Report on Junta Communique
National Security Archive
A British diplomatic cable from 12 September 1973 reproduces the Chilean junta’s coup communique, revealing how the military framed its seizure of power as a constitutional rescue.
Source: Report on Junta Communique Date: Sep 11, 1973 Archive: British Embassy Collection: Chile: Secrets of State Sep 11, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
The Immediate Context of the September 12 Report
The memo dated 12 September 1973 is a terse diplomatic cable from the British Embassy in Santiago, circulated to Washington, Buenos Aires, Lima, Brasilia, Caracas, Havana and Moscow. Its purpose was to relay the text of a “Junta Communique” that had just been issued by the Chilean military leadership that would soon overthrow President Salvador Allende. The language of the communique is strikingly formulaic: it blames a “grave social, moral and economic crisis” on the civilian government, warns of “paramilitary groups” poised to spark civil war, and declares that the armed forces must assume power to “liberate the country from Marxism.” The British cable treats the document as “unclassified,” indicating that the embassy considered it a matter of open, not secret, diplomatic concern.
The timing is crucial. On 11 September the Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, issued the ultimatum that Allende read on national television that evening. Within hours, the junta seized power, and the next day the British Embassy transmitted the communique to its foreign service network. The cable therefore captures the moment when the coup was still being framed as a constitutional rescue rather than a violent overthrow.
The Coup in the Broader Cold‑War Narrative
Chile’s 1970 election of Allende, a democratically elected Marxist, set off a series of covert U.S. actions aimed at destabilising his government—economic pressure, CIA‑backed strikes, and support for opposition forces. By 1973 the United States, under Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, had openly signalled a willingness to tolerate a military solution. The British document sits squarely within that larger Cold‑War contest, where Latin America was a battleground for ideological influence. The communique’s explicit promise that “workers would not lose the economic benefits so far achieved” was designed to placate domestic labor groups and to pre‑empt international criticism that the coup would reverse Allende’s socialist reforms.
The list of recipients—especially Washington and Moscow—reveals the diplomatic calculus. The United Kingdom, a close U.S. ally, was keeping the United States fully briefed, while also informing the Soviet capital, perhaps as a courtesy under the Vienna Convention’s requirement to notify all accredited missions of significant political developments. The inclusion of Buenos Aires, Lima, Brasilia, Caracas and Havana underscores the regional ripple effect: neighboring governments were being warned that Chile’s internal crisis could spill over borders, a concern reflected in the communique’s warning about “paramilitary groups.”
What the Text Reveals About Junta Strategy
The communique’s five points are more than propaganda; they are a blueprint for immediate control. Point A—demanding the president’s resignation—provides the legal veneer for the coup. Point B frames the military as a liberating force, echoing the rhetoric of “national salvation” used by other Latin American juntas. Point C attempts to co‑opt the working class, a demographic that Allende had mobilised, by assuring them that their material gains would be protected. Point D orders the shutdown of all broadcast media, a classic move to prevent dissent and to monopolise the narrative. Point E urges civilians to stay home, effectively imposing a curfew without explicitly calling it one.
The British cable’s neutral tone—simply reproducing the communique—suggests that the United Kingdom was monitoring the situation without yet committing to a public stance. The fact that the document is marked “unclassified” indicates that the embassy did not consider the content sensitive, perhaps because the junta’s demands were already public knowledge in Santiago’s streets and on television.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The 12 September 1973 cable is a rare snapshot of diplomatic communication that captures the exact moment a democratic government was supplanted by a military regime under the guise of crisis management. It shows how foreign embassies catalogued the language of legitimacy that juntas used to justify their seizures of power. For historians, the cable underscores the importance of diplomatic archives in reconstructing the decision‑making environment of the Cold War’s “Third World” theatres.
Today, as Latin America grapples with renewed debates over civilian‑military relations and the legacy of past dictatorships, the document reminds us that coups are rarely spontaneous; they are preceded by carefully crafted public statements that seek both domestic acceptance and international acquiescence. The British Embassy’s transmission, and the broader network of recipients, illustrate how the global diplomatic system can become a conduit for the diffusion of authoritarian narratives, a pattern that continues to echo in contemporary crises worldwide.
CLAIR REGISTRY No. 18 12 SEP 1973 ALC 1/2 IN SANTIAGO 111500 Z SEPT UNCLASSIFIED TO FLASH FCO TELNO 279 OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1973, INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BUENOS AIRES LIMA, ROUTINE BRASILIA CARACAS HAVANA AND MOSCOW. THIS FOLLOWS FROM K I P T 278 OF 11 SEPTEMBER. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE "JUNTA MILITAR" DECLARED AS FOLLOWS, IN VIEW OF THE GRAVE SOCIAL MORAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY, THE INCAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE DETERIORATING SITUATION AND THE RISE IN THE FORMATION OF PARA- MILITARY GROUPS WHICH THREATENED TO LEAD THE COUNTRY TO CIVIL WAR:- A) THE PRESIDENT MUST HAND OVER HIS AUTHORITY TO THE ARMED FORCES; B) THE ARMED FORCES WERE UNITED TO LIBERATE THE COUNTRY FROM MARXISM; C) THE WORKERS WOULD NOT LOSE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS SO FAR ACHIEVED; D) ALL UP PRESS RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS SHOULD SUSPEND ACTIVITIES IMMEDIATELY; E) THE POPULATION SHOULD STAY AT HOME AND AVOID INCIDENTS. SECONDE DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION L AM D EESD N AM D RES D (AM SECT) IRD MOD INTERNAL OLA ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION LATIN AMERICA INTERNAL &
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu