Secretary Powell’s June 29, 2004, Meeting with Sudanese President al-Bashir, cable no. Parto 00002 , Office of the Secretary of State, State Department
National Security Archive
Powell’s 2004 Khartoum meeting ties Sudan’s north‑south peace to Darfur, revealing Washington’s conditional push for humanitarian security.
Source: Secretary Powell’s June 29, 2004, Meeting with Sudanese President al-Bashir, cable no. Parto 00002 , Office of the Secretary of State, State Department Date: Jun 30, 2004 Archive: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Diplomatic Flashpoint in Khartoum
On June 29, 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell met President Omar al‑Bashir in the Sudanese capital, just hours before the nation’s Revolution Day celebrations. The declassified cable (Parto 00002) records the tenor of that conversation: Bashir portrayed the Darfur conflict as “totally contained,” while Powell warned that U.S. support for Sudan’s broader peace process hinged on an immediate halt to militia violence and an unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid. The document is a snapshot of a pivotal moment when Washington tried to leverage the goodwill generated by the 2004 Naivasha peace agreement—an accord that ended three decades of civil war between the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army—to press Sudan on a crisis that had erupted barely a year earlier in the far‑west.
The Darfur Crisis Meets the North‑South Peace Process
The early 2000s were defined by two seemingly separate Sudanese conflicts. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 (negotiated throughout 2004) was the culmination of U.S.‑backed diplomacy that promised an end to the north‑south war and a path to a 2011 referendum on independence for South Sudan. Simultaneously, reports from the United Nations and NGOs were documenting systematic attacks by the Janjaweed militia against civilian populations in Darfur, leading to mass displacement and accusations of genocide. Powell’s cable makes clear that Washington viewed these issues as inseparable: “Normalization cannot proceed without immediate steps to stop Janjaweed violence….” The language signals a shift from the earlier U.S. stance of quiet engagement to a more explicit conditionality—U.S. aid and diplomatic normalization would be withheld unless Sudan demonstrated concrete security improvements in Darfur.
What the Cable Reveals About the Players
President Bashir’s statements in the cable are carefully calibrated. He acknowledges the “shock” of recent Darfur events but insists that militias have been disarmed and that police are re‑entering the region. This self‑assessment contrasts sharply with Powell’s summary, which notes that the United Nations Secretary‑General Kofi Annan and the broader international community do not share the view that the situation is contained. The divergence underscores Bashir’s attempt to present Sudan as a cooperative partner while simultaneously protecting his regime from external pressure.
Powell’s remarks, recorded verbatim in the cable, reveal a personal investment in the peace process: he reminds Bashir that the United States “cannot fail, or we all fail the people of Sudan.” The emphasis on “personal investment” signals that Powell was not merely a bureaucrat delivering policy but a key diplomatic actor seeking to bind Sudan’s compliance to the CPA with tangible incentives—U.S. aid, a possible Washington ceremony, and broader normalization with the West.
The cable also lists a wide array of U.S. officials present, from the U.S. Embassy Chargé d’Affaires to senior defense and intelligence representatives. Their inclusion indicates that the meeting was not a routine diplomatic courtesy but a high‑level, inter‑agency coordination point, reflecting the convergence of humanitarian, security, and congressional concerns over Darfur.
Why the Document Matters Today
The June 29 meeting foreshadows the diplomatic escalation that would culminate in the 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1591, which imposed an arms embargo on Sudan and established a monitoring mechanism for Darfur. It also anticipates the 2006 U.S. decision to withhold full normalization of relations until Sudan took verifiable steps to end civilian killings. The cable’s explicit linkage of Darfur to the CPA demonstrates how the United States began to treat Sudan’s internal conflicts as a single, negotiable package rather than isolated issues.
In contemporary debates over U.S. engagement in Africa, the Powell‑Bashir encounter serves as a case study of conditional diplomacy: humanitarian imperatives were leveraged to extract security concessions, but the approach also exposed the limits of U.S. pressure when faced with a regime willing to reframe its narrative. The language of “ramping up pressure” and the threat of a further UN Security Council resolution reveal an early use of what would later be termed “smart sanctions.”
