[U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities], "NSA Monitoring Issues Outline," 10 September 1975, Top Secret, Excised copy
National Security Archive
A 1975 NSA briefing memo reveals the Senate’s laser‑focus on budget line‑items, domestic intercepts, and a secret drug‑watch list that sparked the modern intelligence oversight regime.
Source: [U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities], "NSA Monitoring Issues Outline," 10 September 1975, Top Secret, Excised copy Date: Sep 10, 1976 Collection: National Security Agency Tracking of U.S. Citizens – “Questionable Practices” from 1960s & 1970s Sep 25, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
NSA’s Budgetary Black Box, 1975
The memorandum dated 10 September 1975 is a draft “issues outline” prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the so‑called Church Committee). Its purpose was to structure the line of questioning the committee would pursue in hearings on the National Security Agency’s domestic monitoring practices. The document is stamped “Top Secret – Very Sensitive – TS/COMINT” and bears the internal code GGF, indicating it was generated by NSA’s internal legal‑policy office for use in a classified congressional briefing. By the fall of 1975 the Senate committee had already subpoenaed senior NSA officials—most notably Director Lt. Gen. Leon E. Porter and Deputy Director William A. Miller—to testify about the size of the agency’s budget, the scope of its intercepts, and the legal bases for those activities. The outline lists the very granular data the senators hoped to extract: line‑item budget figures for SIGINT versus communications security, the number of overseas and domestic bases, and the proportion of funds devoted to “ILCs” (international lines of communications) that passed through a U.S. terminal.
The Church Committee Context
The document belongs to the broader wave of congressional investigations that erupted after the Watergate scandal exposed a pattern of executive overreach. In 1975 the Senate formed the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Frank Church (D‑Idaho). Its mandate was unprecedented: to audit the entire intelligence community, assess violations of civil liberties, and recommend statutory reforms. The NSA monitoring outline reflects the committee’s focus on one of the most opaque parts of the intelligence apparatus—its domestic collection of communications that, on its face, were “foreign” but often carried incidental U.S. content.
Who Was Asked to Answer, and What Their Answers Reveal
The “Witnesses” column names a handful of senior NSA officials—Allen, Banner, Kern, Moody, Buffham—who were slated to be questioned. Allen, likely the agency’s chief financial officer, was tasked with breaking down the FY‑1975 budget by function (SIGINT, COMSEC, service‑agency contributions) and by geography (overseas vs. U.S. bases). The repeated request for exact dollar amounts and percentages signals that the committee suspected a substantial, perhaps undisclosed, portion of the budget funded domestic intercepts.
Banner and Kern were asked about “statutory authority” and “executive branch directives,” probing whether any law explicitly permitted NSA to monitor U.S. citizens, or whether the agency was operating on internal policy memos. The outline’s focus on definitions—what counts as “foreign communications” under NSA’s own classification (NSCID‑6) and how “press broadcasts” are treated—suggests that the committee suspected the agency was using semantic loopholes to justify wide‑ranging surveillance.
Buffham’s line of questioning zeroes in on the infamous “drug watch list” that NSA allegedly maintained at its Sabana Seca (Puerto Rico) facility. The committee wanted to know when the list began, who proposed and authorized it, how names were submitted (even by telephone), and how many U.S. citizens were ever placed on it. By asking for the number of seizures and convictions directly linked to the list, the senators aimed to measure the program’s tangible law‑enforcement value against its intrusion on privacy.
What the Outline Tells Us Beyond the Hearings
The sheer granularity of the questions—down to the number of voice links monitored, the volume of intercepted telephone conversations, and the breakdown of products (summaries, abstracts, analyst copies) disseminated to other agencies—reveals that the committee expected NSA to keep detailed accounting records. The fact that such a document existed indicates an internal awareness within NSA that its activities could be subject to audit; otherwise, no one would have compiled a line‑item budget for “monitoring of ILCs with one terminal in the United States.”
The repeated instruction “HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS” underscores the sensitivity of the material: even within the classified environment, the agency compartmentalized the information as communications intelligence, limiting its distribution to those with the appropriate clearance.
