Looking Forward in Chile, Secret
National Security Archive
A declassified CIA memo from September 1973 reveals how Washington prepared to shape Chile’s post‑coup future, balancing anti‑communist goals with corporate interests.
Source: Looking Forward in Chile, Secret Date: Sep 11, 1973 Archive: CIA Collection: Chile: Secrets of State Sep 11, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Anticipating the Aftermath of a Coup
On 11 September 1973, barely two weeks after the Chilean military seized power, a CIA memorandum titled Looking Forward in Chile was drafted. The document is a classic example of Washington’s real‑time contingency planning: it lists the kinds of requests the new junta might make—recognition, arms, economic aid, food, medical supplies, and “administrative expertise”—and then sketches the variables that would shape the United States’ response. The memo was produced by analysts who were in close contact with the coup plotters and who had been monitoring the Allende government’s collapse for months. Their job was not to predict the future but to give senior policymakers a menu of options that could be calibrated once the junta’s intentions and popular reception were clearer.
The Coup’s Place in Cold‑War Strategy
The September 1973 overthrow was the climax of a decade‑long U.S. campaign to prevent a Marxist government from consolidating in the Western Hemisphere. After the 1970 election of Salvador Allende, the CIA undertook covert actions—funding opposition parties, supporting strikes, and gathering intelligence on the Chilean armed forces. By the spring of 1973, the agency’s focus had shifted from subversion to contingency: what would happen if the military finally acted? The memo therefore belongs to the broader episode of U.S. Cold‑War interventionism in Latin America, a pattern that includes the 1954 Guatemalan coup, the 1964 Brazilian coup, and the 1976 Argentine “Dirty War.” In each case, Washington framed its involvement as a defensive response to perceived Soviet expansion, while simultaneously safeguarding American corporate interests, especially in mining and agriculture.
Who Was Speaking, and What Their Language Reveals
The memorandum is anonymous, but its tone betrays the perspective of senior CIA analysts who had been briefed by Chilean officers such as General Augusto Pinochet and Admiral José Toribio Merino. The language is pragmatic and almost business‑like: “massive economic assistance,” “emergency food and medical supplies,” “administrative expertise.” This reflects a view of the junta not as an ideological ally but as a client state whose stability was a prerequisite for protecting U.S. investments—particularly copper, a sector dominated by American firms like Kennecott and Anaconda. The memo’s emphasis on “compensation for ex‑propriated U.S. investments” underscores how economic restitution was a central negotiating point, even as the document acknowledges that the junta might seek “all nations friendly to Chile.”
Reading Between the Lines
Several passages hint at internal contradictions within the U.S. policy apparatus. While the memo notes that the junta “does not intend to perpetuate itself in power indefinitely,” it also predicts that the military will retain control long enough to draft a new constitution and “hand over the government only when the country has been ‘renewed and made prosperous.’” This suggests that Washington was prepared to tolerate an authoritarian interregnum as long as it delivered economic stability and anti‑communist credentials. Moreover, the analysts concede that “the plans formulated by military and civilian plotters make no mention of disciplinary or repressive measures,” yet they anticipate “drastic measures” to quell leftist resistance. The subtext is clear: the United States was aware that the junta would likely employ repression, but the memo treats such violence as a necessary, if undesirable, adjunct to the broader strategic goal of eliminating Marxist influence.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
Declassified in 2000, this memo provides a rare glimpse into the decision‑making calculus that guided U.S. support for Pinochet’s regime. It shows that Washington’s assistance was conditional, hinging on the junta’s willingness to protect American property and maintain a semblance of political legitimacy. The document also foreshadows the later “Chicago Boys” reforms that transformed Chile into a neoliberal laboratory—a trajectory that began with the very economic assistance the memo anticipates. For scholars of Cold‑War history, the memo illustrates how intelligence agencies blended geopolitical imperatives with corporate interests, a pattern that resurfaces in contemporary debates over U.S. involvement in authoritarian regimes.
In sum, Looking Forward in Chile is more than a bureaucratic forecast; it is a window onto the pragmatic, often morally ambiguous, calculations that underpinned American foreign policy during the height of the Cold War. Its lessons reverberate today as policymakers grapple with the trade‑offs between strategic objectives and human rights concerns in volatile regions.
[SECRET] [507] 11 September 1973
MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Looking Forward in Chile
Assuming that the military junta is reasonably successful in gaining substantial control of Chile, the U.S. Government can anticipate urgent requests for (a) diplomatic recognition, (b) substantial military assistance to control disorders and terrorist activities initiated by the UP and far leftist groups, (c) massive economic assistance to cope with a badly deteriorated economy, (d) emergency food and medical supplies and (e) some form of administrative expertise to help the new government function more efficiently.
U.S. reaction to these requests must be governed by a number of factors which cannot be predicted at the present time. These include the following:
a. The new government's degree of effective control of national territory including popular reaction to the coup. This would include immediate leftist responses, which could range from armed leftist resistance to a non-violent show of strength through strike action, the occupation of factories, and street demonstrations. We can anticipate that the smaller, more extremist leftist groups such as the MIR, VOP, and hardline Socialist Party youth elements will react violently even if most Communist and Socialist leaders choose an initial course of passive resistance.
b. The domestic policies announced by the new government, most specifically whether the government is to be essentially a caretaker regime pending new national elections, or whether it intends to remain in power indefinitely. Only in the latter case could the new government be
[Approved for Release July 2000] [SECRET]
SECRET -2- expected to make significant political and economic decisions; on the other hand, the opposition political parties, and particularly the PDC, might withhold or deny their support to a military government which did not promise new elections at least by 1976, when Allende's term is due to expire.
c. The foreign policy of the new government, particularly with regard to bilateral issues with the U.S., including compensation for expropriated U.S. investments.
- Previous reporting from who were working closely with military coup plotters indicates that the probable actions of military leaders in the aftermath of a successful coup would be as follows:
a. Establishment of a new cabinet composed of military leaders and civilian "technocrats" who are experts in their respective fields. These civilians may be members of opposition political parties but they are not party leaders.
b. The new government will maintain control of all basic resources, of the financial system and of the fundamental productive units of the economy. Although the government thus intends to play a key role in guiding the economy through central planning, it will also encourage free enterprise and provide clear guarantees for legitimate personal property.
c. In the first stages the state will channel the basic part of its investment effort into the agricultural and mining fields. There will be a rapid assignment of individual property titles for land expropriated by the Allende government, and guarantees for agrarian property in the future. The state will provide massive aid to the peasants for machinery, supplies, etc., and will adopt a realistic price structure for agricultural products. The government will also give priority attention to providing new financial;
SECRET
SECRET -3- technical and human resources to the mining sector, especially copper, which has been severely damaged and is running at a fraction of its capacity.
Although the plans formulated by military and civilian plotters make no mention of disciplinary or repressive measures, the new government will undoubtedly find it necessary to take firm action to restore and maintain order in rural and urban areas to control terrorism and to gather up the weapons which have been widely issued to military UP groups and organizations. Drastic measures may be necessary to restore workers discipline and increase production. Extremist organizations of both the left and right would probably be outlawed, and possibly the Communist Party as well.
The opposition parties, having accepted the successful coup, may become increasingly disgruntled if it becomes apparent that the military do not intend to turn the government over to them in the near future. Their protests are, however, likely to be taken grumblings, especially if the new government is successful in restoring order and in rebuilding the economy.
The military government does not intend to perpetuate itself in power indefinitely, but neither does it intend to return the government immediately to the same political parties which the military believe have been responsible for the country's acute national problems. The military apparently hopes to retain power long enough to rebuild the nation's political, economic and social systems, to formulate a new constitution, submit this new constitution for approval in a plebiscite, and to hand over the government only when the country has been "renewed and made prosperous."
The military will seek the aid of "all nations friendly to Chile" in this effort. In practical terms, they will certainly seek and expect a major part of this assistance to come from the United States. They will probably make special efforts to work out current problems, including some form of compensation for U.S. copper interests.
In considering what action might be taken to assist the new military government, it would appear highly desirable to
SECRET
SECRET -4- encourage the Chileans to seek early support from [illegible] SECRET
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