Letter from Frederick A. O. Schwarz to Thomas Latimer, 16 September 1975, with attached Tabs A, "Factual Issues" and B, "Proposed Presentation of Issues," Top Secret, excised copy
National Security Archive
A 1975 Senate memo maps the line between what the NSA could reveal about its domestic surveillance and what must stay secret, setting the stage for the historic Church Committee hearings.
Source: Letter from Frederick A. O. Schwarz to Thomas Latimer, 16 September 1975, with attached Tabs A, "Factual Issues" and B, "Proposed Presentation of Issues," Top Secret, excised copy Date: Sep 16, 1975 Collection: National Security Agency Tracking of U.S. Citizens – “Questionable Practices” from 1960s & 1970s Sep 25, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Senate Probe into NSA’s Domestic Reach
On 16 September 1975 Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., the chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, wrote to Pentagon aide Thomas K. Latimer outlining the next steps in a nascent congressional investigation. The letter, accompanied by two classified tabs, was drafted in the wake of the Watergate‑era revelations that had already forced the executive branch to confront the scope of its own surveillance programs. By early 1975 the Senate committee—often called the Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church—had begun to piece together a picture of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) expansive signals‑intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus, including its practice of tapping “international lines of communication” (ILCs) that terminated on U.S. soil.
The document is not a report but a logistical blueprint. Schwarz asks Latimer to arrange a meeting between committee staff and senior Department of Defense officials (including General Lew Allen, the NSA director) before a Friday executive session. The goal: negotiate which factual elements could survive public scrutiny and which must remain sealed. Tab A lists “Material That Can Be Developed at a Public Hearing” versus “Material That Should Not Be Developed,” while Tab B proposes a procedural format for the hearings. The language is deliberately conciliatory—Schwarz stresses his “strong confidence that we can mutually and amicably agree”—yet the attached outlines reveal the committee’s awareness of how little was publicly known about NSA’s budget, personnel (40‑60,000 staff), and technical capabilities.
The Broader Context: From Secret Surveillance to Congressional Oversight
The Church Committee’s mandate stemmed from a cascade of disclosures: the 1972 Pentagon Papers, the 1973 revelations of illegal COINTELPRO operations, and the 1974 hearings on the CIA’s domestic activities. By mid‑1975, public outrage demanded answers about the nation’s largest intelligence agency, which unlike the CIA operated under a veil of statutory ambiguity. NSA’s mission was defined only in the vague National Security Council Directive 6, leaving the agency free to interpret its authority. The September 1975 letter therefore marks a pivotal moment when the Senate moved from fact‑finding to the prospect of public hearings—a rare opportunity for the American public to glimpse the inner workings of a secretive signals‑intelligence empire.
What the Letter Reveals About Power and Prudence
Schwarz’s memo is a window into the delicate balance the committee sought. The “Outline of Facts” admits that the NSA’s budget exceeded $1 billion and that its technical infrastructure was “unparalleled,” yet it explicitly avoids any discussion of capabilities against the Soviet Union, the Middle East, or the “Third World.” This omission signals two things: first, the committee recognized the political danger of exposing the full extent of U.S. SIGINT power; second, it was already aware that the NSA’s own internal rules prohibited public debate on its foreign‑targeting activities, even as the agency was intercepting domestic communications that merely passed through an international link.
The memo also underscores the bureaucratic choreography required to bring the hearings to fruition. By requesting a meeting “by Thursday morning” and scheduling an executive session for September 19, Schwarz shows the committee’s urgency. The inclusion of General Lew Allen, Jr. as a copy recipient hints at the seniority of the officials the committee expected to negotiate with, and the fact that the document is stamped “Top Secret/COMINT” reflects the sensitivity of the material under review.
Legacy: Foundations for Modern Oversight
Although the Church Committee’s public hearings ultimately led to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the creation of permanent intelligence oversight bodies, the September 1975 correspondence foreshadows ongoing tensions between secrecy and accountability. The very categories Schwarz delineates—what can be disclosed versus what must remain classified—are the same debates that surface today around bulk metadata collection, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the NSA’s modern surveillance programs revealed by Edward Snowden.