Legacy and Continuing Relevance
The Church Committee’s eventual report (1976) led to the establishment of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978), and the creation of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board decades later. The NSA monitoring outline is a concrete artifact of the moment when Congress first forced the intelligence community to confront its secret budgets and domestic surveillance practices. Contemporary debates over bulk metadata collection and the NSA’s “Section 702” authority echo the same questions raised in 1975: how much of the agency’s budget is devoted to domestic intercepts, what legal justifications are invoked, and how transparent are the internal rules governing incidental collection of U.S. persons.
By exposing the bureaucratic scaffolding behind the agency’s covert budget, the document helps explain why later reforms emphasized “public reporting” of the intelligence budget and mandated stricter oversight of any program that could affect U.S. citizens. The same line items the committee pursued—budget allocations for “ILC monitoring,” the number of overseas bases, and the existence of a drug watch list—continue to be points of contention in today’s oversight hearings, proving that the fundamental tension between national security and civil liberties remains unchanged.
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
I. General: Size, Authority, Capabilities Allen
A. Size
- What is NSA's FY 1975 [7b] budget? a. NSA SIGINT b. NSA communications security c. Each Service Security Agency's budget d. Other e. Total
- What is NSA's FY 1975 [7c] budget? a. NSA SIGINT b. NSA communications security c. Each Service Security Agency's budget d. Other e. Total
- How many bases? a. Overseas b. In U.S.
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
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- How much of NSA's FY 1975 budget was expended on monitoring of ILCs? Breakdown between voice and non-voice communications and by functions:
a. Intercepting
b. Storage, analysis
c. Dissemination
d. Total
- How much of NSA's FY 1975 budget was expended on monitoring ILCs with one terminal in the United States? Breakdown between voice and non-voice com- munications and by functions:
a. Intercepting
b. Storage, analysis
c. Dissemination
d. Total
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
B. Authority for Functions Allen Banner Kern Moody
- What statutory authority?
- What Executive Branch directives? a. What are specific functions assigned to NSA? (1) What is meant by "foreign communications" (NSCID-6)? (2) Is domestic law enforcement an authorized function? b. What restrictions are placed on NSA's monitoring of foreign communications? (1) How define "press broadcasts"?
- What restrictions does NSA now impose on itself re- garding the monitoring of U.S. citizens? a. At least one foreign terminal? b. Not specifically target U.S. citizens? c. Keep anonymity in dissemination of product regard- ing incidental intercepts of U.S. citizens? (1) What specific rules exist now? In what documents? (2) What prior rules existed in 1970? 1973?
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Issues
Witnesses
Relevant Documents
Allen Buffham Kern
C. Capabilities
- How intercept communications? a. Telephone line/cable b. High-frequency radio c. Microwave d. Satellite
- Who does intercepts? a. NSA itself b. Service Security Agencies c. Allies [Detail not necessary] d. Others
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
II. Voice Intercepts Allen Kern
A. General capabilities
Total ILCs a. How many voice links are used in international lines of communications? b. What kind of traffic is carried over these links -- e.g., normal voice, facimiles? c. How much traffic is carried -- e.g., number of telephone conversations per month? d. How many of these links does NSA (or someone working with NSA) monitor? e. How many voice communications do you estimate were intercepted in 1974? f. How many summaries or abstracts were forwarded to NSA headquarters in 1974? g. How much is sent to NSA analysts? h. How much is disseminated to other agencies? By types of dissemination? i. How much is retained by NSA? How? Allen Kern
With one terminal within the United States Moody a. How many of these voice links are used in international lines of communications? b. How much traffic is carried on these links -- e.g., number of telephone conversations per month?
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
c. How many of these links does NSA (or someone working with NSA) monitor? Allen Kern Moody
d. How many voice communications do you estimate were intercepted in 1974?
e. How many summaries or abstracts were forwarded to NSA headquarters in 1974?
f. How much is sent to NSA analysts?
g. How much is disseminated to other agencies?
h. How much is retained by NSA? How?
i. What specific links does NSA (or someone working with NSA) now monitor? From where?
j. For what reasons?
k. What specific links did NSA (or someone working with NSA) monitor one year ago? From where?
l. For what reasons?
m. Has NSA ever monitored all Trans-Atlantic telephone calls? Trans-Pacific calls?
B. U.S.-South American telephone calls Buffham Kern Moody
- Origin
a. When did the monitoring of these calls begin?
b. If it started other than at Sabana Seca in Puerto Rico, when did the Sabana Seca monitoring start?
