Telegram 779A from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Secret
National Security Archive
A secret 1965 Jakarta telegram reveals U.S. diplomats hearing, in real time, the army’s plan to execute PKI leaders and reshape Indonesia’s political order.
Source: Telegram 779A from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Secret Date: Oct 18, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 38 (Dummy Box), Folder 3 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Glimpse of the Chaos Behind Jakarta’s Diplomatic Wire
The telegram dated 18 October 1965 is a terse, secret‑level dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It records the words of Sutarto, a special assistant to Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani, as he briefed the American ambassador on the rapidly evolving anti‑Communist purge that had erupted after the failed coup of 30 September. The document was produced in the immediate aftermath of the army’s decisive move against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the subsequent mass killings that would claim an estimated 500,000 to one million lives.
The telegram belongs to the broader episode known as the 1965–66 Indonesian “anti‑Communist revolution,” a turning point that ended President Sukarno’s guided‑democracy, ushered General Suharto to power, and reshaped Cold War geopolitics in Southeast Asia. The United States, fearing a communist foothold on the archipelago, had been quietly encouraging the Indonesian army. The telegram’s content reveals how U.S. officials were receiving on‑the‑ground intelligence that confirmed the scale and ferocity of the violence, and how they interpreted Indonesian elite calculations.
Who Is Speaking, and What Does He Reveal?
Sutarto, the informant, is not a high‑profile politician but a bureaucrat embedded in the foreign ministry’s inner circles. His remarks, relayed verbatim to the ambassador, betray a mixture of confidence and opportunism. He reports that anti‑PKI operations had spread beyond Jakarta to Medan, South Sumatra and Makassar, and that “Central Java is in turmoil,” a phrase the telegram annotates as possibly exaggerated but indicative of “fervor of current public feeling.” This suggests that even within the Indonesian elite there was a perception that the anti‑Communist wave was national, not merely a Jakarta phenomenon.
Sutarto identifies Subandrio, Sukarno’s foreign minister and a known PKI sympathizer, as the “principal target of Army/Muslim anti‑PKI action,” predicting a raid on Subandrio’s newly built residence. He simultaneously notes that the army’s primary PKI target remains General Nasution, who, although in hiding, is still a “strong rallying point.” The dual focus on Subandrio and Nasution captures the two‑pronged strategy of the army: eliminate the party’s civilian leadership while preserving the military’s own command structure.
Perhaps the most chilling passage is Sutarto’s speculation that the leadership of the PKI—Aidit, Njoto and Lukman—might be publicly executed at Banteng Square. This reflects an internal calculus that the purge must be not only lethal but also theatrical, to demonstrate to President Sukarno that the anti‑Communist forces possessed both “strength and action.” The telegram records Sutarto’s assertion that Sukarno “respects only strength and action,” a line that would later justify the army’s brutal crackdown.
Sutarto also comments on the Chinese Embassy, describing it as holding “500 Indos stranded in China…practically hostages,” and hints at a tacit understanding with the U.S. Marines guarding the embassy. This illustrates how the United States was monitoring, and perhaps subtly influencing, the diplomatic tug‑of‑war over Chinese‑Indonesian relations during the crisis.
Finally, the telegram lists a litany of Indonesian officials slated for removal or death—Jusuf Muda Dalam, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Air Force chief Omar Dani, among others—providing a snapshot of the political cleansing that accompanied the anti‑PKI campaign. Sutarto’s appraisal of General Suharto as a “good, strong man” foreshadows Suharto’s eventual rise to the presidency.
Why the Telegram Matters Today
The document is a rare, contemporaneous capture of an insider’s assessment of the 1965 purge, offering scholars a direct line to the mindset of Indonesian officials who were both participants and witnesses. It confirms that the anti‑Communist violence was not a spontaneous outburst but a coordinated effort with clear targets, backed by an army that understood the need for public spectacle. Moreover, the telegram shows how U.S. diplomats interpreted Indonesian signals: they read Sutarto’s confidence as evidence that the army could, and would, force Sukarno’s hand.
Its declassification in 2007, after a 42‑year embargo, has allowed historians to reassess the extent of American awareness—and tacit acquiescence—to the mass killings. While the telegram does not prove direct U.S. orchestration, it demonstrates that Washington was closely monitoring the purge and, through its embassy channel, received vivid details about planned executions and the targeting of high‑level officials.
In the legacy of Indonesia’s “New Order,” the telegram stands as a testament to the opaque diplomatic communications that accompanied one of the Cold War’s bloodiest internal conflicts. It reminds us that the narratives of “spontaneous popular uprising” often mask the calculated, bureaucratic machinations that turn political turmoil into genocide. For contemporary readers, the telegram underscores the importance of scrutinizing diplomatic cables as primary evidence of how great‑power states perceive and sometimes enable atrocities.
The Unfinished Story
Even after decades of scholarship, many questions remain: how much did the United States know about the scale of killings before they were reported in the press? Did the embassy’s reports influence U.S. policy beyond passive observation? The telegram, with its candid tone and stark enumeration of victims, provides a crucial piece of the puzzle, urging scholars to keep probing the shadowy corridors where foreign policy meets mass violence.
