Darfur: Who Will Apologize?, cable no. Khartoum 1015 , Ron Capp, Foreign Service Officer, State Department
National Security Archive
A 2006 State Department cable warns that fragmented rebel command and weak African Union troops doom Darfur peace talks unless a robust, first‑world force steps in.
Source: Darfur: Who Will Apologize?, cable no. Khartoum 1015 , Ron Capp, Foreign Service Officer, State Department Date: Apr 28, 2006 Archive: U.S. Department of State Virtual Reading Room
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Darfur in 2006: A Diplomatic Reality Check
The cable titled Darfur: Who Will Apologize? was dispatched from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum on April 28, 2006, three years after the Sudanese government’s counter‑insurgency campaign erupted in the western region. Authored by Ron Capp, a Foreign Service Officer with a rare blend of diplomatic and military experience, the memorandum was sent through an “open channel” at the urging of Ambassador Cameron R. Hume. Its purpose was not to brief senior officials—those already had daily situation reports—but to circulate a candid assessment of the peace process to a broader audience within the State Department and, ultimately, to the public via the Virtual Reading Room.
The document lands squarely in the middle of the Abuja peace talks, a Sudan‑U.S.‑backed effort that began in 2004 and aimed to forge a comprehensive settlement between the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed militias, and the two main rebel coalitions: the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). By 2006 the talks had stalled, the United Nations‑African Union hybrid mission (UNAMID) was still in planning, and the humanitarian cease‑fire signed in 2004 was widely ignored. Capp’s cable captures the frustration of a field officer who sees the diplomatic veneer peeling away to reveal a fragmented battlefield.
Capp’s most striking observation is the “insufficient levels of control” on all sides. He lists three parallel breakdowns: rebel commanders losing faith in their own hierarchies, the Khartoum government’s inability to command the Arab tribal militias and Janjaweed, and intra‑SLA splintering that threatens to spiral into a tribal war. This diagnosis mirrors contemporaneous intelligence assessments that warned of a “decentralised” conflict where local warlords, rather than central authorities, dictated the tempo of violence. The cable therefore serves as a primary source confirming that, even as high‑level negotiators signed accords, the on‑the‑ground reality was one of multiple, competing power structures.
Capp also critiques the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), describing it as a “stop‑gap” that, while well‑intentioned, lacked the capacity to enforce a cease‑fire across a terrain larger than Iraq. He argues that any successor force must be a “first‑world” operation with robust combat power, drawing on U.S. experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This recommendation anticipates the later establishment of UNAMID in 2007, a hybrid force that combined AU troops with a UN command structure but still struggled with limited rules of engagement and insufficient logistical support. Capp’s call for a Chapter VII mandate foreshadows the Security Council’s repeated attempts—through Resolutions 1591, 1654, and 1769—to give the peace‑keeping mission a more robust enforcement authority.
The title’s rhetorical question, “Who Will Apologize?” hints at a deeper diplomatic anxiety: the United States faced mounting domestic and international pressure to hold the Sudanese regime accountable for alleged war crimes, yet the administration was hesitant to label the conflict as genocide or to impose comprehensive sanctions. By foregrounding the potential for a “first‑world response,” Capp implicitly challenges the Obama‑era foreign‑policy establishment to move beyond statements of concern and toward decisive, coalition‑based action.
In hindsight, the cable’s bleak prognosis was prescient. The Abuja talks collapsed in 2008, the Janjaweed continued atrocities, and UNAMID never achieved the comprehensive security footprint Capp deemed essential. The document thus stands as a rare, unvarnished snapshot of U.S. diplomatic thinking at a pivotal moment—one that reveals the gap between high‑level peace‑building rhetoric and the gritty realities of fragmented command structures, inadequate peace‑keeping capacity, and the geopolitical calculus of a reluctant United States.
For scholars of the Darfur crisis, Capp’s memorandum offers more than a status report; it is a diagnostic tool that explains why subsequent international interventions faltered. It underscores that any durable solution required not only a political accord but also a credible, enforceable security framework—something the international community has struggled to provide ever since.
The Legacy of a Candid Dispatch
The cable’s release in 2013, amid the State Department’s broader declassification drive, allowed historians to trace the evolution of U.S. policy from cautious engagement to the eventual endorsement of stronger UN mandates. It also illustrates how individual diplomats, equipped with field experience, can shape the narrative of a conflict that continues to influence debates over humanitarian intervention, the limits of Chapter VII peace‑keeping, and the responsibility to protect.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013 RELEASED IN FULL
ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 HHS-01 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 M-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 NSCE-00 OIC-00 OIG-00 OMB-00 GIWI-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 SSO-00 SS-00 EPAE-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /001W ----------------C3E9F5 281130Z/38 R 281114Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2545 INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001015
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 TAGS: PREL, KPKO, KAWC, UN, AU-1, SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE?
Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 b and d.
