Memorandum for the record by Robert J. Tracy, "Interview of Mr. Robert Tracy by the Senate Select Committee for the Investigation of Intelligence," 28 August 1975, Secret, excised copy
National Security Archive
Tracy’s 1975 Senate interview reveals how the NSA quietly compiled and later destroyed biographic files on U.S. officials, exposing a domestic surveillance practice hidden within a foreign‑signals agency.
Source: Memorandum for the record by Robert J. Tracy, "Interview of Mr. Robert Tracy by the Senate Select Committee for the Investigation of Intelligence," 28 August 1975, Secret, excised copy Date: Aug 28, 1975 Collection: National Security Agency Tracking of U.S. Citizens – “Questionable Practices” from 1960s & 1970s Sep 25, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Window into NSA’s “U.S. Biographic Files”
On 28 August 1975, Robert J. Tracy—then chief of the International Information Division at the NSA’s Central Information Center—sat in a hotel conference room and answered a series of questions from two Senate staffers, Eric Richard and Peter Fenn. The interview was recorded for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the body that would later author the infamous “Church Committee” reports. Tracy’s testimony, classified at the time and now released in a heavily redacted form, offers a rare, inside‑looking glimpse at a little‑known NSA activity: the systematic collection of biographical data on U.S. citizens and officials.
The immediate trigger for the interview was the Committee’s 1974‑75 investigation into “questionable practices” by the intelligence community. Lawmakers had learned that the NSA, an agency whose charter focuses on foreign signals intelligence, maintained extensive domestic files—seven or eight cabinets of personal data on politicians, diplomats, and even activists. The Committee wanted to know how those files were created, who authorized them, and why they were later destroyed.
The broader episode: domestic surveillance in the post‑Vietnam era
Tracy’s statements belong to the larger narrative of the 1960‑70s intelligence expansion, a period when the Cold War’s global anxieties spilled over into domestic monitoring. Following the 1964 Freedom of Information Act and the 1970s revelations about COINTELPRO, public scrutiny of government spying intensified. The Senate’s investigation culminated in the 1975 Church Committee hearings, which exposed illegal FBI and CIA operations and led to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. NSA’s biographic files, though less notorious than CIA mind‑control projects, illustrate how the agency’s technical capabilities were repurposed for internal political intelligence.
Who is speaking, and what does his language reveal?
Tracy describes himself as a “Chief, International Information Division” responsible for “U.S. Biographic Files.” He emphasizes procedural details—alphabetical filing, reliance on SIGINT products, State Department cables, and open‑source directories—while repeatedly noting that the files never contained FBI material. His calm, matter‑of‑fact tone masks the gravity of the content: the files listed presidents, secretaries of state, and senators, and even hinted at activists like Bella Abzug. When pressed about legality, Tracy flatly states he never considered the files unlawful and saw no internal debate. The lack of any mention of legal counsel or Justice Department guidance suggests a culture of operational autonomy, where the mere utility of the data justified its existence.
The interview also uncovers “Project MILLSTREAM,” a joint NSA‑CIA arrangement that effectively outsourced the biographic function to a shared “open‑source” service. Tracy notes that once MILLSTREAM was operational, the NSA division’s workload dwindled, leading to the files’ destruction in October 1974 after a series of office moves. He attributes the decision to “manpower not worth the effort,” yet the timing—just before the Senate’s probe—raises questions about whether the destruction was an attempt to erase evidence of a potentially illegal domestic intelligence program.
What the record tells us, beyond the surface
Several points emerge from Tracy’s testimony that are not explicit in the declassified text but are strongly implied:
- A hybrid intelligence model – The NSA combined foreign SIGINT with domestic biographical data, blurring the agency’s statutory mandate. By cataloguing U.S. officials alongside foreign subjects, the division created a searchable repository that could be tapped for any internal need.
- Inter‑agency complacency – Both CIA and NSA appear to have assumed the other would not need the files, leading to a mutual “no‑need‑to‑share” stance. This tacit agreement allowed the NSA to maintain a domestic database without formal oversight.