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
c. Who proposed it? Buffham Kern Moody
d. Who authorized it?
e. What links were initially monitored?
f. What type of intercept equipment is used at Sabana Seca for these calls?
- Scope
a. Who submitted names?
b. What were the procedures for submitting names?
c. Were names ever submitted by telephone? If so, how often?
d. What justifications were required from the submitting authorities?
e. What was the total number of U.S. citizens on the drug watch list?
f. What was the highest number of U.S. citizens at any one time? When was this?
g. How many telephone conversations were intercepted?
- Value
a. How much product was generated?
(1) In the beginning?
(2) At the high point of monitoring?
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(3) In the two years preceding termination?
b. How valuable was the product? E.g.,
(1) How many seizures of drugs can be directly linked to it?
(2) How many convictions for drug smuggling of
(a) Foreigners?
(b) U.S. citizens?
Witnesses
Relevant Documents
Buffham Kern Moody Banner
EO 3.3b(1)
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
g. If so, with what conclusions? Why? Buffham Kern Moody Banner
Termination of drug watch list a. When did NSA discontinue its drug watch list activity? b. Why? c. Who in NSA decided to terminate the activity? Who was consulted before the decision -- e.g., Director, Deputy Director?
Continued monitoring of [ ] etc. at Sabana Seca? a. Why did NSA continue to monitor the New York-Montevideo link at Sabana Seca after termination of the drug watch list? b. What other voice links with one U.S. terminal continued to be monitored at Sabana Seca? c. What were the results of continued monitoring? E.g., (1) Amount of product (2) Number of prosecutions (3) Other information d. When was this monitoring terminated?
EO 3.3b(3) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
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e. By whom?
f. For what reasons?
g. Does NSA have any formal policy that would prohibit resumption of this U.S.-South American monitoring? If so, what is the policy and in what documents is it stated?
- Destruction of files
a. Were the watch list, product, and other documents about this activity destroyed?
b. When?
c. Who authorized it? When did the Director and Deputy Director become knowledgeable?
d. Why the destruction?
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
III. Non-Voice Intercepts Allen Kern A. General capabilities
- Total international lines of communications (ILC)? a. How many non-voice links are used in international lines of communication? b. What kind of traffic is carried over these links -- e.g., telexes, computer data? c. How much traffic is carried on these links -- e.g., number of telexes per month? d. How many international links are monitored? e. How much international non-voice traffic does NSA (or someone working with NSA) intercept? E.g., in 1974. f. How much is forwarded to NSA headquarters? E.g., in 1974. g. How much is sent to NSA analysts? h. How much is disseminated to other agencies? By types of dissemination? i. How much is retained by NSA? How?
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
- ILCs with one terminal in United States a. How many of these non-voice links are used in international lines of communica- tion? b. How much traffic is carried on these links -- e.g., number of telexes per month? c. How many of these links does NSA (or someone working with NSA) monitor? d. How much of this non-voice traffic does NSA intercept? E.g., in 1974. e. How much is forwarded to NSA headquarters? E.g., in 1974. f. How much is sent to NSA analysts? g. How much is disseminated to other agencies? By types of dissemination? h. How much is retained by NSA? How?
B. Watch Lists Buffham
- Before October 1967 Kern Iredell a. Origin (i) When was the first watch list es- tablished?
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
(2) By whom? Buffham (3) For what purpose? Kerns Iredell (4) Were any Americans on these lists? Who? When?
(5) Why were they put on these lists?
(6) Which agencies were involved in submitting names for the watch lists? (a) FBI (b) CIA (c) DIA (d) Military Services (e) Secret Service/Treasury (f) State Department (g) Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (h) White House (i) State or local police (j) NSA Office of Security (k) Others
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| Issues | Witnesses | Relevant Documents |
|---|---|---|
| (7) Did the Director or Deputy Director know about these watch lists? If so, when? Did they have to approve each name that was included? Each American citizen that was included? | Buffham Kern Iredell |
|
| (8) When did the Office of Security first submit names? | ||
| (9) Were any names submitted by telephone? Why (i.e., was there a rush)? By whom? How many? What names? | ||
| 2. After October 1967 and Before 1 July 1969 | Buffham Kern Moody Iredell Yarborough |
|
| a. Was the Yarborough cable the first time that NSA was tasked to place names of U.S. citizens and groups associated with black and antiwar movements on the watch list? | ||
| b. Who authored General Carter's 10/21/67 telegram reply to General Yarborough? | ||
| c. What was included on the watch list as a result of Yarborough's telegram? | ||
| d. What other new measures, if any, were taken in response to the Yarborough telegram? | ||
| e. Did anyone in NSA communicate orally with Yarborough concerning the telegram? If so, what happened? | ||
| f. Were there any meetings within NSA resulting from the Yarborough cable? If so, who was present? What came out of those meetings? |
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
g. Were there any meetings with other agencies as a result of the Yarborough cable? If so, who was present? What came out of those meetings? Buffham Kern Moody Iredell Yarborough
h. Which agencies submitted names of U.S. citizens to the watch list as a result of the Yarborough cable? (See list in Section 1, above, page twelve.)
