Africa Press Guidance April 7, 2004, cable no. State 77443 , Office of the Secretary of State, State Department
National Security Archive
A declassified 2004 State Department memo shows how Washington juggled Sudan’s peace talks and the exploding Darfur crisis, revealing the diplomatic tightrope the U.S. walked.
Source: Africa Press Guidance April 7, 2004, cable no. State 77443 , Office of the Secretary of State, State Department Date: Mar 31, 2004 Archive: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
U.S. Press Guidance on Sudan, April 2004
The cable labeled State 77443 is a routine “press guidance” memo from the State Department’s Africa Bureau, drafted on 7 April 2004 and circulated to every American diplomatic post on the continent, as well as to the White House and the U.S. Mission to the UN. Its immediate trigger was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James Snyder’s meeting in Naivasha, Kenya, with Sudan’s Vice‑President Ali Mohamed Taha, SPLM/A Chairman John Garang, and General Sumbeywo, who was mediating the Inter‑Governmental Authority (IGA) talks on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The memo was produced just days before the IGA deadline of 11 April, when the parties were expected to seal a deal on the remaining “hard‑core” issues – the presidency, security arrangements, the Abyei border, and revenue sharing.
The broader crisis: Darfur and the CPA
The document sits at the intersection of two overlapping crises that dominated U.S. policy in Africa in the early 2000s. First, the IGA negotiations aimed to end the 21‑year civil war between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). By early 2004 the talks had produced a tentative framework, but key points – especially the status of Abyei and the composition of a post‑war power‑sharing presidency – remained contested. Second, the conflict in Darfur, which erupted in early 2003, was rapidly being framed in Washington as an emerging case of ethnic cleansing, with militia groups such as the Janjaweed accused of systematic attacks on non‑Arab civilians.
The cable’s “Darfur develops” section makes explicit the administration’s dual track: diplomatic pressure on the CPA while simultaneously warning Sudan about “grave concerns” over Darfur. It references the UN Security Council’s pending Item 9 resolution and a proposed special rapporteur, showing how Washington was leveraging multilateral mechanisms to force Khartoum’s hand.
What the language reveals about U.S. calculations
Several phrases betray the tension between public diplomacy and behind‑the‑scenes bargaining. Snyder’s insistence that the United States would “remain present at the talks for the next four days” signals a calibrated show of support – enough to reassure the SPLM/A that Washington was backing the IGA, but coupled with the warning that Washington “is not prepared to remain engaged indefinitely.” This phrasing leaves room for a diplomatic pull‑back if the CPA stalled, a classic “carrot‑and‑stick” approach.
The memo’s assessment of Darfur is striking for its candid terminology. When asked whether the atrocities constituted genocide, the staffer writes, “It appears that what is taking place is ethnic cleansing.” The choice to avoid the legally loaded term “genocide” while still labeling the violence as “ethnically based” reflects a cautious legal posture – likely intended to keep the option of stronger actions (such as sanctions or even military intervention) on the table without committing to the higher evidentiary standard required for genocide.
The inclusion of specific displacement figures – 750,000 internally displaced and 110,000 refugees in Chad – shows that the State Department was already quantifying the humanitarian fallout for congressional briefings and possible aid appropriations. Yet the memo expressly refrains from estimating death tolls, underscoring the uncertainty that still plagued U.S. intelligence on the ground.
Legacy and why the cable matters today
State 77443 is more than a bureaucratic update; it captures a moment when Washington tried to balance two high‑stakes diplomatic tracks. Within weeks of this guidance, the IGA produced a “final” agreement on 9 January 2005, leading to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that eventually birthed South Sudan’s independence in 2011. Simultaneously, Darfur’s crisis spiraled, prompting the UN‑African Union Mission (UNAMID) in 2007 and a protracted debate in Washington over the use of force – a debate that resurfaced in 2011 when the U.S. authorized limited airstrikes against Sudanese militia leaders.
The cable’s language foreshadows the administration’s later reliance on “robust diplomatic efforts” and “all appropriate means” to address Darfur, a phrasing that would reappear in congressional hearings and the 2006 Darfur Genocide Act. By documenting the internal calculus – the willingness to stay engaged, the legal caution around genocide, and the coordination with multilateral bodies – the memo helps scholars trace how U.S. policy evolved from a primarily mediation‑focused stance on the north‑south civil war to a more interventionist posture on Darfur.
For historians of early‑21st‑century U.S. Africa policy, this declassified guidance illustrates the real‑time juggling act of a department trying to shepherd a fragile peace process while confronting a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian disaster, and it reveals the nuanced language that policymakers used to keep diplomatic options open.
ORIGIN AF-00
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USNW-00 DODE-00 WHA-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00
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DCP-01 NSAE-00 OIC-00 OIG-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
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077443
SOURCE: CBLEXCLS.009654
DRAFTED BY: AF/PD:JBARNES -- 04/07/2004 202-647-6724
APPROVED BY: AF/PD:LWKOENGETER
----------------0985CB 071746Z /38
P 071744Z APR 04
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
UNCLAS STATE 077443
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP, OPRC, PREL, US, XA
SUBJECT: AFRICA PRESS GUIDANCE APRIL 7, 2004
AF PRESS GUIDANCE
SUDAN: TALKS MOVING AHEAD
APRIL 7, 2004
KEY POINTS
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SNYDER MET TODAY IN
NAIVASHA KENYA WITH THE HEADS OF DELEGATION AT THE
SUDAN PEACE TALKS: VICE PRESIDENT TAHA AND SUDAN
PEOPLES LIBERATION MOVEMENT CHAIRMAN GARANG, AS
WELL AS GENERAL SUMBEIYWO, WHO IS MEDIATING THE
TALKS ON BEHALF OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY
ON DEVELOPMENT.
THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY PUSHED THE PARTIES
TO FINALIZE THE AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING
OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE TWO SIDES ASSURED SNYDER
THAT THEY ARE COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT
WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR DAYS. GENERAL SUMBEIYWO HAS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
DATE/CASE ID: 09 AUG 2006 200502212
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED EXTENDED THE TALKS UNTIL APRIL 11.
THE TWO SIDES INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPAL ON FOUR OF THE SIX MAJOR POWER ISSUES (SECURITY ORGANS, THE PRESIDENCY, ABYEI, AND PERCENTAGES). THEY ARE INTENSIVELY DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF THE CAPITAL AND THE TWO CONFLICT AREAS OF SOUTHERN BLUE NILE AND NUBA MOUNTAINS.
SNYDER EMPHASIZED TO BOTH SIDES OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY MEDIATION EFFORT AND FOR EFFORTS THAT THE GROUP IS MAKING TO ENCOURAGE RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES.
THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED TO BOTH SIDES THAT THE UNITED STATE WOULD REMAIN PRESENT AT THE TALKS FOR THE NEXT FOUR DAYS GIVEN THE ASSURANCES PROVIDED BY THE TWO SIDES.
WHILE WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE PEACE EXPRESSED BY BOTH SIDES IT IS CLEAR THAT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN AND THAT THE PARTIES WILL NEED TO SHOW GOOD FAITH IN ORDER TO REACH COMPROMISES ON THE REMAINING ISSUES.
SNYDER UNDERSCORED THE UNITED STATE'S INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A PEACE ACCORD, BUT ALSO SAID THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO REMAIN ENGAGED INDEFINITELY.
SNYDER EXPRESSED TO SUDANESE VICE PRESIDENT TAHA OUR GRAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN DARFUR AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT COOPERATING IN THE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY IN CHAD TO NEGOTIATE A HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE THAT WOULD INCLUDE OUTSIDE MONITORING. SNYDER EMPHASIZED THE URGENCY OF THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT TAKING IMMEDIATE STEPS TO STOP THE ATTACKS AND ATROCITIES BEING PERPETRATED BY THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MILITIAS IN DARFUR.
AF PRESS GUIDANCE
SUDAN: DARFUR DEVELOPS APRIL 7, 2004
KEY POINTS
THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BE GRAVELY CONCERNED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED WITH THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN DARFUR. WE ARE DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE TALKS IN N'DJAMENA, CHAD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN AND THE ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS HAVE NOT MADE MORE PROGRESS.
HOWEVER, WE HEARD LAST NIGHT THAT THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION GROUPS FINALLY BEGAN DIRECT TALKS FOCUSED ON ACHIEVING AN HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE, WITH OUTSIDE MONITORING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TALKS ARE CONTINUING.
DURING HIS VISIT TO LAKE NAIVASHSA, KENYA TODAY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SNYDER DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH SUDANESE VICE PRESIDENT TAHA. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF DARFUR ISSUE TO THE UNITED STATES AND STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN TO COOPERATE IN THE CHAD TALKS AND TO ACHIEVE A HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE.
THE VICE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN WILL COOPERATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN CHAD.
THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN TO STOP THE ATTACKS AND ATROCITIES BEING COMMITTED BY GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MILITIAS IN DARFUR. THESE STEPS INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR LAST FRIDAY'S BRIEFING IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL'S PRESS STATEMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE ADOPTION OF A STRONG ITEM 9 RESOLUTION AT THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR.
WE HAVE SEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S COMMENTS AND FULLY SHARE HIS CONCERNS. THE KEY ISSUE NOW IS STOPPING THE VIOLENCE IN DARFUR. WE HOPE THAT OTHERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL SUPPORT OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SECURE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE.
WE INTEND TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN DARFUR UNDER INTENSE REVIEW AND INTEND TO USE ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS AND TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MORE PRECISE INFORMATION REGARDING WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND. BASED ON MULTIPLE SOURCES ON INFORMATION IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MILITIAS ARE CONTINUING TO ATTACK CIVILIANS AND COMMIT ATROCITIES. GIVEN THIS VERY GRAVE SITUATION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.
IF ASKED- IS THIS GENOCIDE?
IT APPEARS THAT WHAT IS TAKING PLACE IS ETHNIC CLEANSING. BY THAT WE MEAN WHAT IS OCCURRING HAS INVOLVED ATTACKS AND ATROCITIES AGAINST AFRICAN CIVILIANS BY THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED ARAB MILITIAS. WE KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE ATTACKS AND ATROCITIES ARE APPARENTLY WIDE SPREAD AND APPEAR IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO BE ETHNICALLY BASED. WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN MUST TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO STOP THE ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS.
IF ASKED ABOUT SYG'S COMMENT ON MILITARY ACTION:
UNDERSTAND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS SPEAKING OF A CONTINUUM OF STEPS, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE MILITARY ACTION AS AN EXTREME MEASURE. WE UNDERSTAND HIS CONCERN. THE FOCUS NOW IS ON ROBUST DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO BRING A CEASEFIRE AND STOP THE BLOODSHED. WE BELIEVE THESE EFFORTS CAN SUCCEED. WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT.
IF ASKED ABOUT NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED, DISPLACED, ETC:
USAID IS REPORTING THAT 750,000 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED AND AN ADDITIONAL 110,000 HAVE SOUGHT REFUGE IN CHAD AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT.
WE CANNOT SPECULATE THE NUMBER OF DEATHS CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT. POWELL
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
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