Understanding this cable helps explain why, despite later improvements in the north‑south peace process, the Darfur crisis persisted for years, ultimately leading to the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Bashir in 2009. The document is a reminder that diplomatic breakthroughs in one arena can be weaponized to address parallel conflicts—an insight that remains relevant for policymakers navigating complex, multi‑theater crises today.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 00002
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2009
TAGS: OVIP (POWELL, COLIN L.), PREL, EAID, PREF, PGOV,
PTER, SU
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY POWELL'S JUNE 29, 2004, MEETING
WITH SUDANESE PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: DOUGLAS C. GREENE, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, S/ES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON
1.4 (D)
2. (U) JUNE 29, 2004; 2215; KHARTOUM, SUDAN
3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
THE SECRETARY
CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES GERARD GALLUCCI, U.S. EMBASSY, KHARTOUM
USAID ADMINISTRATOR ANDREW NATSIOS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUN 2011 201100790
UNCLASSIFIED
A/S RICHARD BOUCHER, PA UNCLASSIFIED MICHAEL RANNEBERGER, AF/SPG SPECIAL ADVISOR VADM JAMES METZGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS ROBERT BEECROFT, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY D. PURNELL DELLY, DCM, U.S. EMBASSY, KHARTOUM (NOTETAKER)
SUDAN H.E. OMER HASSAN AL-BASHIR, PRESIDENT OF SUDAN DR. MUSTAFA OSMAN ISMAIL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YAHYA HUSSAIN, STATE MINISTER FOR THE PRESIDENCY MGEN BAKRI HASSAN SALIH, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MGEN ABDEL-RAHIM M. HUSSEIN, MINISTER OF INTERIOR IBRAHIM MAHMOUD HAMID, MINISTER OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AMBASSADOR KHIDIR HARUM, EMBASSY OF SUDAN, WASHINGTON D.C. AMBASSADOR MOHAMED A.A. EL-KARIB, DIRECTOR OF AMERICAS DEPARTMENT, SUDAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(C) SUMMARY. ON JUNE 29 SUDANESE PRESIDENT BASHIR TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT RECENT EVENTS IN DARFUR HAD DAMPENED CELEBRATION OF THE RECENT AGREEMENT IN NAIVASHA. HOWEVER, THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR WAS STEADILY IMPROVING AND THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS NOW "TOTALLY CONTAINED." THE SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT BUSH WAS PLEASED WITH EVENTS IN NAIVASHA BUT DEEPLY TROUBLED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE IN DARFUR. NORMALIZATION CANNOT PROCEED WITHOUT IMMEDIATE STEPS TO STOP JINJAWEED VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS AND ELIMINATE RED TAPE SLOWING DELIVERY OF RELIEF. IN DARFUR AS IN NAIVASHA, THE U.S. WANTS TO HELP. IT DOES NOT WANT TO BE PUNITIVE. BUT UNLESS SUDAN ACTS IMMEDIATELY ON SECURITY AND RELIEF IN DARFUR, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE. END SUMMARY.
(C) PRESIDENT BASHIR SAID RECENT SIGNATURE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN NAIVASHA WOULD BE CELEBRATED AT REVOLUTION DAY ON JUNE 30. HOWEVER, THE SHOCK OF RECENT EVENTS IN DARFUR HAD DIMINISHED THE SENSE OF JOY. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PURSUE PEACE IN DARFUR AS HARD AS IT HAD PURSUED PEACE IN NAIVASHA; HOWEVER, ALREADY MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN DARFUR AND THE SITUATION WAS "TOTALLY CONTAINED" NOW. THE MILITIAS WERE NOT OPERATING AND IN THE PAST FOUR MONTHS ONLY THE REBELS HAD VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE. THEY HAD OVER THE COURSE OF THE WAR TARGETED 89 POLICE STATIONS IN DARFUR AND AS A RESULT "MILITIA STEPPED IN TO FILL [THE SECURITY] VACUUM." NOW POLICE WERE DEPLOYING TO DARFUR ONCE AGAIN.
(C) THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR WAS STEADILY IMPROVING, ACCORDING TO THE PRESIDENT, AND CONDITIONS FOR IDPS IN CAMPS WERE BETTER THAN IN THEIR VILLAGES.
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VILLAGERS FOUND FOOD AND SERVICES IN THESE CAMPS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE IN THEIR OWN VILLAGES, AND THUS THE CAMPS WERE BECOMING "TOO ATTRACTIVE." UNCLASSIFIED
(C) THE SECRETARY SAID PRESIDENT BUSH WAS PLEASED WITH ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE PAST THREE YEARS. CONGRESSMEN HAD COME TO HIS OFFICE ONLY A FEW MONTHS AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND SAID THE U.S. HAD TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT. IT WAS A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE, BUT THE U.S. HAD ENGAGED. THE SECRETARY HIMSELF HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL INVESTMENT IN THE PROCESS, REMINDING PRESIDENT BASHIR THAT HE HAD COME TO NAIVASHA AND SAID, "THIS PROCESS CANNOT FAIL, OR WE ALL FAIL THE PEOPLE OF SUDAN." PRESIDENT BUSH LOOKS FORWARD TO CONCLUSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT AND WELCOMING THE PARTIES TO A CEREMONY IN WASHINGTON. HE WANTS IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.
(C) BUT THAT CANNOT HAPPEN UNTIL DARFUR IS SECURE AND RELIEF IS FLOWING. THE SITUATION IN DARFUR IS NOT "CONTAINED." THAT IS THE JUDGMENT NOT ONLY OF THE U.S., BUT UNSYG KOFI ANNAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY TROUBLED BY PROSPECTS FOR A HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE IN DARFUR. TO AVERT CATASTROPHE, SECURITY MUST BE RESTORED SO JINJAWEED NO LONGER COMMIT VIOLENCE AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS. WE ARE ALSO TELLING THE REBELS THAT SUCH VIOLENCE IS UNACCEPTABLE. BARRIERS MUST BE ELIMINATED TO DELIVERY OF RELIEF AND VISAS FOR RELIEF WORKERS. IT IS IN SUDAN'S INTEREST TO SHOW IT IS MORE CONCERNED THAN WE ARE ABOUT SECURITY AND RELIEF DELIVERY. THE U.S. MUST ALSO SEE FULL COOPERATION WITH AU MONITORING. THERE MUST ALSO BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
(C) PRESIDENT BUSH HAS DISCUSSED DARFUR WITH THE EU, G-8, AND NATO ALLIES. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH UNSYG KOFI ANNAN, WHO IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED. THERE MUST BE IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IN DARFUR OR IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION LIKE A UNSC RESOLUTION. PRESIDENT BUSH DOES NOT WANT TO DO THIS. BUT PEACE MUST NOT ONLY INCLUDE THE SOUTH. AMBASSADOR DANFORTH'S SIX POINTS THAT HE SAID WOULD LEAD TO NORMALIZATION WITH THE U.S. INCLUDED ALL OF SUDAN, BUT EVEN IF A NARROW LEGAL INTERPRETATION LIMITED THEM TO THE SOUTH THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD NOT ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO MOVE FORWARD ON NORMALIZATION WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF DARFUR. THE U.S. WANTS TO HELP. IT DOES NOT WANT TO BE PUNITIVE. TO THE $116 MILLION ALREADY COMMITTED FOR DARFUR THE CONGRESS HAS JUST ADDED $95 MILLION IN A DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL. BUT SUDAN MUST ACT IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESS DARFUR, OR THE
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL RATCHET UP THE PRESSURE. UNCLASSIFIED
(C) PRESIDENT BASHIR SAID SUDAN WAS NOT PERFECT, BUT REITERATED THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL OF ANY ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CIVILIANS OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS EXCEPTING THE REBELS. (COMMENT: AT THIS POINT THE FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVENED TO POINT OUT MILITIA VIOLENCE WAS CONTINUING IN SOME AREAS.) HOWEVER, SUDAN MUST ELIMINATE ALL OBSTACLES TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND WOULD DEAL HEAD ON WITH ANY REMAINING ONES. EVERYTHING POSSIBLE MUST BE DONE TO DELIVER RELIEF BECAUSE AT THE END OF THE DAY DARFURIANS ARE ALL SUDANESE CITIZENS.
(C) USAID ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS ECHOED THE SECRETARY THAT THE U.S. WANTS A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOUTH AND DOES NOT WANT TO DELIVER BAD NEWS. BUT ONLY TWO WEEKS AGO SIX VILLAGES WERE BURNED. LAST WEEK 14 YEAR OLD GIRLS WERE WHIPPED AND RAPED. GOS SOLDIERS SHOT AT A RELIEF CONVOY LAST WEEK. THESE INCIDENTS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES. ACUTE MALNUTRITION WAS AT A RATE OF 10 PERCENT AND GLOBAL MALNUTRITION WAS AT FAMINE RATE. PEOPLE WERE DYING IN CAMPS. CHILDREN WERE DYING OF MALARIA, MEASLES, AND DIARRHEA.
(C) THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID INCIDENTS OF RAPE AND OTHER VIOLENCE SHOULD BE REPORTED TO HIM IMMEDIATELY AND THEY WOULD BE INVESTIGATED. HE ALSO SAID THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION WAS TELLING SUDAN THAT THERE WERE NO EPIDEMICS IN DARFUR BY UN STANDARDS. THE HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS MINISTER SAID THE VACCINATION RATE IN DARFUR WAS BETTER THAN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, BUT THAT MALARIA MIGHT BECOME A PROBLEM DURING THE RAINY SEASON AS IT WOULD ACROSS THE REST OF SUDAN. MALNUTRITION RATES WERE HIGHER IN REGIONS OUTSIDE DARFUR.
(C) ACCESS HAD IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY IN DARFUR BY UN MEASURES, SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTER. SUDAN HAD ADOPTED A FAST TRACK SYSTEM FOR RELIEF DELIVERY THAT INCLUDED PRECLEARANCE FOR MAJOR FOOD SHIPMENTS BEFORE THEY EVEN REACHED PORT SUDAN. WHILE THERE WERE "PRACTICAL PROBLEMS" IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SYSTEM AND PROBLEMS MIGHT LINGER FOR SMALLER NGOS, MAJOR ACCESS AND DELIVERY ISSUES WERE IMPROVING. THE MAIN PROBLEM NOW WAS REBEL ATTACKS ON DELIVERIES AND WORKERS; IN NORTH DARFUR THERE HAD BEEN 40 SUCH ATTACKS. SUDAN NEEDED TO IMPROVE ITS STORAGE CAPACITY, AND DELIVERY WOULD BENEFIT IF SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED ON SPARE PARTS FOR SUDAN'S TRAINS.
(C) BASHIR ADDED IT WAS HARD TO EXPECT CRIME COULD BE ELIMINATED IN DARFUR (COMMENT: THE GOS ATTRIBUTES MUCH
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JINJAWEED VIOLENCE TO "ARMED BANDITS.") DARFUR IS A VAST AREA. CRIME HAPPENS IN KHARTOUM TOO. IF THERE ARE CRIMES "HERE AND THERE" IT DOES NOT MEAN THE TOTAL COLLAPSE OF SECURITY. IT SHOULD NOT LEAD TO CHARACTERIZATION OF DARFUR AS A MAJOR HUMANITARIAN DISASTER.
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(C) THE INTERIOR MINISTER THEN LAID OUT THE FIVE MAJOR ELEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S PLAN FOR DARFUR: FIRST, FULL COMMITMENT TO THE PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF ALL CITIZENS, WHICH INCLUDES DISARMING OF MILITIAS; SECOND, ACCESS TO ALL DARFURIANS IN NEED; THIRD, A PLAN FOR IDPS TO RETURN VOLUNTARILY TO THEIR VILLAGES; FOURTH, A "FACT-FINDING MISSION" TO APPLY PUNITIVE ACTIONS TO CRIMINALS AND COMPENSATION TO THOSE AFFECTED BY CRIMINAL ACTS AND DEPLOYMENT OF POLICE TO ALL AREAS; FIFTH, THE CONVENING OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE ALL OPPOSITION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SUDAN TO REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION. SUDAN WELCOMES SUPPORT FOR ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES.
(C) THE INTERIOR MINISTER ADDED THAT ALREADY SUDAN HAS DEPLOYED POLICE AND MILITARY TO IDP CAMPS TO PROVIDE SECURITY. SUDAN IS ALSO WORKING WITH "VARIOUS PARTIES" TO DEVELOP ITS VOLUNTARY RETURN PLAN FOR IDPS. IN EACH OF DARFUR'S THREE STATES AREAS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND FORCES ARE ALREADY DEPLOYING TO SECURE THEM. TRIBAL LEADERS ARE BEING SHOWN THESE AREAS SO THEY WILL APPRECIATE THE LEVEL OF SECURITY AWAITING RETURNING IDPS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL THEN SUPPLY THREE MONTHS OF FOOD TO THESE AREAS FOR RETURNEES. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO WORKING HARD WITH THE AGRICULTURE MINISTRY TO GIVE RETURNEES SEED FOR PLANTING, AND HELP THEM DEVELOP THE MEANS FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION.
(C) RETURNING TO A THEME HE HAD RAISED IN HIS OWN MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY (SEPTEL), THE FOREIGN MINISTER URGED THE U.S. TO BEGIN WORKING IMMEDIATELY WITH HIS GOVERNMENT ON A JOINT APPROACH TO DARFUR. HE SAID FIRST VICE PRESIDENT TAHA WOULD BE FLYING WITH THE SECRETARY TO DARFUR ON JUNE 30 AND COULD DISCUSS SUCH AN APPROACH WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE PLANE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT HIS TEAM WOULD MEET WITH GOS OFFICIALS TO LAY OUT IN MORE DETAIL THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS THE US WANTS THE GOS TO TAKE. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. POWELL
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