i. Who had to approve the inclusion of the name of any U.S. citizen? The Director or Deputy Director?
j. Do you know what person or agency put together the roughly-typed four-page memorandum in the watch list files?
k. When was it prepared?
l. How was this memorandum used? Were the names and organizations listed in the memorandum put on the watch list? Which ones?
m. Were any names submitted by telephone? Why? By whom? How many? What were the names? When was the last time this happened.
- MINARET (post 1 July 1969) Buffham Kern Iredell Moody
a. Charter (1) Who prepared it? Who suggested that it be prepared? (2) Who was consulted within NSA?
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Doc ID: 6571846 TOP SECRET VERY SENSITIVE TS//COMINT Page Fifteen Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents (3) Who was consulted from other agencies or from the White House? Buffham Kern Iredell Moody (4) Who approved it within NSA? (5) Who approved it from other agencies or from the White House? (6) What were the reasons for it? (7) Was the legality of the intercept program questioned during this period? If so, by whom? With what result? (8) Why was the intercept program suddenly considered so sensitive? b. Targets. For each of the illustrative product examples (Times, McIntire, Abernathy, Hersh): (1) Why were these communiques intercepted? (2) Who submitted the requirements that resulted in their interception? (3) How was the information used or disseminated after interception? c. Scope (1) Who submitted names? (a) FBI (b) CIA HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
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(c) DIA (d) Military Services (e) Secret Services/Treasury (f) State Department (g) BNDD (h) White House or NSC (i) State or local police (j) NSA Office of Security (k) Others
(2) What justifications were required from submitting authorities?
(3) What were the procedures for sub- mitting names?
(4) Were any names submitted by tele- phone? Why? By whom? How many? What names?
- Overall Scope of Watch List
a. How many total entries of U.S. citizens were on the watch list from its start through its termination?
b. What was the greatest number of U.S. citi- zens on the watch list at any one time? When?
Witnesses
Buffham Kern Iredell Moody
Relevant Documents
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
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c. How much product was generated per month on average in 1971-1973? Buffham Kern Iredell Moody (1) For NSA analysts? (2) Disseminated to other agencies? (3) Retained by NSA?
d. How valuable was the product? E.g., (1) Give two or three examples of its greatest value.
e. When did the General Counsel's Office first become aware of the watch list activity? What actions did it take? Banner
- Watch List Product a. Collating intercepted material Kern Iredell Moody (1) What criteria were used to decide which messages were worth processing? (a) Were all "hits" processed and reports typed up on them? (b) If not, were there any key individuals or groups about whom a transcript or gist was always prepared? (c) Who were they? E.g., Venceremos Brigade?
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Issues
Witnesses
Relevant Documents
(2) How was the biographic information obtained that was included on the watch list product?
Kein Iredell Moody Tracy
Muckler to Washlock 6/18/70
(a) Who compiled the footnotes?
(b) Did NSA have biographic information for everyone on the watch list?
(c) Did NSA also use the biographic information for individuals and groups mentioned in the messages who were not on the watch list?
(d) Did these include:
- Members of Congress
- Executive Branch officials
- Business persons
- Professors
- Labor leaders
- Other radicals who were celebrities
- Any others
(e) Did you also acquire information from other agencies that was included on the watch list product? If so, from which agencies? About which individuals?
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b. Disseminating the product Kern Iredell Moody (1) What criteria were used to decide which messages were disseminated to which agencies? (2) In what different ways was the information disseminated? (3) Were any agencies barred from receiving a certain type of material? If so, describe. (4) Did any agencies not want to receive material on particular individuals or groups? If so, describe. (5) Why did you have to send out your 5/7/70 memorandum requesting that all agencies reaffirm their interest in the watch list product? (a) Who suggested that memorandum? (b) Who approved that memorandum? (c) What was the response? (d) Was there any question of the product's utility at that time?
- Termination Buffham Kern Iredell Moody Banner a. When did any official in the Department of Justice, besides the FBI, become aware that the names of U.S. citizens were on the watch list? Mitchell? How? What was the reaction?
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Issues Witnesses Relevant Documents
b. When did NSA stop putting U.S. names (except for the very limited 4-5 entries from the Secret Service) on the watch list? Buffham Kern Iredell Moody Banner
c. Why were the U.S. names so eliminated?
(1) Who proposed it first -- NSA, the Department of Justice, others?
(2) What legal issues and cases were involved?
d. Who are the remaining U.S. citizens/entities on the watch list? Who requested their inclusion?
- File destruction
a. When were the watch list materials destroyed? For which years?
b. Why?
c. Who authorized their destruction?
d. Who was consulted? When did the Director or Deputy Director know?
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IV. Files on U.S. Citizens/Entities A. Biographic files
- Were files maintained by C-5 on U.S. citizens?
- When did this practice begin?
- Why was it done?
- Criteria for inclusion of U.S. names?
- How many files on U.S. citizens were there at maximum point? Total over time?
- Specific names? a. Members of Congress b. Executive Branch officials c. Political activists (1) Left-wing (2) Black d. News media persons e. Professors f. Business persons g. Labor leaders
Kern Moody Tracy
CS Rhyming Dictionary
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h. Celebrities -- e.g., movie stars i. Others 7. Sources of materials on citizens? a. Open sources -- e.g., newspapers? b. From within NSA (1) SIGINT (a) Were any of these U.S. citizens' communications intentionally intercepted by the Agency? E.g., watch list, MINARET. (b) If not intentional, how? (2) NSA Office of Security -- e.g., background investigations (3) NSA Office of Personnel c. From agencies outside NSA? (1) FBI (2) CIA (3) DIA (4) Military Services (5) Secret Service/Treasury
Witnesses
Kern Moody Tracy
Relevant Documents
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(6) State Department (7) BNDD (8) State or local police 8. Who had access? a. Within NSA (1) SIGINT analysts (2) Office of Security (3) Office of Personnel (4) Others b. Outside NSA (1) FBI (2) CIA (3) DIA (4) Military Services (5) Secret Service/Treasury (6) State Department (7) BNDD (8) Civil Service Commission (9) White House or NSC
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(10) State or local law enforcement agencies
(11) Private parties (a) Potential employers of former NSA personnel (b) Others
- Do these files still exist? a. When destroyed? b. Why destroyed? c. Who ordered destruction? Who consulted prior to destruction?
B. Organizations files 1. Are they maintained on U.S. organizations? 2. Have they been in the past? 3. When did this practice begin? 4. Why was it done? 5. Criteria for including specific U.S. organizations? 6. How many files on U.S. organizations at maximum point? Total over time?
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- Kinds of U.S. organizations included? a. Political parties b. Political groups (1) Leftist (2) Black c. Corporations (1) Oil companies, e.g., (a) Exxon (2) Other companies d. Labor unions e. Social clubs, fraternities, civic associations, etc.
- Sources of materials on organizations? a. Open sources -- e.g., newspapers? b. From within NSA (1) SIGINT (a) Were any of these organizations' communications intentionally intercepted by the Agency? E.g., watch list, MINARET?
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Witnesses
Relevant Documents
(b) If not intentional, how? (2) Office of Security -- e.g., background investigations (3) Office of Personnel c. From outside NSA (1) Federal agencies (2) State or local law enforcement agencies (3) Others 9. Who had access? a. Within NSA. (1) SIGINT analysts (2) Office of Security (3) Office of Personnel (4) Others
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b. Outside NSA (1) FBI (2) CIA (3) DIA (4) Military Services (5) Secret Service/Treasury (6) State Department (7) BNDD (8) State or local police (9) Private parties (a) Competitor corporations 10. When were files destroyed? a. What reason for destruction? b. Who ordered destruction? Who was consulted prior to destruction?
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Issues Legal Authority A. Does NSA have a legislative charter? What statutes?
- 10 U.S.C. 133(d)?
- 18 U.S.C. 798 (Divulgence of COMINT)?
- 18 U.S.C. 952 (Divulgence of foreign diplomats' communications)?
- PL 88-290 (Personnel security)?
- Appropriations acts?
- 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (Omnibus Act's national security proviso)?
- Any others? B. Do Executive Branch Directives provide NSA's charter?
- NSCID 6 a. What does the "technical and intelligence information" definition of COMINT include? (1) Military intelligence? (2) Political intelligence? (3) International trade? (4) Law enforcement collection?
Witnesses Banner
Buffham Banner Kern Moody
Relevant Documents Allen House Testimony
Banner Memorandum
Banner Memorandum Bartimo Memorandum
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ssues Witnesses Relevant Documents
(b) If not, how justify watch list for BNDD?
Buffham Banner Kerns Moody
Houston Memorandum
EO 3.3b(1)
(5) Others
- DCID 6/3
a. Does the definition of "foreign communications" permit NSA to monitor:
(1) Communications between a foreign citizen inside the U.S. and a foreign citizen outside the U.S.?
(a) If not, how justify watch list product? E.g., Arab student groups.
(2) Communications between a foreign citizen inside the U.S. and a U.S. citizen outside the U.S.?
(3) Communications between a U.S. citizen inside the U.S. and a foreign citizen outside the U.S.?
(a) If not, how justify watch list product? E.g., Abernathy communications.
Banner Memorandum Bartimo Memorandum
Product
Product
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| Issues | Witnesses | Relevant Documents |
|---|---|---|
| (4) Communications between a U.S. citizen inside the U.S. and a U.S. citizen outside the U.S.? | Buffham Banner Kerns Moody |
|
| (a) If not, how justify watch list product? E.g., Dellinger to Dellinger, Cleaver to Cleaver. | Product | |
| (5) Communications between two foreign citizens, both within the U.S.? | ||
| (a) If so, should the charter be amended to eliminate this? | ||
| (6) Communications between a U.S. citizen and a foreign citizen, both within the U.S.? | ||
| (a) If so, should the charter be amended to eliminate this? | ||
| C. Do statutory prohibitions on wiretapping apply to NSA? | Banner | |
| 1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968? | 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520 | |
| a. General issues | ||
| (1) Does any or all of the communications monitoring apparatus in the possession or control of the National Security Agency constitute an "electronic, mechanical, or other device," as defined in § 2510(5) of the Act? |
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b. Voice communications (1) Are the voice communications monitored by NSA "intercepted" within the meaning of § 2510(4) of the Act (including the issue of whether they are aurally "acquired") in the following cases? Assume in all cases that at least one terminal of the communication is located in the U.S. (a) Where an NSA operator simply listens to part of the communication? To all of it? (b) Where an NSA operator makes a summary, or "gist," of the conversation? (c) Where all or part of the communication is recorded? (d) Where a "gist" of the communication is forwarded to NSA for analysis? (e) Where the recording of the communication is forwarded to NSA for analysis? (f) Where a "gist" of the communication is forwarded to consumer agencies by NSA? (g) Where a transcript of the communication is forwarded to consumer agencies by NSA?
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(2) For each of the above cases in which an interception has taken place within the definition of the Act, is the interception "willful," within the meaning of § 2511 of the Act, where:
(a) A U.S. name is keyword and that person is a party to the communication?
(b) A U.S. name is keyword and that person is not a party to the communication, but the communication is nevertheless intercepted because the name is mentioned?
(c) No U.S. name is keyword, but a U.S. citizen is a party to the communication, and the communication is intercepted because another keyword is mentioned?
(d) No U.S. name is keyword and that person is not a party to the communication, but the communication is nevertheless intercepted because another keyword is mentioned?
c. Non-voice communications: Are the non-voice communications monitored by NSA "intercepted" within the meaning of § 2510(4) of the Act in the following cases? Assume in all cases that at least one terminal of the communication is in the U.S. Address the issue of whether the communication is:
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(a) "acquired," and (b) whether the communication is acquired "aurally."