- Administrative opacity – Tracy could not identify who ordered the final destruction, indicating a lack of clear chain‑of‑command documentation for such a sensitive action.
- Potential political sensitivity – The mention of high‑profile names (e.g., Secretary Kissinger, Senator Kennedy) hints that the files could have been used for political leverage, even if Tracy denies any direct use for “special reports.”
Legacy and relevance today
The NSA’s biographic files episode foreshadows contemporary debates over bulk data collection and the blending of foreign and domestic surveillance. The 1975 destruction of the cabinets did not erase the institutional memory that an intelligence agency could, and did, compile dossiers on its own citizens. Modern revelations about the NSA’s PRISM program and the 2013 Snowden disclosures echo the same tension between national security imperatives and civil liberties.
By examining Tracy’s interview, historians can trace how bureaucratic inertia, inter‑agency competition, and a culture of secrecy enabled a covert domestic intelligence function to exist under the guise of foreign signal work. The document’s redactions remind us that even decades later, the full scope of such programs remains partially hidden, underscoring the ongoing need for vigilant oversight.
The memorandum, dated 28 August 1975 and classified as Secret, was produced for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s investigation into intelligence community practices. It was declassified in 2017 as part of the NSA’s “Questionable Practices” collection.
Doc ID: 6571846 SECRET PL 86-36/50 USC 3605
28 August 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Robert Tracy by the Senate Select Committee for the Investigation of Intelligence.
DATE: 28 August 1975, 0930 hours
PLACE: Carroll Arms Hotel
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Eric Richard and Mr. Peter Fenn of the Senate Staff, Mr. Robert Tracy, NSA/C52 and NSA monitor.
QUESTIONS: Mr. Richard
Q - What is your position title?
A - Chief, International Information Division, Central Information Center
Q - How long have you been in this position?
A - March 1971 to present.
Q - Were you responsible for U.S. Biographic Files?
A - Yes.
Q - How many file cabinets?
A - Seven or eight.
Q - Did you have other biographic files?
A - Yes. Active on Communist China, North and South Korea, Southeast Asian countries. Inactive on "Project MILLSTREAM" countries all of which were destroyed except Middle East/North Africa.
Q - How were U. S. files arranged?
A - Alphabetical.
Q - In U. S. files were government officials separated from private citizens?
A - No.
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Q - What sources of information were in U.S. Files?
A - SIGINT product, State Department Cables, Intelligence Reports, such as, DoD IR's, CIA numbered reports and Press.
Q - Did U. S. Files have information from FBI?
A - No.
Q - Did you receive other reports from FBI or military investigative agencies?
A - No.
Q - Describe Project MILLSTREAM.
A - It was a project agreed to by both Director, NSA and Director, CIA where by CIA/CRS would provide answers to questions from NSA analysts (PROD). In doing this my division would no longer provide this service and billets would become available for work elsewhere.
Q - When did Project MILLSTREAM begin?
A - Thinking and Discussion stage 1969-1970 time frame.
Q - Did CIA ask for NSA files?
A - No. Due to similarity of contents of files they said they didn't want them.
Q - Did CIA want U. S. Files?
A - No. CIA personnel at various times in briefing production personnel on MILLSTREAM implementation said they did not have U. S. files but could answer questions from open-source material such as Who's Who, telephone books, trade directories, etc.
Q - How was information selected for U.S. Files?
A - Based on selection guidance memo (1969) U.S. Personalities.
Q - Where was file located (section)?
A - When I became chief of division in 1971, it was in the Western Hemisphere Branch. This branch was immediately disestablished because its function went under Project MILLSTREAM. The U.S. Files were transferred to the Central Reference Branch.
Q - Who was responsible for the U.S. Files?
A - [Box]
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Q - What made you decide to destroy U.S. Files? and When?
A - They were destroyed Oct 1974. Prior to that they were inactive from Jan 1974. On three ocassions, from mid 1973 thru Oct 1974, my division went through physical moves to consolidate work spaces. On each ocassion, large number of file cabinets were destroyed (inactive MILLSTREAM information).
As more and more Agency analysts came under MILLSTREAM umbrella my division received fewer questions and the usage of the U.S. files showed a decided decrease. We found that of the questions we did receive, we could get answers from Who's Who, telephone directories, trade directories, etc. I then decided that the manpower to process and maintain the files was not worth the effort. When we made our final move in Oct 1974, I discussed the destruction of the files with my Office Chief, Mr. Welday. He approved their destruction at that time.
Q - Who ordered Mr. Welday to destroy the files?
A - I don't know.
Q - Was there ever a discussion at NSA about the legality of the U.S. Files?
A - Not to my knowledge.
Q - Did you consider the files unlawful?
A - No.
Q - Do you know if the Justice Department told NSA to destroy files?
A - No.
Q - Name some high-level people in U.S. Files.
A - President, Sec. Kissinger, Sen. Kennedy, other high-level State Department people, government officials.
Q - Sen. McGovern?
A - I don't know.
Q - Congressmen?
A - Probably.
Q - Bella Abzug?
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A - Probably. I don't know.
Q - If Sen Kennedy went to Hanoi and sent a message home, would that be in file?
A - No.
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Q - Would you have messages from U.S. citizens in file? A - No. Q - Mr. Tracy, are you familiar with Black Panthers, other activitists organizations? Did you keep information on any of them? A - Not to my knowledge. Familiarity, yes--as an Information Specialist I'm interested in current affairs and naturally, when they were making headlines I read about them. Mr. FENN: Q - Mr. Tracy, would you ever use information in files on individuals to compile a special report? A - No. My business is to answer spot questions, this is identifications like proper spell of surname, individual occupation, where located, nationality, etc. At this point, [redacted] interjected and said "that as a former customer of my division services, when he was a translator, he would call my organization when at a certain point he was at a standstill, like he thought he had a name, we were called upon to assist him. If we were successful it would greatly add to his product and help him crib further to finish the message. Questions of this nature came to Bob's division from all over the Agency." Mr. RICHARD Q - What services did you provide M5? A - We handled check list queries. Q - How did you do this? A - We received in sealed envelopes the queries. When I became Chief of the division, they were sent to an employee in one of my branches. She would search the files to see if she could find information on the person's name, address, nationality, etc. If information was found, a notation was placed on back of form along with the proper source of that information. The check lists were then mailed by this person to M5. Q - Who took care of these queries? A - [redacted] She handled the M5 queries from March 1971 until she left the Agency in Feb 1974. She was a part-time employee working only two days a week. Approximately 4 of her 16 hours was devoted to these checks. Toward the end of her time with us little success was attained in getting information. One statistic I remember was only 3 hits with info out of 192 queries (Dec 1973). Her branch chief had asked on different ocassions that we stop this service. HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE ONLY
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Q - After she left, how did you handle the M5 requests?
A - In early 1974, I informed M5 that we could only handle checks on non-MILLSTREAM countries. They understood this. I also asked them to send queries to my attention. This was the first time I'd actually seen a name check query. To my recollection we received only a very few in 1974 and that most of them were Koreans or Southeast Asians. I had them researched in my Southeast Asia/Korea Branch. We received no name checks from M5 after January 1975.
Q - Can you describe the Rhyming Dictionary and in what form do you have it?
A - Yes. It is on cartridge microfilm for the years 1958 to 1970. Mag tape 1970-1973. The years 1970 to 1973 is slated to be placed on cartridge film. There will be three sorts. One alphabetical by surname, one by reverse sort of surname, and one by surname with given name. Nationality appeared with each line entry.
Q - Could all U.S. entries be separated out into ine listing?
A - I believe this could be accomplished by computer people.
This I believed was the last question asked.
Robert J. Tracy ROBERT J. TRACY Chief, C52
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