Report on Actions to be Taken by New Junta

Source: Report on Actions to be Taken by New Junta Date: Sep 11, 1973 Archive: CIA Collection: Chile: Secrets of State Sep 11, 2017

Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Blueprint for Authoritarian Consolidation

The declassified CIA “Report on Actions to be Taken by New Junta” is a terse internal memorandum dated 11 September 1973, drafted in the immediate wake of the Chilean military coup that toppled President Salvador Allende on 11 September 1973. The document lists, point‑by‑point, the policies the newly installed military junta intended to implement. It was produced by the Directorate of Operations and circulated among U.S. intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, etc.) as an “information report, not finally evaluated intelligence,” indicating that Washington’s analysts were still assessing the reliability of the source—likely a Chilean officer or a member of the coup leadership.

The memo arrives at a pivotal moment in Cold War Latin America. The United States, still reeling from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Revolution, had for years pursued a policy of containment that increasingly relied on covert support for right‑wing regimes willing to suppress leftist movements. In Chile, the Allende government’s democratic but socialist agenda, its nationalization of copper mines, and its alignment with the Soviet bloc had made it a focal point of U.S. concern. The coup, orchestrated by General Augusto Pinochet and his fellow commanders, was tacitly welcomed in Washington, and the CIA’s rapid production of this report reflects an effort to map the junta’s political roadmap for future U.S. engagement.

The actors named in the document reveal both the junta’s internal power dynamics and the United States’ expectations. The reference to “the new director of the Department of Investigations will be retired Carabinero General Desiderio Herrera” signals a purge of civilian police leadership in favor of military control. The explicit pledge to “follow the Brazilian model” situates Pinochet’s regime within a broader pattern of Latin American dictatorships that borrowed constitutional frameworks from Brazil’s 1964‑85 authoritarian period. The plan to rotate the presidency among the armed forces and to abolish the existing Congress while eventually establishing a “bi‑cameral congress” under a new constitution demonstrates a calculated balance between outright military rule and the façade of civilian legitimacy.

Reading between the lines, the report’s emphasis on a plebiscite for a new constitution and on “senatorial elections” suggests that the junta anticipated international criticism and sought a veneer of popular consent. The insistence on expelling “all foreign terrorists” and breaking relations with Cuba aligns with U.S. anti‑communist rhetoric and provides a pretext for cracking down on domestic dissent, especially labor unions—evidenced by the declaration that the Chilean Confederation of Labor would be illegal. The mention of a “law of immobility” (presumably a statute restricting civil servants’ ability to change employment) and its abolition hints at an effort to purge the bureaucracy of Allende loyalists while simultaneously offering a limited concession to moderate elements.

Why does this three‑page memo matter today? First, it offers a rare, contemporaneous snapshot of the junta’s self‑described agenda, revealing how the architects of the Pinochet regime framed their authoritarian project in terms of legal reform, institutional restructuring, and anti‑terrorism. Second, the document underscores the extent to which U.S. intelligence agencies were monitoring, and arguably shaping, the post‑coup political calculus. The fact that the report was classified as “Secret” and retained for decades before release in 1999 illustrates the lingering sensitivity surrounding U.S. involvement in Chile’s dark transition.

The legacy of the policies enumerated here is stark. The 1980 Constitution—drafted under Pinochet’s direct supervision—embodied many of the structural changes foreshadowed in the memo, cementing military dominance while promising a controlled return to civilian rule. The outlawing of the CUT and the systematic repression of labor activists contributed to a climate of fear that persisted for years. Moreover, the break with Cuba and the alignment with Brazil’s authoritarian playbook reinforced a regional network of right‑wing regimes that collectively shaped Latin America’s political landscape throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

In sum, the CIA’s “Report on Actions to be Taken by New Junta” is more than a bureaucratic checklist; it is a window onto the strategic thinking of both Chile’s new rulers and the United States at a moment when the Cold War’s ideological battle was being fought on the streets of Santiago. Its declassification invites scholars and the public to reassess the calculated steps that turned a democratic experiment into one of the 20th century’s most notorious dictatorships.

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS
STATE/INR NMCC/NMC DIA CIA/NACC NIC NSA TREAS IRS ONI CES
{SY/I/PIB} {ASETO}
EXO SS/ID FBI SECUR
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
DATE 11 SEPTEMBER 1973
M 1.5 (c)
1.5 (c)
1. ACCORDING TO [illegible] THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA:
A. THE PRESIDENCY OF THE JUNTA WILL BE ROTATED PERIODICALLY AMONG THE ARMED FORCES REPRESENTATIVES.
B. PRESENT CONGRESS WILL BE CLOSED.
C. THE CHILEAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CUT) WILL BE DECLARED ILLEGAL.
D. THE LAW OF IMMOBILITY WILL BE ABOLISHED. THE LAW [illegible]
2546-91- 3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JUN 11 1999
45
A-96