(1) Where the communication is susceptible to comprehension through the use of the human ear (e.g.; the case of a simple telegram sent in Morse code), whether or not the human ear is actually used in the monitoring: (a) Where the communication is transcribed onto a paper tape? (b) Where the communication is further transcribed onto a magnetic tape? (c) Where the communication is cabled to NSA for analysis? (d) Where the communication is printed out at the interception site, at NSA, or elsewhere? (e) Where a transcript or summary of the communication is forwarded to consumer agencies?
(2) Where the communication is not susceptible to comprehension through the use of the human ear? Address the same issues for each of the same questions as listed above, (1)(a)-(e).
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(4) Are any of the non-voice communications monitored by NSA "wire communications" within the meaning of § 2510(1) of the Act?
(5) For each of the above cases in which an "interception" has taken place, is the interception "willful" in each of the sets of circumstances set out under C.1.b.(2), above?
- Federal Communications Act of 1934? What effect in the following cases?
a. Voice communications?
(1) Ship-to-ship radio broadcasts in U.S. waters?
(2) Ship-to-U.S. shore telephone calls?
(3) Radio-telephone calls?
(4) Telephone calls traveling at some point by radio?
b. Non-voice communications?
(1) Ship-to-ship code transmissions in U.S. waters?
47 U.S.C. 605
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(2) Short-wave private radio broadcasts? Banner
(3) Telegrams, telexes, etc?
D. Do constitutional prohibitions (Fourth Amendment) on wiretapping restrict NSA monitoring? Banner House Testimony
- Is warrantless monitoring for national security purposes constitutional? Petersen 9/7/73 Memorandum to Kelly
a. Effect of Keith case (need warrant for domestic group seeking to influence or change U.S. Government by unlawful means)? Kelly 9/10/73 Memorandum to Petersen
(1) Justification for warrantless surveillance of SNCC? Black Panthers? Women's Strike for Peace? Clergy and Laymen Concerned? Vietnam Veterans Against the War? Richardson 10/1/73 Letter to Allen (and similar letters to other agencies)
b. Effect of Zweibon case (need warrant for domestic group affecting U.S. foreign relations and seeking to change policies of a foreign power)?
(1) Justification for warrantless surveillance of JDL, Meir Kahane, and Zweibon himself?
- If a warrant is required in national security cases, does this apply to:
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a. Voice communications?
(1) Where U.S. name is keyword, where that person is a party to the communication, and the communication is intercepted? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
(2) Where U.S. name is keyword, where that person is not a party to the communication, and where the intercepted communication has at least one terminal in the United States? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
(3) Where no U.S. name is keyword, where a U.S. citizen is party to the communication, and the communication is intercepted because another keyword is mentioned? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
(4) Where no U.S. name is keyword, where that person is not a party to the communication, where the communication has at least one terminal in the U.S., and the communication is intercepted because another keyword is mentioned? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
b. Non-voice communications (i.e., does the Constitution protect telegrams, telexes, etc.)?
(1) Where U.S. name is keyword, where that person is a party to the communication, and the communication is intercepted? Printed
Witnesses
Relevant Documents Banner House Testimony
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(2) Where U.S. name is keyword, where that person is not a party to the communication, and where the intercepted communication has at least one terminal in the United States? Printed out? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
(3) Where no U.S. name is keyword, where a U.S. citizen is party to the communication, and the communication is intercepted because another keyword is mentioned? Printed out? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
(4) Where no U.S. name is keyword, where that person is not a party to the communication, where the communication has at least one terminal in the U.S., and the communication is intercepted because another keyword is mentioned? Printed out? Given to NSA analysts? Distributed to outside agencies?
E. Factual Questions Bartimo Memorandum
- Have you ever prepared any memoranda on the lawfulness of: a. monitoring links with one terminal in the U.S.? b. the watch list activity?
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If not, why not?
If so, identify the memoranda. What conclusions were reached?
What is your present evaluation of the lawfulness of the watch list activity with U.S. names on the list? Of [illegible]............................EO 3.3b(1)
F. Future Charter Allen Buffham Banner NSCID 6 DCID 6/3
- Should NSA have a specific legislative charter? If so,
a. Should it more carefully define "foreign communications"? If so, how?
b. "Foreign intelligence"? If so, how?
c. "National security"? If so, how?
d. Other?
Should there be any other legislative changes? E.g., in Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act? If so, how?
Should there be changes in the NSCID and relevant DCIDs? If so, how?
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu