Next Steps on Darfur, cable no. Khartoum 75 , Gerard Gallucci, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum
National Security Archive
A 2004 diplomatic cable reveals how the U.S., Europe, and Sudan’s own factions juggled humanitarian access and peace talks amid the rising Darfur crisis.
Source: Next Steps on Darfur, cable no. Khartoum 75 , Gerard Gallucci, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum Date: Jan 22, 2004 Archive: U.S. Department of State Virtual Reading Room
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Diplomatic Pulse‑Check on Darfur, January 2004
The cable dated 22 January 2004 is a routine yet revealing dispatch from Chargé d’Affaires Gerard Gallucci in Khartoum to Washington, copied to a wide network of U.S. embassies, the National Security Council and senior Defense officials. It arrived at a moment when the Sudanese government’s counter‑insurgency in Darfur had escalated into a full‑blown humanitarian crisis, and Washington was still formulating a coherent policy response. The memo references a “Danforth letter” – the March 2003 missive from former Secretary of State James Danforth to President Bashir urging restraint – signalling that the United States had already entered the diplomatic arena but had yet to translate concern into concrete leverage.
The Darfur Crisis in Context
By early 2004 the conflict, ignited in early 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against Khartoum, had spiraled into systematic attacks on civilian populations, mass displacement and accusations of genocide. International attention surged after a 2004 United Nations‑commissioned report documented widespread atrocities. The United States, still reeling from the Iraq invasion, faced a dilemma: how to pressure Bashir without over‑extending its already‑stretched diplomatic and military resources. The cable therefore serves as a snapshot of the “next steps” deliberations that would shape the later 2004‑2005 U.S. push for a United Nations Security Council resolution and the eventual deployment of a joint African‑U.N. peacekeeping mission.
Actors, Alliances, and Subtext
Gallucci’s report foregrounds three tiers of actors: the Sudanese government, the rebel coalitions (SLM and JEM), and a surprisingly coordinated European bloc led by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The European ambassadors are described as “quite active,” inserting Darfur into broader human‑rights dialogues and arranging high‑level meetings with Sudan’s foreign minister, Ismail Ahmed Ali Abdel Rahman (identified as a member of the “peace” faction). The cable’s emphasis on a Jan 26 meeting, with the UK ambassador taking the lead, hints at a tacit division of labor: Europe would marshal diplomatic pressure and humanitarian advocacy, while the United States would supply political backing and development resources through USAID and the State Department’s political section.
The memo also uncovers internal fissures within Khartoum. Gallucci notes a split between hard‑liners favoring a “military solution” to avoid a “Mchakos‑like outcome” (a reference to the 1994 Rwandan genocide) and moderates willing to negotiate a political settlement once the rebels were militarily weakened. This nuance contradicts the often monolithic portrayal of Bashir’s regime and suggests that Washington was being fed a more granular intelligence picture than public statements implied.
What the Cable Reveals Beneath the Surface
First, the United States was not merely a passive observer; it had already engaged in “extensive reporting” and was preparing to align its strategy with European initiatives. The mention of “contacts with Darfurian groups… linked to the SLM and JEM” indicates covert outreach, likely aimed at gathering on‑the‑ground verification of civilian casualties and perhaps laying groundwork for future mediation.
Second, the document exposes a diplomatic tactic: leveraging humanitarian access as a bargaining chip. Gallucci writes that the Sudanese government routinely denied UN and NGO access on “political grounds,” even when security assessments deemed areas safe. By positioning the Jan 26 meeting as a forum to bring NGOs directly into dialogue with “authoritative elements of the GOS,” Washington and its allies hoped to force a concession on aid corridors without overtly threatening sanctions.
Third, the cable’s reference to the “Abêche process” (the 2003 peace talks that ended the Sudanese civil war) underscores a strategic calculus: the United States and Europe sought to transplant the Southern Sudan framework onto Darfur, assuming that a similar power‑sharing model could quell the rebellion. This reveals an early, perhaps overly optimistic, belief that the Darfur conflict could be resolved through the same political formula that had succeeded in the south.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The January 2004 cable foreshadows the diplomatic crescendo that culminated in the 2005 U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the African Union‑United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It also illustrates the limits of that approach: despite the diplomatic choreography described, humanitarian access remained sporadic, and the conflict persisted for another decade.
For today’s policymakers, the document offers two cautionary lessons. One, the importance of granular intelligence on intra‑governmental rivalries; the U.S. missed an opportunity to exploit the “peace” faction’s willingness to negotiate. Two, the danger of over‑relying on a single conflict‑resolution template; Darfur’s ethnic, regional, and militia dynamics differed markedly from those in Southern Sudan. As the United States confronts new crises—whether in the Sahel or elsewhere—the Khartoum‑75 cable reminds us that diplomatic nuance, coalition‑building, and realistic assessments of local power structures remain essential ingredients for any effective response.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014 RELEASED IN PART 1.4(B),B1,B5,1.4(D)
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INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 A-00 CCO-00 CG-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00 USNW-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 IO-00 L-00 CAC-00 VCE-00 M-00 AC-00 NEA-00 NRCE-00 NSAE-00 OCS-00 OMB-00 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 ASDS-00 DTC-00 EPAE-00 ECA-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /000W ----------------EOE8A6 221401Z /38 P R 220900Z JAN 04 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0075 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY ASMARA AMEMBASSY BANGUI USEU BRUSSELS 0001 AMEMBASSY CAIRO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA NSC WASHDC AMEMBASSY OSLO AMEMBASSY PARIS SECDEF WASHDC AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL USMISSION USUN N Y
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2009 TAGS: SU, PREF, PREL, PTER, MASS, CD SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR
REF: A. STATE 14168 (NOTAL): B. PARIS 0472 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: GERARD GALLUCCI, COM, EMBASSY KHARTOUM, DOS. REASON: (B), (D)
- (C) EMBASSY HAS BEEN WORKING THE DARFUR ISSUE FOR SOME MONTHS NOW AND HAS PROVIDED EXTENSIVE REPORTING ON THE INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WASHINGTON IS DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR INCREASING US ENGAGEMENT ON DARFUR AND HAVE RECEIVED DANFORTH LETTER (REF A) FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT BASHIR. THIS CABLE PROVIDES UPDATE ON DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE MIGHT FACTOR THEM INTO OUR THINKING OF REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer
Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B1 ~ Declassify on: 01/22/2024 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
OUR OWN APPROACH.
(C) THE EUROPEANS -- LED BY THE UK AND THE DUTCH -- HAVE BECOME QUITE ACTIVE ON DARFUR. THE EU AMBASSADORS HAVE INTRODUCED DARFUR -- AND SPECIFICALLY THE QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS -- INTO THEIR ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOS AND HAVE MADE STATEMENTS ON, AND VISITS TO, DARFUR TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR CONCERN. (WE HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR STEPS, INCLUDING IN TANDEM WITH THE EU MEMBERS.) WE HAVE ALL BEEN DEVELOPING CONTACTS WITH DARFURIANS WHERE WE CAN FIND THEM, INCLUDING SOME LINKED TO THE SLM AND JEM AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS TRIBES.
(C) IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE GOS, WE HAVE ALL RAISED DARFUR TO NOTE OUR CONCERN OVER THE CIVILIAN CAUSALITIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR REBELLION, THE GOS'S USE OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED ARAB MILITIAS AND ITS DENIAL OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL MOTIVES. IN RESPONSE TO THESE INTERVENTIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER ISMAEL OFFERED IN DECEMBER TO BRIEF US -- WESTERN AND OTHER INTERESTED COMS -- ON DARFUR. LETTING THE BRITISH KEEP THE LEAD ON THIS, THE UK AMBASSADOR HAS NOW ARRANGED WITH THE MINISTER TO HOLD THIS MEETING ON JANUARY 26TH. OUR IDEA IS TO USE THE MEETING AS AN OCCASION TO BRING THE NGO COMMUNITY INTO A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH AUTHORITATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE GOS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ACCESS ISSUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER (REPORTEDLY A MEMBER OF THE GOS "PEACE" FACTION) AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH AND WILL CONVOKE HAC AND OTHER GOS OFFICIALS FOR THE JANUARY 26TH MEETING. THE DUTCH CHARGE -- WHO HAS ALSO TAKEN AN PARTICULARLY ACTIVE APPROACH TO DARFUR -- WILL HOST A PRELIMINARY MEETING BETWEEN THE DONOR COMS AND THE NGOS FOR JANUARY 25. WE -- COM, USAID AND POL -- WILL TAKE PART IN BOTH MEETINGS. WE WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS THE GOS TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN DARFUR IN ALL CASES AND PLACES WHEN/WHERE THE UN AND INVOLVED NGOS JUDGE IT SECURE ENOUGH TO CONDUCT FIELD OPERATIONS. (UP TO NOW THE GOS HAS BEEN DENYING ACCESS ON SECURITY GROUNDS EVEN WHEN THE UN AND NGO SECURITY PEOPLE BELIEVE IT IS SECURE FOR THEM TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. UN SECURITY [PLEASE PROTECT] HAS DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH COMMUNITIES AND THE REBELS AND NGOS BELIEVE THAT IN MANY AREAS IT IS ONLY THE GOS'S POLITICAL AGENDA THAT LEADS THEM TO DENY ACCESS.)
(C) AGENDAS OF THE VARIOUS DARFUR PLAYERS ARE COMPLEX AND CONFLICTING. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE SLM (SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT) AND JEM (JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT) ARE COOPERATING IN THE FIELD BUT PERHAPS LESS SO AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. (THOUGH WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY THAT BOTH ARE NOW READY TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS.) THE SLM WERE REPORTEDLY NEAR ACCEPTING A CHADIAN PROPOSAL TO REACH A BROAD AGREEMENT WITH THE GOS -- WITHIN THE ABECHE CONTEXT -- LAST YEAR BUT WERE STOPPED BY EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP AND THE JEM, BOTH OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN OPERATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIST RADICAL HASAN AL TURABI. THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE NO CLEAR REBEL POLITICAL AGENDA OTHER THAN TO GET A DEAL FROM THE GOS LIKE THAT BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GOS AND THE SPLM, I.E., LOCAL AUTONOMY AND WEALTH SHARING. ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, THE GOS MAY BE SPLIT BETWEEN
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
THOSE SEEKING A MILITARY SOLUTION IN ORDER TO AVOID A MACHAKOS-LIKE OUTCOME IN DARFUR AND THOSE READY TO FIND A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE REBELS ONCE THEY ARE DEFEATED. (THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS PARTICULARLY WORRIED THAT ANY ACCEPTANCE OF A REFERENDUM FOR ABYEI WOULD BE PICKED UP BY THE DARFUR REBELS AS WELL.) THE ARAB NOMAD MILITIAS ENLISTED BY THE GOS TO FIGHT THE REBELS HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA, LARGELY CENTERED ON
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APPEARS CONCERNED THAT ITS NORTHERN OPPONENTS -- TURABI AND THOSE WITHIN THE GOS OPPOSED TO PEACE WITH THE SOUTH -- ARE USING DARFUR TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS PROMPT A COUP.
(C) THE COMPLEXITIES OF DARFUR REQUIRE A POLITICAL SOLUTION AS WELL AS AN AGREEMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IF THE WAR IS TO BE ENDED. THEREFORE, WE -- EU MEMBERS AND US -- HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSING HOW TO ENCOURAGE A RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELS. THE EU COMS MET ON JANUARY 12 TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRUSSELS ON NEXT STEPS ON BOTH HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND NEGOTIATIONS. THEY DECIDED THAT A BALANCED APPROACH BUILDING ON THE ABECHE PROCESS WOULD MAKE MOST SENSE. THE AIM WOULD BE TO REINVIGORATE THE CHADIAN EFFORT INTO AN ABECHE PLUS FRAMEWORK THROUGH GRADUALLY ADDING FURTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS MUCH AS WE ADDED OURSELVES (AS THE TROIKA AND OTHERS) TO THE IGAD PROCESS ON SOUTHERN SUDAN. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO EXPLICITLY COMMIT ITSELF TO RETURNING TO NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO TO ACCEPT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CEASEFIRE. (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IS A KEY DEMAND OF THE REBELS.) THE EU WOULD REITERATE SUPPORT FOR THE CHADIAN EFFORT. (PRESIDENT DEBY IS REPORTED READY TO RE-ENGAGE IN THE ABECHE PROCESS.) THE EU WOULD ALSO FIND WAYS TO ENGAGE WITH THE REBEL MOVEMENTS TO CONVEY THEIR MESSAGE THAT THEY MUST COMMIT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE EU WOULD MAKE A FACT FINDING MISSION TO DARFUR. THIS MISSION -- TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE EU COMS IN KHARTOUM -- WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO PUSH THE OVERALL NEGOTIATING APPROACH WITH THE GOS AND REBELS AS WELL KEEPING FOCUS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. THE DUTCH CHARGE TELLS US THAT BRUSSELS APPROVAL OF THIS APPROACH IS EXPECTED.
(C) WE ARE WORKING WITH THE EU AND HAVE ASKED TO JOIN THEIR FACT FINDING MISSION AS OBSERVERS. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING INTO OUR OWN MESSAGE WITH DARFURIANS IN OR PASSING THROUGH KHARTOUM THAT THE REBELS MUST RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATIONS AND BE READY TO RESUME THEIR PLACE IN THE ABECHE PROCESS WITH A CLEAR AND REALIZABLE POLITICAL AGENDA. WE ALSO ARE PULLING TOGETHER A REPRESENTATIVE MEETING OF TRIBAL FIGURES TO ENCOURAGE A DARFUR-BASED EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE GRASS ROOTS CAUSES OF THE TRIBAL CONFLICT.
(C) WE BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE EFFORTS AMOUNT TO AN APPROACH THAT WE SHOULD GIVE TIME TO DEVELOP. THE ELEMENTS INCLUDE:
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2013-09087 Doc No. C05424588 Date: 01/22/2014
-- US PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU AND OTHER INTERESTED DONOR COUNTRIES;
-- COMBINED DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND TO COMMIT ITSELF TO RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION;
-- CLEAR SIGNALS TO BOTH SIDES (GOVERNMENT AND REBELS) THAT WE HAVE NO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL;
-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF TRIBAL RECONCILIATION THROUGH INTER-TRIBAL DIALOGUE;
-- ENCOURAGEMENT OF RENEWED CHADIAN ROLE PLUS EXPRESSION OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ALL SIDE TO ACCOMPANY PROCESS AND TO ASSIST WITH QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING (PERHAPS THROUGH EXTENSION OF CPMT ACTIVITY);
-- ENCOURAGEMENT TO OUTSIDE ACTORS (SPLM, ERITREA, LIBYA, ETC) TO SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION (EU LEAD ON CONTACTS WITH LIBYA MIGHT MAKE MOST SENSE);
-- CONTINUED CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORTING A DARFUR PEACE PROCESS:
- (C) WASHINGTON WILL NOTICE OUR PREFERENCE FOR WORKING WITH EU PARTNERS AND ALLOWING THEM TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE. [illegible] THE B5
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E OF THAT. (INTERESTINGLY, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE[illegible] 1.4(B) 1.4(D) B1 [illegible] HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WILL SUPPORT THE EU EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS.) B5
GALLUCCI
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