EACT: Darfur Humanitarian Update #6 (March 22-28, 2004), cable no. Khartoum 334 , Gerard Gallucci, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum
National Security Archive
A 2004 State Department cable details how Sudan’s Janjaweed militias, backed by the government, intensified attacks in Darfur, forcing massive displacement and prompting a costly humanitarian airlift.
Source: EACT: Darfur Humanitarian Update #6 (March 22-28, 2004), cable no. Khartoum 334 , Gerard Gallucci, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum Date: Mar 31, 2004 Archive: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Weekly Dispatch from the Frontlines of Darfur
The cable dated 31 March 2004 is the sixth in a series of “EACT: Darfur Humanitarian Updates” transmitted by Chargé d’Affaires Gerard Gallucci from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. It was generated as part of the State Department’s Emergency Assistance Coordination Team (EACT), a bureaucratic hub created after the United Nations declared the conflict in western Sudan a humanitarian crisis in early 2004. The memo was circulated to a wide audience of inter‑agency actors—CIA, DIA, USAID, the U.N. mission in Geneva, and senior officials in Washington—reflecting the urgency with which Washington sought to monitor the rapidly deteriorating security and relief environment.
The document belongs to the early‑war phase of the Darfur conflict (2003‑2004), a period when the Sudanese government’s Janjaweed militias began a campaign of scorched‑earth attacks against non‑Arab farming communities. By March 2004 the violence had spilled into the south, pitting the Janjaweed and government forces against the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). The fighting triggered massive internal displacement, with estimates of half a million people on the move by the summer of 2004. The United States, still formulating its diplomatic response, relied on these weekly updates to shape policy, allocate aid, and calibrate the language of its public statements.
Gallucci’s report is stark in its enumeration of new attacks: villages around Tawula razed on 19 March, an SLA assault on Burum on 22 March, and a Janjaweed raid on a refugee site near the Chadian border on 18 March. The language—“government‑supported militias,” “impunity,” “traumatized by constant threats of rape”—reveals a diplomatic calculus that already framed the Janjaweed as an extension of the Sudanese Armed Forces (GOS). The memo’s emphasis on “voluntary return” policies, juxtaposed with the observation that the Janjaweed still controlled key return zones, signals an internal tension: Washington was warning Khartoum of humanitarian standards while simultaneously acknowledging the regime’s leverage over displaced populations.
Beyond the headline violence, the cable provides a logistical snapshot of the humanitarian architecture. It notes that the UN Joint Logistics Center had been cleared to operate in the Krinik area, that road access between El Obeid and Nyala was “satisfactory,” yet the artery to El Fasher remained closed because of security concerns. The World Food Programme’s decision to air‑lift 1,000 metric tons of food from El Obeid to El Fasher illustrates how the United Nations was forced to rely on costly air corridors when ground convoys became too risky—a pattern that would repeat throughout the conflict.
The protective dimension of the memo is particularly revealing. An inter‑agency mission’s visit to Kebkabiya and Tawula uncovered systematic sexual violence, with girls as young as twelve being raped “in front of their fathers.” By documenting these abuses, the State Department was building an evidentiary base that would later underpin U.S. calls for International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement and for sanctions against Sudanese officials. The report also records that “GOS security forces” turned back IDPs attempting to reach Khartoum, suggesting that the capital was not a safe haven and that the government was actively managing displacement to limit international scrutiny.
The significance of this cable lies in its timing and audience. Issued just weeks before the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1556 (July 2004), which imposed an arms embargo on Sudan and demanded an end to the Janjaweed’s attacks, the memo supplied the factual matrix that informed the debate in Washington. Its distribution to senior defense and intelligence officials indicates that the U.S. was already treating Darfur as a security issue with regional implications, not merely a humanitarian emergency.
Legacy‑wise, the EACT updates became a primary source for scholars reconstructing the early dynamics of the Darfur war. They expose how U.S. policymakers balanced diplomatic caution with moral condemnation, and how the language of “voluntary return” was used to pressure Khartoum while masking the coercive reality on the ground. The document also foreshadows the later shift from humanitarian assistance to a more robust political stance, culminating in the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that eventually led to the ICC indictment of Sudanese officials. For contemporary readers, the cable reminds us that bureaucratic memos, though terse, can illuminate the moment when a crisis moves from the periphery of foreign policy to the center of strategic decision‑making.
ACTION AF-00 UNCLASSIFIED E1 RELEASED IN FULL INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CA-00 INL-00 USNW-00 SRPP-00 EUR-00 UTED-00 FDRE-01 VC-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 VCE-00 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OIC-00 PA-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TEST-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /002W ------------------05AE62 311731Z /38 O R 312337Z MAR 04 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0415 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA AMEMBASSY ASMARA AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS AMEMBASSY CAIRO CIA WASHDC DIA WASHDC USMISSION GENEVA AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NAIROBI AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA NSC WASHDC AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME SECDEF WASHDC AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000334
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR KSMITH, BKAUFFELD, MBEERS, SGREEN, AREED NDJAMENA FOR TDY JELMORE, RWINTER, KALMQUIST NSC FOR JDWORKEN ROME FOR FODAG STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W STATE FOR AF/E:DRAAD STATE FOR PRM:TSTOLTZFUS USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:RWINTER, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST-SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, JMARKS, J.
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF, PHUM, EAID, SU SUBJECT: EACT: DARFUR HUMANITARIAN UPDATE #6 (MARCH 22-28, 2004)
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 306 (B) KHARTOUM 296 (C) KHARTOUM 229
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE DATE/CASE ID: 10 JAN 2007 200502144 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
- SUMMARY: THIS IS THE SIXTH WEEKLY UPDATE ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN DARFUR, WESTERN SUDAN. INCREASED FIGHTING BETWEEN THE SUDANESE LIBERATION ARMY (SLA) AND THE GOS IN SOUTH DARFUR HAS LED TO FURTHER DISPLACEMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH DARFUR. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN ALL OF GREATER DARFUR ARE MOVING TOWARDS URBAN AREAS FLEEING THE VIOLENCE LARGELY PERPETRATED BY THE GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED MILITIA KNOWN AS THE JANJAWEED. AID AGENCIES STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH THE PROVISION OF FOOD, HEALTH AND OTHER BASIC SERVICES TO IDPS AND OTHER WAR-AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN DARFUR. THE UN JOINT LOGISTICS CENTER HAS BEEN CALLED UPON TO SUPPORT THE UN EFFORT IN DARFUR. END SUMMARY.
ACCESS
- THE OFFICE OF THE UN SECURITY COORDINATOR (UNSECOORD) CLEARED THE KRINIK AREA (WEST DARFUR) FOR UN OPERATIONS. THE UN REPORTS THAT ROAD ACCESS BETWEEN EL OBEID AND NYALA IS SATISFACTORY. LINKS BETWEEN NYALA AND GENEINA ARE SPORADIC AND DEPENDENT ON SECURITY. THE ROAD BETWEEN EL OBEID AND EL FASHER REMAINS CLOSED FOR HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS DUE TO SECURITY. COMMERCIAL TRUCKERS ARE ALSO HESITANT TO USE THIS ROAD. TRANSPORT BETWEEN NYALA AND EL FASHER IS OFFICIALLY OPEN BUT CAN CLOSE AT ANY TIME DUE TO SECURITY. THERE IS A CRITICAL NEED TO MOVE FOOD INTO EL FASHER DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF IDPS GATHERED IN CAMPS IN THAT STATE. WFP WILL BEGIN ANOTHER AIRLIFT OF 1,000 MT FROM EL OBEID TO EL FASHER TO MEET THE NEED.
SECURITY
THE UN REPORTS THAT IDPS CONTINUE TO MOVE INTO EL FASHER, TAWILA AND KUTUM DUE TO RECURRING ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BY MILITIAS LINKED TO THE GOS. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MILITIAS ATTACKED 24 VILLAGES AROUND TAWILA ON MARCH 19 RESULTING IN THE MOVEMENT OF 3,000 - 4,000 IDPS TO THE TOWN OF TAWILA. TRIBAL CONFLICTS IN MELLIT LOCALITY LED TO THE DEATHS OF A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS. FIGHTING ERUPTED AFTER THE LOOTING OF LIVESTOCK. THE JANJAWEED REPORTEDLY ATTACKED A REFUGEE SITE 30 KILOMETERS NORTH OF TINA ON THE CHADIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER ON MARCH 18.
THE UN REPORTED HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GOS FORCES (INCLUDING THE GOS-SUPPORTED JANJAWEED MILITIAS) AND THE SLA IN SOUTH DARFUR, LEADING TO FURTHER DISPLACEMENTS. THE UN WORLD
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) DESCRIBED LARGE NUMBERS OF IDPS IN KASS WITH ADDITIONAL IDPS ARRIVING DAILY FROM THE SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE.