Introduction
- (C) Introduction by Cameron R. Hume, CDA Embassy Khartoum. Everyone with an interest in Darfur should read this message. It is written by Ron Capps, the Foreign Service Officer who has the most comprehensive knowledge of Darfur. He is now completing with great distinction a tour as the deputy chief of the political /economic section in Embassy Khartoum. Previously he served as a U.S. military officer advising the African Union peace-keeping force in Darfur as well as with NATO forces and diplomatic missions in the Balkans, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq. I have benefited greatly from his knowledge and analysis, even if I might not endorse his conclusions. At my urging he agreed to send this message in an open channel so that it would be available to a wider readership.
Three Years On
- (C) This week marked the third anniversary of the start of a large-scale armed rebellion in Darfur. Peace talks in Abuja are moving incrementally towards what may be a peace accord, and the United Nations has begun planning to supplant the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Meanwhile, all sides ignore a two year old Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement (HCA); the war has spread across the border into Chad and now clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and
REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
security. If there is an Abuja peace accord, and this is by no means certain, it will not be an end in itself. It will be the beginning of the hardest part of stopping the violence in Darfur. If there is no peace accord, things can only get worse.
- (C) United Nations officials have described their worst-case scenario in assuming the AMIS mission in Darfur as one where the warring factions ignore the peace accord just as they have ignored the HCA. Unfortunately, that is also the most likely scenario.
Insufficient Levels of Control
(C) An Abuja peace accord is unlikely to stop the violence in Darfur. There are several reasons why: (1) rebel field commanders have lost faith in the leadership of their movements. Nineteen SLA/Wahid commanders have publicly broken with Wahid. SLA/Minawi has splintered with open breaks by Sulieman Jamooz, Sharif Harir, Sulieman Marajan, Khamis Abdullah and 17 other commanders. Other commanders have defected to Wahid. At least one has joined the Government in fighting the SLA. Khalil comes to Abuja when it suits him and many of his fighters are in Chad acting as mercenaries. In short, rebel leaders do not have a sufficient level of control over rebel commanders to guarantee their compliance; (2) Government of Sudan negotiators do not represent the Arab tribal militias or the Janjaweit leaders, nor does the government have a sufficient level of control over those militias to guarantee their compliance; (3) fighting between the SLA factions will continue and could degrade into a tribal war which would eventually draw in the Arab tribes.
(C) A weak international force with a limited mandate will be powerless to stop the violence. In this scenario IDPs and refugees will be unable to return home, rebels and militias will continue to kill with impunity and all our work in Abuja will have been futile.
Complex and Thorny Missions Ahead...
- (C) AMIS has been a stop-gap. It was put in place in haste and because at the time it was the best solution. Seen in this light, AMIS has done well. But it has not met its mandate. Coalition task force operations of the type that are required in Darfur are complex beyond the experience of AMIS. I many cases the troops want to perform but simply do not have the experience to conduct a successful peace support operation in an area larger than Iraq. And neither the force as a whole nor many of the troops and units that make up the mission are capable of conducting the militarily complex and
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
politically thorny missions that will face a post-Abuja international security force.
- (C) Regardless of whether Abuja produces an enhanced cease-fire agreement or a complete peace accord -- or even if the talks ultimately collapse -- rebel forces and militias will have to be mapped, counted, cantoned and disarmed. Given the lack of cohesion among the rebels and the lack of government control over the militias, it seems likely that the groups will resist these steps, particularly disarmament. In this event, the international peace support force will be required to militarily defeat them. This is not a Chapter VI mission. The force will require the combat power and prowess to enforce a peace accord if it is to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of IDPs and refugees. It will also require the right mandate. Seven UN Security Council resolutions on Darfur have been issued under Chapter VII. This must be the starting point for the follow-on force.
... Require a First-World Response
- (C) Stopping the violence in Darfur will require a military force with first-world leadership, first-world assets and first-world experience. U.S. and coalition experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq are relevant here. Putting together such a coalition and getting it into place to do its work will require that the United States government and our military take on the lead role, at least initially. Our NATO and other first-world military partners will not be keen to step forward without our participation, and many of the traditional UN troop contributing countries lack the military capability to successfully complete the mission.
It Is Our responsibility
(C) We alone have called the atrocities in Darfur Genocide. We must lead the coalition that will stop it. We must demonstrate our resolve and determination to stop this Genocide and to never again let Genocide happen. We already lead the world in the provision of humanitarian aid to Darfur. We must not cede our leadership at the crucial moment.
(C) During the Rwandan Genocide the United States and others in the international community failed the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were killed by the hundreds of thousands at the hands of the Interahamwe. In 1998 President Clinton went to Rwanda to apologize and said, "We must never again be shy in the face of evidence." In Darfur the evidence of
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
Genocide is clear. The President of the United States has said so; two Secretaries of State have said so.
Or Who Will Apologize?
- (C) Some will say that the steps outlined here are impossible, but they are not. Certainly the Government of Sudan will resist. This will be a challenge to the nation's sovereignty and perhaps even to the survival of the government. Security Council members will resist. But if we fail to construct and mandate this force correctly, we will fail to stop the Genocide and more people will needlessly die. Yes, it will be hard. But being hard should not deter us from doing what is right. Otherwise, which American president will be the one to apologize for failing the dead of Darfur? STEINFELD
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-03137 Doc No. C05159643 Date: 01/22/2013
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