies Brig. Gen. Sukendro, an “anti‑communist Army leader,” as a contact point for the source. Sukendro’s reassurance that the informants need not worry hints at the emerging alliance between the army and civilian anti‑communist elements, a coalition that would soon launch a systematic purge of the PKI, killing an estimated 500,000 to one million Indonesians.
What the Cable Reveals Beneath the Surface
While the telegram does not mention the death toll or the later establishment of the “New Order,” its language betrays an acute awareness of a tipping point. The embassy’s analysts describe the labor pressure as “continues” and warn that “demonstrators warned Sutomo they would return in force after one week if demands not met.” This suggests that the United States expected the army to capitalize on popular anti‑communist sentiment, using it as a justification for a broader crackdown.
The cable’s observation that “SOBSI unions in railroads, plantations, postal and telecommunications, harbors, public works, public utilities and motor transport” had been “temporarily frozen” except in the oil sector reveals a selective approach to economic disruption. By allowing oil‑related unions to continue, the Indonesian government could maintain critical revenue streams while still signaling a hard line against the PKI‑linked sectors.
Finally, the document’s concluding analysis—“Sukarno is now attempting to restore pre‑coup status quo which strongly favored SOBSI… Army … now appears moving country in opposite direction”—captures the emerging polarity that would define Indonesian politics for the next two decades. The embassy’s prognostication that “Sutomo … can be expected to fall in line with Army if pressure exerted” proved prescient; by early 1966, the army had effectively taken control, and Sukarno was sidelined.
Legacy of the Telegram
Declassified in 2017, this cable offers scholars a granular view of how U.S. diplomats interpreted the interplay of labor, bureaucracy, and the military in the immediate aftermath of the September 30 coup attempt. It underscores that U.S. policy was not merely reactive but actively calibrated to the perceived balance of power within Jakarta’s elite circles. The telegram also illustrates how American officials anticipated the army’s willingness to act as a de‑communization force, a belief that would later be validated by the brutal anti‑PKI purge.
For contemporary readers, the document reminds us that diplomatic cables often contain the raw, unfiltered judgments of on‑the‑ground analysts—judgments that can shape policy decisions far beyond the moment of writing. In the case of Indonesia, those judgments helped frame the United States’ tacit endorsement of the army’s actions, a stance that continues to inform debates over accountability, historical memory, and the long shadow of Cold‑War interventions in Southeast Asia.
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA Pol 23-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Charge: Embassy Classification Control: 1072A Date: 10/23/65 1:45PM
ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1168 INFO : AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 203 AMCONSUL SINGAPORE 181
- "Thousands of progressive revolutionary workers" October 21 called for dissolution of PKI and its labor arm SOBSI, according to newspaper reports. Unions including SARBUMUSI, SOKSI, Kebo Pantjasila, GASBIINDO, Buruh Pantjasila, Kespekri, GOBSII, KBIM and KBKI visited GOI LabDept, delivered demands personally to LabMin Sutomo. When Min promised only to forward demands to President Sukarno disturbance followed. Angry unionists claimed: (a) SOBSI clearly behind abortive coup by 30 September Movement; (b) Banning union clearly LabMin's obligation; (c) LabDept itself contained elements of 30 September Movement which Sutomo had not yet purged. Armed forces called in to keep order but on their arrival demonstrators voluntarily disbanded.
CONFIDENTIAL Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55
"Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"".
PPRC, Japan
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -2- Date:
- According usually reliable GOI LabDept source demonstration highlights following problem Sutomo faces due collapse PKI-sponsored coup and subsequent upsurge anti-communist sentiment among Indonesian people:
a. Labor's pressure will continue. Demonstrators warned Sutomo they would return in force after one week if demands not met.
b. Despite GOI requirement to purge rebel elements throughout government and probably specific instructions to ban SOBSI, Sutomo reluctant to do so because: (i) his dept under control SOBSI union of departmental officials; (ii) he holds cabinet post as result SOBSI support; (iii) his loyalty is to Subandrio whom source believes advised him to delay anti-SOBSI actions as long as possible.
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
- Source knew of impending union demonstration and accompanied representative of unions to confer with Army's LabDept liaison officer Colonel Chaerul Basri.
CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
CONFIDENTIAL
Charge: Embassy Classification -3- Control: Date:
They told Basri of union's intention and added their belief LabDept must meet demands but would be unable to do so unless outside pressure were applied to counteract SOBSI control of departmental organization. Basri replied they should tell him no more or if "conditions changed" he would have to have them "picked up". Thoroughly chilled from this reception by Army officer whom they had felt loyal to Nasution and Army, source and companion sought to protect themselves and expose Basri by reporting incident to Brig. Gen. Sukendro (See Emb A-50) prominent anti-communist Army leader to whom they had access. Sukendro told them not to worry.
- While SOBSI labor federation not itself banned nationally, key communist industrial unions have been temporarily frozen in all but oil industry (where action believed impending). SOBSI unions in railroads, plantations, postal and telecommunications, harbors, public works, public utilities and motor
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
CONFIDENTIAL Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55
"Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"."
PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -4- Date:
transport were ordered to cease all activities for present. (Not yet known how widely these directions being enforced.)
- Improbable LabDept officials participated in coup; but their sentiments clear both from Sutomo's and Basri's reactions. Sukarno is now attempting restore pre-coup status quo which strongly favored SOBSI, and in which anti-communist unions were being suppressed. Army (while not basically pro-labor) now appears moving country in opposite direction. Non- communist unions still too weak and fragmented to be independent political force, but SOBSI believed to have power potential to make Army's job harder. Therefore LabDept delay in hobbling SOBSI could hamper Army efforts. However, Sutomo an opportunistic bureaucrat and can be expected to fall in line with Army if pressure exerted within GOI and if unions continue popular clamor.
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
GP-3. +89 POL:Embasters /M POL:LAB/AmrigJr.:efr 10/23/65
GREEN mg
CONFIDENTIAL Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM PS-413 9-1-55
"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"."
FPRC, Japan
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