AN ATTACK BY THE SUDANESE LIBERATION ARMY (SLA) ON THE TOWN OF BURUM (SOUTH DARFUR) ON MARCH 22 IS EXPECTED TO HAVE RESULTED IN DISPLACEMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AS WELL AS CASUALTIES. THIS ASSAULT ALLEGEDLY RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THREE SENIOR LEADERS OF THE HABANIA TRIBE. IT IS UNCLEAR WHO WHICH SIDE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIATING THIS CLASH BUT IT MAY - AND MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO -- EXACERBATE TRIBAL CONFLICT IN THIS AREA. THE UN REPORTED THAT GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MILITIAS STRUCK THE VILLAGES OF BIATRA, MERSHENG AND WAD ALMERAM BETWEEN MARCH 19 AND 21.
DRIVERS OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLES ARE REFUSING TO TRAVEL ALONG THE GENEINA TO OMAR SERAF ROAD IN WEST DARFUR CITING INSECURITY.
KHARTOUM 00000334 002 OF 004
MENT OF RELIEF COMMODITIES. ALSO IN WEST DARFUR, THE UN REPORTED THAT JANJAWEED ARE OPERATING WITH IMPUNITY IN MANY AREAS OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL, EL GENEINA.
PROTECTION
AN INTERAGENCY MISSION VISITED KEBKABIYA AND TAWILLA (NORTH DARFUR) ON MARCH 20-21. THE TEAM REPORTED THAT IDPS IN KEBKABIYA ARE TRAUMATIZED BY THE CONSTANT THREATS OF RAPE AND VIOLENCE. THE IDPS IN TAWILLA STATED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO HARASSMENT. AN NGO REPORT ON INTERVIEWS WITH IDPS REVEALS THE EXTENT OF THE DEHUMANIZING VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS AS YOUNG AS 12 AND 13 WHO ARE OFTEN RAPED IN FRONT OF THEIR FATHERS. OTHER IDPS HAVE CLAIMED THAT MANY IDPS WHO MAKE THEIR WAY TO KHARTOUM ARE TURNED BACK BY GOS SECURITY FORCES AND DISCOURAGED FROM SETTLING WITH THEIR RELATIVES IN KHARTOUM (NOTE: EMBASSY HAS REPORTED ON THE ARRIVAL OF IDPS IN KHARTOUM AND ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THEIR MOVEMENTS, REFS A AND C).
KEY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE WALI (GOVERNOR) OF SOUTH DARFUR TO RAISE CONCERNS ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND ACCESS TO VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE. RELIEF AGENCIES HAVE NOTED THAT THE GOS IS PROMOTING A POLICY OF "VOLUNTARY" RETURN OF IDPS IN SOUTH AND WEST DARFUR. UN AGENCIES AND NGOS HAVE ENGAGED WITH GOS OFFICIALS IN THESE STATES TO ENSURE THAT ANY RETURNS ARE TRULY VOLUNTARY AND THAT THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR RETURN EXIST IN TERMS OF SHELTER, FOOD, WATER, HEALTH, SERVICES AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, SECURITY. IT REPORTED THAT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED JANJAWEED STILL CONTROL AREAS WHERE THE GOS WOULD LIKE IDPS TO RETURN. THE UN REPORTS THAT THE STATE MINISTER FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS IN WEST DARFUR HAS ALREADY ALLOCATED FUNDS TO RETURN IDPS TO ZALENGI. HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES DOUBT THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION WILL PERMIT THE SAFE RETURN OF IDPS TO ZALENGI AT THE MOMENT.
- KEY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES PARTICIPATED IN THE FIRST SECTORAL MEETING ON PROTECTION IN KHARTOUM ON MARCH 21. CARE INTERNATIONAL PLANS ON ASSESSMENT MISSION TO KUBUM AND KASS IN SOUTH DARFUR, AND WILL LOOK SPECIFICALLY AT PROTECTION ISSUES RELATED TO IDPS AND HOST POPULATIONS.
NORTH DARFUR
CONDITIONS IN MESHTEL IDPS CAMP IN EL FASHER REMAIN DIRE. THE CROWDED CONDITIONS REMAIN AN ON-GOING CONCERN. THE HEALTH AND SANITATION SITUATION IS DEPLORABLE. RELIEF AGENCIES PLAN TO INSTALL ADDITIONAL COMMUNAL LATRINES, DISTRIBUTE NON-FOOD ITEMS (NFI) AND DISTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL FOOD RATIONS.
AN INTER-AGENCY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITED KEBKABIYA AND TRANSMITTED REPORTS OF DETERIORATING CONDITIONS AS THE COPING MECHANISM OF IDPS AND HOST COMMUNITIES CONTINUE TO WEAKEN. NEW IDPS ARE STILL MOVING TO KEBKABIYA FROM NEARBY VILLAGES. THE HOSPITAL IN KEBKABIYA REMAINS THE ONLY HEALTH FACILITY PROVIDING SERVICES. THERE IS AN INCONSISTENT FLOW OF UN-PROVIDED EMERGENCY DRUGS FOR THE FACILITY.
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY HAS CEASED IN TAWILLA AND THE UN REPORTS THAT IDPS ARE URGENTLY IN NEED OF FOOD AID AS WELL AS INTERVENTIONS IN THE SANITATION SECTOR. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION REPORTS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF DRUGS IN TAWILLA.
KHARTOUM 00000334 003 OF 004
MP IN EL FASHER.
SOUTH DARFUR
- THE SITUATION IN SOUTH DARFUR SEEMS TO BE DETERIORATING DAILY WITH INCREASING REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, MASSIVE DISPLACEMENTS, ATTACKS AND FIGHTING. THE INSECURITY PREVENTS AGENCIES FROM TRAVELING AROUND SOUTH DARFUR TO PERFORM ASSESSMENTS AND DELIVER ASSISTANCE. IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF SOUTH DARFUR, IT IS BECOMING CLEAR THAT IDPS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED SEVERAL TIMES, ESCAPING THE ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT. THE MULTIPLE DISPLACEMENTS ARE TAKING A HEAVY TOLL ON THE COPING MECHANISMS OF THE IDPS.
WEST DARFUR
WFP COMPLETED FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN MORNEI AND STARTED DISTRIBUTION OF A 15-DAY RATION IN AND AROUND GENEINA AND UM HER. WFP IS EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS REGISTERING IDPS IN PARTS OF GENEINA AS LOCAL RESIDENTS OFTEN PRESENT THEMSELVES AT THE REGISTRATION TABLES AND CLAIM TO BE IDPS.
UNICEF IS AIRLIFTING BLANKETS, KITCHEN UTENSILS AND OTHER NFIS INTO WEST DARFUR. UNICEF'S LOCAL PARTNER IN WEST DARFUR FOR WATER AND SANITATION HAS REHABILITATED SEVEN HAND PUMPS IN ZALENGI, MORNEI, AND NERTITI. HOWEVER THE WATER SITUATION IN SISI IS DESCRIBED AS CRITICAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS. DONKEYS BELONGING TO IDPS IN THE CAMP AT SISI ARE STARTING TO DIE DUE TO LACK OF WATER RESOURCES. THE TWO DRILLING RIGS IN WEST DARFUR ARE OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO POOR CONDITION.
MISCELLANEOUS
AT THE REQUEST OF THE UN RESIDENT/HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR AND THE UN COUNTRY TEAM IN KHARTOUM, THE UN JOINT LOGISTICS CENTER (UNJLC) WAS TASKED WITH BEING THE FOCAL POINT FOR LOGISTICS COORDINATION FOR THE DARFUR EMERGENCY. THE FIRST LOGISTICS COORDINATION MEETING FOR DARFUR WAS HELD 25 MARCH FOLLOWING THE REGULAR SOUTHERN SUDAN LOGISTICS COORDINATION MEETING. THE UNJLC WAS SPECIFICALLY TASKED TO DEVELOP LOGISTICS PLANS FOR THE RAINY SEASON. THIS INCLUDES ESTIMATES OF TRANSPORT AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPLIES TO BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE RAINY SEASON AND FOR NEEDS DURING THE RAINY SEASON.
THE UN IS DEVELOPING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE CRISIS IN DARFUR THAT SHOULD BE RELEASED BY THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL.
HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR DEPARTS
- DR. MUKESH KAPILA, UN RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE AND HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR DEPARTED SUDAN ON MARCH 30. IN HIS LAST WEEKS AS RC/HC, DR. KAPILA HAS DRAWN THE ATTENTION AND IRE OF THE GOS THROUGH HIS POINTED AND DETAILED LETTERS REGARDING THE TRAGEDY UNFOLDING IN WESTERN SUDAN. POST WILL TRANSMIT TEXTS OF
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED THESE LETTERS SEPTEL. THE LETTERS WERE RELEASED TO ALL DONORS AFTER THE GOS LEAKED CONTENTS OF ONE OF DR. KAPILA'S LETTERS TO KHARTOUM 00000334 004 OF 004 S COMMUNIQUES AND INTERVIEWS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS WHICH HAVE HELPED DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE CRISIS. THE US EMBASSY, ON BEHALF OF DONORS, RELEASED ON MARCH 25 A STATEMENT IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH KAPILA'S CHARACTERIZATION OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR. GALLUCCI NNNN UNCLASSIFIED
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