By exposing the procedural scaffolding behind the 1975 hearings, this letter helps us understand why the Church Committee succeeded where earlier inquiries floundered: it combined detailed internal knowledge (budget, personnel, technical reach) with a willingness to negotiate the limits of public disclosure. The document’s emphasis on “mutual and amicable agreement” also illustrates the early recognition that lasting reform required not just congressional will but a negotiated settlement with the intelligence community itself. The legacy of that negotiation endures in today’s classified briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees, the annual “intelligence community” reports to Congress, and the continuing debate over how much of the nation’s most secretive capabilities should ever be aired in the public arena.
In short, Schwarz’s September 16, 1975 letter is more than an administrative note; it is a snapshot of a watershed moment when the United States began to reckon publicly with the scope of its own electronic eyes.
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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN. WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA. GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
TOP SECRET/COMINT (when TAB A is attached)
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
September 16, 1975
Mr. Thomas K. Latimer Special Assistant to the Secretary OSD 3E941, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Mr. Latimer:
As Committee staff members discussed with you last Tuesday, and with General Allen of the NSA last Thursday and yesterday, the Select Committee may wish to hold public hearings that focus on NSA's monitoring of international lines of communication (ILC) that have one terminal in the United States. Such public hearings will be preceded by an executive session of the full Committee to discuss not only the substantive issues, but also the question of what could properly be made public. The executive session is now tentatively scheduled for Friday morning, September 19.
To prepare for the executive session, we have drafted an Outline of Facts (Tab A) that we tentatively believe can or cannot be made public. I emphasize that this outline is very rough. We are still obtaining testimony and documents, and we have not had the benefit of your detailed views.
Committee staff representatives would hope to meet with NSA officials and any other DoD officials you believe appropriate to seek agreement on what could be made public and, where there might be differences of opinion, to crystallize these differences so that they can be addressed effectively at the executive session of the Committee. It would be helpful if the meeting between the Committee staff and DoD representatives could be by this Thursday morning, September 18.
I also include a proposed format for proceeding in the executive session and the public hearings (Tab B). Your views on this would be appreciated.
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Mr. Thomas K. Latimer September 16, 1975 Page Two
Let me emphasize my strong confidence that we can mutually and amicably agree on these matters.
Sincerely,
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Chief Counsel
cc: General Lew Allen, Jr. Attachments Tab A Tab B
Doc ID: 6571846 DRAFT 2: 9/16/75 TAB A VERY SENSITIVE TOP SECRET/COMINT R1128
OUTLINE
FACTUAL ISSUES
Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
I. General: Size, Authority, Capability
The National Security Agency (NSA) is by far the largest intelligence organization in the United States. Its budget is well over $1 billion, and it has between 40-60,000 personnel. These figures include the individual Service Security Agencies which are responsible to NSA -- i.e., the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service.
NSA is generally marked by a very high degree of professionalism and many of its activities are extremely sensitive.
NSA's mission is defined in no statute and only very ambiguously in an NSC Intelligence Directive 6 (NSCID 6) and supporting documents. The Director of NSA is program manager for the signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications security efforts of the U.S. Government. NSA's primary mission is to collect and analyze SIGINT, which includes communications intelligence (COMINT) plus a variety of other signals, such as radar emissions. Much of the COMINT is encrypted.
This intelligence mission necessarily requires highly sophisticated monitoring equipment and NSA has it. There is no known agency in the world with as sophisticated communications gear or computers.
No breakdown of NSA's budget into various categories, such as SIGINT, Communications Security, or collection.
No discussion of sensitive technology -- e.g., regarding the size or capabilities of NSA's equipment or computers, except for elementary discussion of the Puerto Rican intercept (see p. 3) and the key- word computer dictionaries (see p. 4).
Avoid discussion, except in the most general terms, of our capability or effort against the Soviet Union, the People's
Doc ID: 6571846 EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Page 2 VERY SENSITIVE TOP SECRET/COMINT
Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
the Middle East, or the Third World. (This principle will sometimes conflict with public discussion of NSA capabilities and practices against U.S. citizens communicating on international lines of communications with one terminal in the U.S.)
Avoid discussion of any treaty relationships with our Allies re: SIGINT activities.
NSA does not produce "finished" intelligence reports, but does only preliminary analysis so that it can determine the context of messages and to whom they should be disseminated.
II. Monitoring of International Lines of Communications
NSA uses a substantial part of its resources and unparalleled technology to intercept and analyze "foreign communications." The Executive Branch directives define this phrase as including most communications involving one foreign citizen, but NSA limits itself to communications with at least one foreign terminal. Hence, NSA does not intercept domestic communications between U.S. citizens.
One targeted type of communications is the international lines of communications (ILCs).* Although intercepting all ILCs is far beyond NSA's capabilities and resources, NSA does intercept vast numbers of communications over some of them, including some that have one terminal in the United States.
- These are international commercial links, and do not include domestic (internal) communications links, military links, etc.
Doc ID: 6571846 VERY SENSITIVE TOP SECRET/COMINT
Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
A. Voice Traffic
While sorting and analyzing voice communications over the ILCs is difficult, NSA does do some of this. Only a handful of the links now monitored or monitored in the past year have one terminal in the United States. Many additional links, however, can be listened to very simply.
No listing of any specific voice links other than those mentioned below.
Questionable Practice: U.S.-South American Monitoring. NSA has intercepted telephone calls between the United States and some South American cities. NSA did this most recently by intercepting at a military base in Puerto Rico the high-frequency radio waves carrying these calls. This was a simple technological effort that a good "ham" radio operator could do in the same gen- eral locations.
EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
This activity just ended on July 9, 1975, after con- tinuing with one brief interruption since late 1970. Neither NSA nor any other agency had obtained a warrant to conduct this moni- toring.
No discussion of technical details of the Puerto Rican operation -- such as the number of links that could be monitored.
For the last two years, this monitoring was to collect economic intelligence and
When a frequency was being monitored, each telephone call, even a personal call between husband and wife, had to be lis- tened to and recorded by the operators and reduced to a summary and sometimes a transcript. There can be no computer sorting until then. [Note: See comments later, under II.B, about public discussion of computer sorting.]
The value of the monitoring was marginal. In 1974-75, the Puerto Rican station sent only 6-7 call summaries ("gists") a day back to NSA for even the most elementary analysis, and NSA only requested one or two full transcripts.
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VERY SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/COMINT
Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
In the initial period, from late 1970 through June 1973, the primary purpose of this U.S.-South American monitoring was to gather information about drug traffic. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) asked NSA to initiate the monitoring and also supplied NSA with the names of various individuals, in- cluding U.S. citizens who were especially suspicious.
Existing laws and Executive Branch directives are unclear whether combating drug traffic is a valid foreign intelligence pur- pose.* The NSA General Counsel distinguishes between control of international drug traffic and domestic law enforcement; only the former he considers a valid foreign intelligence purpose.
EO 3.3b(1)
B. Non-Voice Traffic
A very high proportion of NSA's monitoring effort against ILCs is to intercept telegrams. This is because (a) telegrams can be fed directly into the computer, which can sort through them, looking for key words, and select out the most valuable messages; and (b) NSA believes that most important information is communicated at some point by telegram. [Note: The basic fact that NSA computers sort through messages by using a keyword dictionary should not be
Do not use a 95-99% figure.
- Existing directives do not limit NSA to foreign intelligence col- lection, but NSA consistently tells Congressional committees that it perceives this to be its purpose and believes this is the only collection it is now engaged in.
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Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
sensitive technology today. Many private companies index and sort through material by use of computer dictionaries. It is the size of the dictionary and the capabilities of NSA's com- puters that seem sensitive.]
Contrary to some statements in the media, NSA does not monitor most telegram traffic; on the other hand, it does handle an enormous volume. An estimated 2 billion telegrams a month pass over ILC channels. Computers at NSA field stations scan many millions of them, forward about 2.8 million to NSA head- quarters, and NSA analysts probably see 1 million of these.
[NSA watch-list turns on "Watch list" of returned names from electronic agencies & then put names in collection file names]
Questionable Practice: The Watch List Activity. Start- ing sometime in the early 1960s, and switching into high gear in 1967, NSA included the names of U.S. citizens/entities on its "watch list" of names. (Foreign citizens or entities were also on the list.) This meant that intercepted messages to or from these individuals or even mentioning them would be sent to NSA analysts and often forwarded to consumer agencies -- especially the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service.
At one time or another, the list included the names of at least 1,200 U.S. citizens. At its high point in 1973, it had about 250-300 names on it. One document from NSA's files, a four- page memorandum, contains some names that may have been included on the watch list; NSA does not know the history of the document or whether the names were entered on the watch list. The names in the memorandum include Whitney Young, Benjamin Spock, the NAACP, and the Urban League. Already documented as entries on the watch list are such other names as Donald Sutherland (FBI, 1971-73); Muhammed Ali (FBI, 1971-73); Roy Innis (FBI, 1971-73); the Women's Liberation Movement (Secret Service, 1971-73); Vietnam Veterans Against the War (Secret Service, 1971-73); Quaker Action Group (Secret Service, 1971-73); and Bertram Zweibon (Secret Service, 1971-73; a U.S. Court of Appeals recently ruled that an FBI wire- tap on Zweibon during some of the same period was illegal without a warrant).
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
No discussion of the number of words in the dictionary or the speed of the compu- ters. No discussion of NSA use of voice prints.
[illegible]
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Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
The inclusion of U.S. names was sharply curtailed in August-October 1973 as a result of self-doubts by NSA officials and the intervention of the Department of Justice. Attorney Gen- eral Richardson found that this was electronic surveillance with- out a warrant and that the dissemination of information obtained to the FBI might be illegal. NSA then asked other agencies to eliminate all U.S. names from the watch list, except for a few that the Secret Service now maintains to carry out its purposes.
Some characteristics of the watch list are:
There usually was some justification given that a name was on the list to help determine the individual's or the group's links to foreign governments, terrorists, or subversive groups.
The inclusion of names was extremely casual. Some requests were initially given over the telephone at a relatively low staff level. Written requests often contained only a very brief justification for including names. The four-page unidenti- fied memorandum from NSA's files was poorly typed and some names were presented in almost random order.
Communications between two U.S. citizens would be intercepted if one of them was on the watch list or if the cable mentioned one of them. Note that one of them would have to be at a foreign terminal. (Even now the NSA computer might send a com- munication between two U.S. citizens to an analyst if a keyword is contained in the message.)
The incidental fallout from the watch list meant that there was a considerable collection effort against other U.S. citizens. For instance, a cable mentioning the "Women's Liberation Movement" (a target) might include the names of U.S. citizens as senders, recipients, and attendees at a meeting.
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Do not discuss the number or identity of the Secret Service entries.
[handwritten: 052 illegible signature]
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Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
The normal practice was to leave these names in the text disseminated to other agencies and to add them to NSA's biographic files.
Note: Even though the use of the names of U.S. citizens/entities in the computer has been sharply curtailed, some of the intercepted communications (telephone as well as telegram) still sent to NSA analysts have U.S. citizens/entities as a party or mentioned in the text. This is because the messages contain other keywords that identify it as appropriate for analysis. NSA now has internal regulations that require that specific U.S. citizens/entities not be identified in any material disseminated to other agencies as a result of ILC intercepts "only if great intelligence significance is gained by doing so."
Another Questionable Practice: [black box] NSA, with the aid of CIA, had an arrangement in New York whereby some telegram companies provided NSA the opportunity to duplicate certain telegrams. This practice apparently continued for many years, possibly three or four decades. It was recently terminated. EO 3.3b(1)
This activity would only be considered insofar as it involved looking for communications to, from, or involving U.S. citizens/entities. There would be no discussion of targeting telegrams of foreign governments, entities, or individuals.
C. Files on U.S. Citizens/Entities
In the course of monitoring many communications links (ILC and otherwise), NSA intercepts, analyzes, and stores hundreds of millions of messages per year. The information therein, much irrelevant to the reason the message was intercepted, is filed in many ways.
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Questionable Practice: The C5 Files on U.S. Citizens. Until 1973, [illegible] as part of its overall responsibility to maintain world-wide biographic information in support of NSA's mission, maintained limited biographic and organization files on tens of thousands of U.S. citizens, including members of Congress, such as Senators Church and Goldwater who would likely appear in foreign diplomatic communications. The files themselves, composed of 6x8 microprints or hard copy page containing information filled, at their high point, 8 filing cabinets, each with approximately nine cubic feet of storage space. The information came not only from published SIGINT but also press and published USIB Agency Intelligence Reports. NSA used the files to support NSA analysts in various stages of product preparation. If clarification of message text was required, identification of U.S. personalities were infrequently included in a footnote. Access to C5 files was restricted to NSA analysts with a need-to-know and accredited USIB agency personnel on a very limited basis. inactive The files were in after 1973 because of lack of manpower to maintain them and were destroyed in Oct 1974 because the use of the files had decreased to the point they did not warrant utilization of the very limited floor space available for filing. [handwritten note]
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VERY SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/COMINT
Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Questionable Practice: The C-5 Files on U.S. Citizens. Until 1973, NSA maintained extensive biographic and organization files on U.S. citizens and entities. The biographic files included files on tens of thousands of U.S. citizens, including members of Congress, such as Senators Church and Goldwater. The files them- selves, composed of 5x8 cards with small print, filled at their high point 8 to 10 filing cabinets, each with 9 cubic feet of storage space. The information came not only from SIGINT intercepts, but also from other agencies. NSA apparently used the files with few restrictions in adding biographic information to messages that were disseminated to other agencies. In addition, agencies had easy ac- cess to the files; CIA had an employee who worked among the files without NSA supervision from at least 1971-73.
[Press State]
The files were inactive after 1971 and destroyed in 1973 because, NSA says, they were running out of space. For background information on U.S. citizens/entities, NSA now apparently relies on the data bank maintained by the New York Times.
III. Underlying Problems
An underlying problem appears to be the lack of a statutory charter and clear Executive Branch directives. Three phrases might be examined more carefully:
A. "Foreign communications." This phrase now seems to in- clude under present Executive Branch directives almost all commu- nications except those between two U.S. citizens. As a result, except for NSA's own directive, a telephone call between a for- eigner in Des Moines and a U.S. citizen in Chicago appears to be a foreign communication.
No discussion of citizens or entities being treated as U.S. citizens.
EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
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Material That Can Be Developed At A Public Hearing
Material That Should Not Be Developed At A Public Hearing
B. "Foreign intelligence." Does this include, for example, intelligence relating to national security only; national security and foreign affairs; national security, foreign affairs (including possible foreign influence on domestic groups), economic matters, and domestic law enforcement?
C. "National security."
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TAB B September 16, 1975 SENSITIVE
PROPOSED PRESENTATION OF ISSUES
The hearings on NSA monitoring would begin with an executive session of the full Committee where General Allen, the Director of NSA, can brief the Senators about NSA and, to avoid later questions in public hearings, about some of the technical means for intercepting communications. Drawing upon prior negotiations between the Committee staff and the Department of Defense, Allen would address what NSA believes can be presented in public and what cannot. The executive session would be on Friday, September 19.
After a few days' interval to iron out any disputes over the classification issue, the Committee would hold public hearings designed to last three mornings. These hearings would be on Tuesday, September 23, through Thursday, September 25. The public hearings would proceed with the following witnesses from NSA:
General Allen, NSA Director. He would sketch the role of NSA, its size, and its monitoring capabilities -- the latter in very general terms. He might also note that NSA has stopped the questionable practices to be addressed. (See Outline of Factual Issues.)
Mrs. Moody, director of the NSA group in charge of customer relations (V Group). She has had long experience in the Agency and is very familiar with the questionable practices to be investigated. She would be accompanied by Milton Iredell, who knows more about the drug monitoring than Mrs. Moody.
With Mrs. Moody in the lead, the two would discuss NSA's questionable practices in the past in the voice (U.S.-South American monitoring) and then the non-voice (watch list, [illegible] area.
Mr. Richard Tracy. Tracy was in charge of the biographic and organization files from 1971-73. He would describe the extent of the files on U.S. citizens/entities and the fact that outside intelligence agencies, [illegible] had easy access to these files.
Mr. Richard Kern, the recently appointed head of the NSA group responsible for ILC monitoring (G Group). He was not very involved in the questionable practices. He would testify that NSA has stopped these practices through internal regulation.
Mr. Roy Banner, the General Counsel of NSA. Banner would discuss the applicable statutes and Executive Branch directives, noting the wide discretion for the Agency under the terms "foreign communications" and "foreign intelligence."
EO 3.3b(1)
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