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State
Box: 00118 Withhold Box: 0 Withhold Folder: 0 Document: 44
HMS REID: Entry:
Series: State Department Post Files
Total Pages: 5
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Document Date: 10-18-1965
Document Type: Telegram
Special Media:
File Number:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. This document is being withheld under Section 3.3b of EO 13526 and/or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256.
NND: 37770
Withdrawn: 01-31-2005 by:
RETRIEVAL #: 37770 00118 0 0 44
System DocID: 24101610
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING Amembassy DJAKARTA [Pr 23-9]
FILES COMM Charge: CHRON AMB MIN RF POL POL ECON
SECRET Classification
Control: 779A
Date: 10/18/65 5:45AM
This document consists of 5 pages. Copy 1 of 9 copies. Series A.
[Stamp: STATE DEPT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW ... Date: 6/20/96 Declass 2007]
ACTION: SEC STATE WASHINGTON
REF: Embtel 1043
Interesting and probably significant parts of story rapidly unfolding here were passed along Oct 16 to Emboff by Sutarto, special assistant to Ruslan Abdulgani, and long and intimately involved in Javanese and GOI circles.
Anti-PKI action being extended, Sutarto said, to other areas in addition Djakarta: Medan, South Sumatra, Makassar, while "Central Java is in turmoil." (COMMENT: Although this latter may be exaggeration, it indicates something of fervor of current
publicfeeling.)Sutarto made clear that principal target of Army/Moslem anti-PKI action here is Subandrio. He predicted forthcoming raid on Subandrio's elegant new residence which because of its ostentatiousness
ostentationhad already evoked jaundiced though whispered comments.On other side, Nasution remains main target of PKI
SECRET Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without typing. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM OUTGOING Foreign Service of the United States of America
Charge: SECRET Classification -2- Control: Date:
underground remnants and is under heavy guard. (Sutarto's implication was that, though lying low, Nasution is strong rallying point.) 5. When queried by Emboff as to next step beyond present mass demonstrations and sacking PKI-associated establishments and residences, Sutarto commented that Sukarno respects only strength and action, and said firmly: "Now we must show him that we have both." 6. He indicated there will be some action at Chicom Embassy, but this being delayed pending return to Indo of some 500 Indos stranded in China due transportation and other complications, and thus practically Chicom hostages. (Among these, he said, are several PKI militants who will not return.) Sutarto said "we have understanding" with Marines now on guard at Chicom Emb, and "when time is ripe they will help us." 7. Sutarto evidenced conviction that firm measures must be meted out to PKI and accomplices. He said: "We will probably have to string up Aidit, Njoto and Lukman in Banteng Square in order show everybody what kind of people they are."
SECRET Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without typing. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". FPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM OUTGOING Foreign Service of the United States of America
SECRET Charge: Classification Control: -3- Date:
He thought Njoto and Lukman had asylum in Djakarta palace, and did not know Aidit's whereabouts.
Sutarto's comments on other personalities: Appointment of Suharto is excellent; "he is good, strong man." Jusuf Muda Dalam is directly responsible for missing sum of 31 billion rupiah, total which has disappeared from various banks. Hardi will emerge on top of reconstituted PNI; Ali Sastroamidjojo will have to go, since his left-wing is completely discredited with revelation of shelter it has given to PKI. Ruslan [illegible] Abdulgani is weak and vaccilating; his principal aim is to be in right place at right time to get Subandrio's job. Sukirman lost his job as head of RRI through his [illegible] refusal Oct 1 to answer summons from his boss, Info Minister Achmadi, and his going off instead with contingent of Untung's Tjakrabirawa men.
As for Air Force, Sutarto said grimly: "Omar Dani must resign or we will have to kill him." Four other AURI officers must go too: Sri Muljono, Suryadarma, Abdoerachmat, [illegible] and one other not named.
SECRET Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289]
address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without using. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING
Foreign Service of the
United States of America
SECRET
Charge:
Classification
Control:
Date:
-4-
10. Sutarto had earlier talked with one of Untung's
interrogators and reported Untung "saying a lot of things,"
including definite implication PKI in 30 Sept Movement. Untung
severely beaten up by captors and interrogators, and Sutarto
had suggested that more gentle treatment likely to elicit fuller
testimony. (Moslem youth source told Emb off Untung had also
put bee on Subandrio.)
11. COMMENT: Sutarto's visit to Emboff residence
punctuated by separate arrivals Moslem youth leader and family
of anti-PKI journalist who has been in seclusion. People are
beginning to see again; general atmosphere seems genuinely
lighter. Most encouraging of all, there are more signs people
actually, if still somewhat incredulously, putting blame where
it belongs. Whether Sukarno/PKI iron grip broken remains be
seen, but one thoughtful Indonesian speaking of formerly
inflated concept of President, said to Emboff last night in
words that reflect what is reaching us from various sources,
"I tell you, the balloon has burst."
12. While Sutarto's rationale for demonstrations and
raids is of course reverse of line GOI used to feed us, i. e. that
SECRET
Classification
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 67289
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
Press messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
ing. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
PPWC, Japan
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING
Foreign Service of the United States of America
Charge:
SECRET Classification -5- Control: Date:
anger of people is aroused, it nevertheless is interesting and doubtless accurate as expression of sort of thing Sukarno understands.
GP-2
GREEN [mg]
[7md]
POL:MVTrent/ac
XXX 10/17/65
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
SECRET Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without rpm "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
FFBC, Japan
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu