Chad--Sudan: Darfur Refugees Situation Report, cable no. Nairobi 34 , Leslie Rowe, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi
National Security Archive
A 2004 Nairobi cable reveals how U.S. diplomats wrestled with uncertain refugee counts, security threats, and logistics to shape the early Darfur humanitarian response.
Source: Chad--Sudan: Darfur Refugees Situation Report, cable no. Nairobi 34 , Leslie Rowe, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi Date: Jan 5, 2004 Archive: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Front‑Line Dispatch from Nairobi
The cable dated 5 January 2004 is a routine “Situation Report” sent by Deputy Chief of Mission Leslie Rowe from the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi to a wide array of Washington agencies and overseas posts. It was generated after a Sudan‑field‑office officer, Daniel Sutherland, made a rapid field visit to eastern Chad in mid‑December 2003, the first U.S. diplomatic reconnaissance of the fledgling Darfur refugee spill‑over. The memo’s purpose was to calibrate U.S. humanitarian assistance—primarily through USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and the Office of Disaster Assistance (ODA)—against the on‑the‑ground realities that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was still trying to quantify.
The Darfur Crisis in Context
By late 2003 the Sudanese government’s counter‑insurgency in Darfur had escalated into a campaign of village burnings, mass killings and forced displacement, prompting the term “genocide” to appear in U.N. debates. The conflict’s regional dimension emerged when tens of thousands of Darfuris crossed the porous Chad‑Sudan border, straining Chad’s already fragile security and food‑security apparatus. Washington’s response was caught between two imperatives: averting a humanitarian disaster that could destabilize a key U.S. ally in the Sahel, and avoiding a direct entanglement in a conflict that was, at the time, still framed as an internal Sudanese matter.
What the Cable Reveals
Rowe’s memo does more than list numbers; it exposes the operational blind spots that shaped U.S. policy. First, the report underscores the extreme uncertainty of refugee counts—official Chadian estimates of 90,000 contrast sharply with UNHCR’s 60‑70 000 and Médecins Sans Frontières’ 30 000. The cable’s own field estimate of 40‑45 000, based on a brief drive of 2 400 km and visits to eight sites, suggests that Washington was already skeptical of inflated figures and wary of over‑committing resources.
Second, the document highlights three intertwined constraints: security, logistics, and identification. Cross‑border raids by Arab militias—identified in the text as “janjawit” or “peshmerga”—were not just a humanitarian hazard; they threatened the safety of aid workers and complicated any potential U.S. military or intelligence footprint. The terrain, a 1 000 km stretch of remote, clan‑intermixed settlements, rendered conventional aid delivery impossible, prompting the recommendation to concentrate displaced Darfuris in two central camps 50 km from the border. This recommendation signals a shift from ad‑hoc assistance to a more controlled, securitized humanitarian architecture that the U.S. would later fund through the Emergency Operations (EMOP) of the World Food Programme.
Third, the tone of the report is strikingly pragmatic. While acknowledging “harrowing ordeals” at the hands of militia, Rowe notes that refugees’ physical condition was “surprisingly good,” bolstered by ethnic clan support and an abundant Chadian harvest. This assessment likely tempered any impulse for a large‑scale emergency response and helped justify a modest, targeted contribution rather than a massive influx of aid.
Legacy and Relevance
The cable foreshadows the strategic calculus that guided U.S. engagement in Darfur for the next decade: a preference for supporting UN‑led humanitarian operations, limiting direct military involvement, and using diplomatic pressure (including the 2004 “genocide” label controversy) to compel Sudanese concessions. The emphasis on establishing central camps prefigured the later creation of the Adré and Goz Amer camps, which became focal points for both aid distribution and security monitoring.
In today’s context, the document offers a case study in how diplomatic field reports shape inter‑agency coordination and resource allocation under conditions of uncertainty. It also illustrates the enduring challenges of humanitarian assistance in conflict‑adjacent zones—issues that reappear in contemporary crises from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. By reading between the lines of Rowe’s terse dispatch, we see a snapshot of the early U.S. response to Darfur’s spill‑over, a response that balanced humanitarian concern with geopolitical caution, setting a template for later interventions.
The Human Dimension Behind the Numbers
Beyond the bureaucratic distribution list—State, CIA, DIA, NSC, USAID, UN agencies—the cable carries the voices of refugees who “recount harrowing ordeals” and the field officer who drove 2 400 km through “dusty” terrain to verify them. Their testimonies, filtered through diplomatic language, remind us that each statistic in the report represents a village razed, a family displaced, and a regional security dilemma that continues to reverberate.
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AIDAC
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W STATE FOR PRM:TSTOLTZFUS STATE FOR AF/E:DRAAD USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:RWINTER, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST- SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, KFARNSWORTH, JMARKS, JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER NAIROBI FOR KSMITH, BKAUFFELD, MBEERS, SGREEN, AREED ROME FOR FODAG
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NSC FOR JDWORKEN REDSO FOR ESTES AND DEPREZ E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN: DARFUR REFUGEES SITUATION REPORT
SUMMARY
- SUDAN FIELD OFFICE (SFO) FFP OFFICER DANIEL SUTHER TRAVELED TO CHAD 10-17 DECEMBER; MET WITH GOC OFFICIALS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, DROVE SOME 2,400 DUSTY KILOMETERS TO THE SUDANESE BORDER, AND VISITED EIGHT DARFUR REFUGEE AREAS SOUTH OF THE TOWN OF ADRE.
- WHILE NUMBERS ARE UNCERTAIN, THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 40,000-45,000 SUDANESE REFUGEES FROM DARFUR SCATTERED IN SOME FIFTY SETTLEMENTS ALONG A 1,000 KM STRETCH OF BORDER. THEIR LOCATION ON THE BORDER POSES SEVERAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING: SECURITY, WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS OCCURRING FREQUENTLY; LOGISTICS, AS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES SIMPLY CANNOT REACH THE DIFFUSE POPULATIONS IN THE CHALLENGING TERRAIN; AND IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE REFUGEES ARE SETTLED IN AREAS INHABITED BY THEIR TRIBAL CLANSMEN, AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUDANESE AND CHADIAN IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT.
- ALTHOUGH THE REFUGEES' PHYSICAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT OF CRISIS PROPORTIONS, WITH ETHNIC SUPPORT AND AN EXCELLENT RECENT HARVEST IN CHAD, MANY OF THEM RECOUNT HARROWING ORDEALS IN DARFUR AT THE HANDS OF ARAB "JANJAWIT" OR "PESHMERGA" MILITIA, WHO THE REFUGEES SAY HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE AND BURNED SCORES OF VILLAGES TO THE GROUND.
- THE SFO STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNHCR'S CURRENT PLANS TO OPEN TWO CENTRAL CAMPS SOME FIFTY KM FROM THE BORDER IN ORDER TO IMPROVE SECURITY, MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCESS REFUGEE POPULATIONS, AND DIFFERENTIATE REFUGEES FROM LOCAL CHADIAN POPULATIONS.
- THE SFO FURTHER RECOMMENDS AN APPROPRIATE DCHA/FFP CONTRIBUTION TO WFP'S UPCOMING EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP) IN EASTERN CHAD IF THE TWO CAMPS CAN BE ESTABLISHED, OR IF THE REFUGEES' CONDITIONS ALONG THE BORDER SHOULD WORSEN.
- GIVEN THE CONTINUING INABILITY OF AGENCIES TO FULLY
3 ACCESS DARFUR REGION FROM GOS AREAS, THE BORDER TOWN OF TINE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE ENTRY POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE INTO SUDANESE LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SLM/A) AREAS OF DARFUR. THIS WOULD NEED TO BE ASSESSED FOR ITS LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY, AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF POTENTIAL POPULATIONS AND AREAS THAT COULD BE EFFECTIVELY ACCESSED IN SUCH A CROSS-BORDER OPERATION. END SUMMARY
REFUGEE SITUATION
- THERE HAVE BEEN THREE MAIN ZONES OF SUDANESE REFUGEE INFLUX INTO EASTERN CHAD FROM APRIL ONWARDS THIS YEAR: A AIDAC
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W STATE FOR PRM:TSTOLTZFUS STATE FOR AF/E:DRAAD USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:RWINTER, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST- SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, KFARNSWORTH, JMARKS, JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER NAIROBI FOR KSMITH, BKAUFFELD, MBEERS, SGREEN, AREED ROME FOR FO
NORTHERN, PRIMARILY ETHNIC ZAGHAWA AREA INCLUDING BIRAK, TINE AND BAHAI, COMPRISING ABOUT HALF THE TOTAL REFUGEES; A CENTRAL, VERY SCATTERED, PREDOMINATELY MASSALIT POPULATION SOUTH OF BIRAK TO ADE; AND A NEWER SOUTHERN FUR COMMUNITY AROUND TISSI, IN THE SOUTHEASTERN TIP OF THE COUNTRY.
THE REFUGEE POPULATION NUMBERS VARY WIDELY DEPENDING ON THE SOURCE. THE GOC ESTIMATES SOME 90,000 REFUGEES, WHILE UNHCR/WFP ASSESSMENTS IN AUGUST AND OCTOBER ESTIMATED APPROXIMATELY 60,000-70,000 PEOPLE. THE UN BELIEVES THESE FIGURES ARE PROBABLY HIGH, HOWEVER, AND MSF HAS ESTIMATED AROUND 30,000 REFUGEES.
WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000-1,500 NEW ARRIVALS IN RECENT WEEKS IN THE CENTRAL ZONE, AND AN ADDITIONAL 6,000-8,000 IN THE SOUTH, UNHCR BELIEVES THERE ARE NOW APPROXIMATELY 40,000-45,000 SUDANESE REFUGEES IN EASTERN CHAD. WE BELIEVE THIS ESTIMATE SOUNDS FAIRLY REASONABLE; HOWEVER,
4 GIVEN THE SCATTERED LOCATIONS OF THE REFUGEES ALONG 1,000 KM OF BORDER, AND THE FACT THAT THEY ARE LIVING TOGETHER WITH THEIR CHADIAN ETHNIC CLANSMEN, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE A SOLID ESTIMATE UNTIL CENTRAL CAMPS ARE ESTABLISHED.
THE REFUGEES' PHYSICAL CONDITIONS ARE SURPRISINGLY GOOD. THEY ARE GENERALLY LIVING IN THEIR CLANSMEN'S AREAS, SO RECEIVE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FROM FAMILY TIES; MANY OF THEM HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE LABOR IN CHADIAN SORGHUM AND PEANUT FIELDS, HELPING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COUNTRY'S RECENT EXCELLENT HARVEST, WHICH SOME ESTIMATE AT AROUND 30% ABOVE AVERAGE; AND MANY REFUGEES ALSO HAVE BROUGHT LARGE NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK WITH THEM.
MSF/HOLLAND, BASED ON THE BORDER IN ADRE, NOTED THAT THE REFUGEE SITUATION WAS "NOT A MEDICAL CRISIS", AND PROVIDED A VERY ROUGH ESTIMATION OF MALNOURISHED CHILDREN BASED ON IMMUNIZATION NUMBERS IN ONE AREA THAT CALCULATED TO LESS THAN 5% GLOBAL ACUTE MALNUTRITION.
SECURITY, LOGISTICS AND IDENTIFICATION: DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE...
THERE ARE THREE MAJOR CONSTRAINTS FOR AGENCIES TRYING TO ACCESS THE REFUGEES. THE FIRST, SECURITY, AFFECTS THE REFUGEES AND LOCAL CHADIANS EVEN MORE THAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, BUT POSES A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR AGENCIES AS WELL. SECURITY ALONG THE BORDER HAS WORSENED CONSIDERABLY IN RECENT MONTHS, WITH FREQUENT CROSS-BORDER RAIDING OCCURRING, OFTEN TO STEAL LIVESTOCK OF BOTH REFUGEES AND CHADIANS, WITH REVENGE ATTACKS INTO SUDAN ALSO REPORTED. MUCH OF THE BORDER AREA HAS BECOME INSECURE AT NIGHT, AND SOME OF IT EVEN DURING THE DAY. GOS HELICOPTERS ALSO REGULARLY PATROL THE BORDER AREA, CAUSING A SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONG THE REFUGEES.ROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER NAIROBI FOR KS
THE SECOND DIFFICULTY IS LOGISTICS, AS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES ARE NOT ABLE TO REGULARLY ACCESS ALL THE REFUGEE SITES DUE TO THE VAST AREA AND LACK OF ROADS. THIRDLY, AS THE BORDER CHADIANS ARE OF THE SAME TRIBES AS THE REFUGEES, IDENTIFICATION OF TRUE REFUGEES CAN BE
5 EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.
MSF/HOLLAND AND MSF/BELGIUM WORK IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN ZONES RESPECTIVELY, MANAGING PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTERS, MOBILE CLINICS, EPI PROGRAMS AND NUTRITIONAL FEEDING. MSF/H NOTED THAT ACCESS WAS QUITE DIFFICULT, GIVEN POOR ROAD CONDITIONS, AND THAT A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT MAY HAVE SIMPLY MOVED ON TO A NEW AREA THE NEXT TIME MSF ARRIVED; THE AGENCY WAS THEN FORCED TO SEARCH FOR THE POPULATIONS OVER THE FOLLOWING DAY OR TWO. MSF ALSO BELIEVED THAT AS THE ABUNDANT HARVEST DIMINISHES OVER THE COMING MONTHS, REFUGEES' CONDITIONS WOULD LIKELY DETERIORATE.
WFP HAS PROVIDED SOME 500 MT OF FOOD TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AMONG THE REFUGEES, BUT HAS FOUND THE LOGISTICS OF DELIVERING THIS ASSISTANCE TO BE DAUNTING. WFP'S NEW EMOP, REQUESTING 13,878 MT OF COMMODITIES FOR 60,000 PEOPLE JANUARY-DECEMBER 2004, IS CURRENTLY IN THE FINAL APPROVAL PROCESS.
UNHCR HAS ALSO DISTRIBUTED SOME ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING PLASTIC SHEETING AND JERRYCANS. AS WITH WFP, UNHCR HAS FOUND THE LOGISTICS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.
THE BORDER TOWN OF ADRE LIES IN CHAD'S EASTERN OUADDAI REGION, "THE LAND OF WADIS", AND JUST TO REACH THE BORDER ALONG THE MAIN ROAD, ONE MUST CROSS SCORES OF DRY RIVERBEDS, DIFFICULT EVEN IN THE DRY SEASON, AND WHICH, WHEN FULL OF WATER JUNE-AUGUST, CAN BECOME COMPETELY IMPASSABLE. THESE GEOGRAPHIC HINDRANCES, COMBINED WITH THE REFUGEES LIVING IN SOME FIFTY SETTLEMENTS ALONG A 1,000 KM STRETCH OF BORDER -- IN A REMOTE REGION WITHOUT GOOD (OR SOMETIMES ANY) ROADS -- MAKE THE LOGISTICS SOMEWHAT OVERWHELMING.
WFP NOW HAS AN EMERGENCY COORDINATOR AND A LOGISTICS OFFICER BASED IN THE EAST TO SUPORT ITS OPERATION. VEHICLES AND PORTABLE STORAGE FACILITIES HAVE ALSO RECENTLY ARRIVED INCOUNTRY. GIVEN THE REFUGEES' CURRENTLY GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION, WITH AN ABUNDANT HARVEST, AND THE CONSTRAINTS PRESENTED ABOVE, THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR HAS RECOMMENDED THAT WFP NOT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES, EXCEPT FOR NUTRITIONAL SUPPORT THROUGH MSF/H AND MSF/B, UNTIL ACCESSIBLE CENTRAL CAMPS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED OR THE REFUGEES' CONDITIONS SHOULD WORSEN.
6
...THUS A NEED FOR CENTRAL CAMPS
-------------------------------FUS
STATE FOR AF/E:DRAD
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:RWINTER, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST-
SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, KFARNSWORTH, JMARKS,
JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN
USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA
USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE
USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL
USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER
NAIROBI FOR KSMITH, BKAUFFELD, MBEERS, SGREEN, AREED
ROME FOR FODAG
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NSC FOR JDWORKEN
REDSO FOR E
19. A UNHCR EMERGENCY TEAM, ON GROUND IN THE EAST FOR
THE PAST THREE MONTHS, BELIEVES THE CURRENT SITUATION IS
UNTENABLE. IT HAS RECOMENDED -- DUE TO THE WORSENING
BORDER SECURITY, OVERWHELMING LOGISTICS, AND THE
DIFFICULTY IN DIFFERENTIATING REFUGEES FROM CHADIAN
POPULATIONS -- THAT TWO CENTRAL CAMPS BE ESTABLISHED
AROUND FIFTY KM FROM THE BORDER. UNHCR BELIEVES THAT
ONLY TRUE REFUGEES REQUIRING ASSISTANCE WILL MOVE TO THE
CAMPS, AND THAT CHADIAN POPULATIONS, AS WELL AS REFUGEES
WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK, WOULD PREFER NOT TO
SHIFT FROM THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS.
20. UNHCR PROPOSES OPENING ONE CAMP IN FARCHANA FOR THE
CENTRAL/SOUTHERN POPULATIONS, AND ANOTHER UP IN SAHARAN
FOR THE NORTHERN. THE GOC HAS AGREED TO ESTABLISHING
FARCHANA, AND GTZ IS DUE TO BEGIN PREPARING IT FOR
OCCUPATION BY LATE JANUARY. THE SFO/FFP OFFICER EXAMINED
THE SIXTEEN SQ KM SITE, WHICH APPEARED QUITE ADEQUATE
FOR 20,000 PEOPLE, TOGETHER WITH A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF
LIVESTOCK OUTSIDE ITS PERIMETERS. FARCHANA OFFICIALS
ALSO PLEDGED TO PROVIDE THE REFUGEES SOME ACCESS TO
FARMLAND.
21. UNHCR'S MAIN DIFFICULTY WITH FARCHANA IS THE
LOGISTICS INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTING 6,000-8,000 PEOPLE
THERE FROM TISSI, SOME 550 KM (AND FOUR-DAYS' TRUCK
DRIVE) AWAY -- WHICH MAY TAKE OVER ONE MONTH TO
ACCOMPLISH. WFP IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING
FOOD FOR WORK (FFW) FOR LOCAL CHADIAN POPULATIONS TO
IMPROVE THIS ROUTE.
22. AS OPPOSED TO THE POSITIVE FORWARD MOVEMENTS ON
FARCHANA, UNHCR IS EXPERIENCING SOME DIFFICULTY IN
7
OBTAINING GOC APPROVAL TO ESTABLISH THE NORTHERN CAMP OF
SAHARAN, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE SOME LOCAL OFFICIALS WOULD
PREFER THAT THE REFUGEES REMAIN IN THEIR AREAS ALONG THE
BORDER. OBSERVERS SPECULATE THAT THEIR RATIONALE MAY BE
TO INFLATE REFUGEE NUMBERS AND THEREFORE THE ASSISTANCE
PROVIDED, AS WELL AS TO FACILITATE SLM/A MOVEMENT AND
ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE BORDER.
23. UNHCR BELIEVES A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION IS NECESSARY,
NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE THIS NORTHERN ZONE IS INHABITED BY
HIS ZAGHAWA GROUP, AND THE REFUGEES THERE ARE ALSO
PREDOMINATELY ZAGHAWA. THE UN ASSISTANT HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TRAVELED TO CHAD 16-18
DECEMBER, AND WE PRESUME THAT THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH
PRESIDENT DEBY AT THAT TIME.
24. IN SHORT, WHILE HUMANITARIAN ACCESS HAS BEEN
LOGISTICALLY DIFFICULT, THE REFUGEES DO NOT CURRENTLY
REQUIRE MAJOR SUPPORT, AND IF THE CAMPS CAN BE
ESTABLISHED AND RUNNING BY THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WILL THEN BE MUCH BETTER
ABLE TO ACCESS THOSE WHO ARE TRULY IN NEED OF
ASSISTANCE.
--------------------, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST-
SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, KFARNSWORTH, JMARKS,
JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN
USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA
USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE
USAID FOR DCHA
REFUGEES' REPORTS FROM DARFUR
------------------------------
25. AS MUCH OF THE NORTHERN ZONE'S BORDER AREA IN SUDAN
IS CONTROLLED BY THE SLM/A, REPORTS FROM THERE INDICATE
MOSTLY GOS ANTONOV BOMBING OF TOWNS AND MARKETS, AND
FEWER MILITA INCURSIONS -- MORE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTIMIDATION THAN A TRUE MILITARY CAMPAIGN. THE SLM/A IS
STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE CLANS WITHIN THE
ZAGHAWA COMMUNITY. WHILE SMALL IN NUMBER, THE ZAGHAWA
IN CHAD ARE EXTREMELY POWERFUL POLITICALLY AND
ECONOMICALLY.
26. ALONG THE CENTRAL/SOUTHERN ZONE -- BIRAK TO TISSI --
THE GOS CONTROLS THE BORDER, AND THE MASSALIT REFUGEES
INTERVIEWED RECOUNTED NUMEROUS ATTACKS BY "ARABS" WHICH
FORCED THEM INTO CHAD. WHEN PRESSED FOR MORE DETAIL ON
THE ATTACKERS, THEY DISCUSSED "JANJAWIT", ARMED CAMEL-
8 AND HORSEMEN, WHO HAD MOVED ONTO THE REFUGEES' FARMS AND WHOSE CATTLE HAD EATEN THEIR CROPS.
THE REFUGEES NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN TRADITIONAL CONFLICT WITH THESE PASTORAL ARABS FOR GENERATIONS, BUT THAT THE ARABS WERE NOW BEING SUPPORTED BY ARMED MILITIA KNOWN AS "PESHMERGA", WHO HAD KILLED MANY PEOPLE AND BURNED A LARGE NUMBER OF VILLAGES. THE REFUGEES BELIEVED THAT THIS BURNING HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT TO INTIMIDATE THEM, AND IT APPEARED TO BE QUITE EFFECTIVE, AS MANY REFUGEES WERE CLEARLY TRAUMATIZED AND DID NOT FEEL SAFE RETURNING HOME AT PRESENT.
REFUGEES IN NAKOULOUTA SETTLEMENT REPORTED THAT TWO DAYS EARLIER, THEY HAD HEARD THAT 12 VILLAGES WERE BURNED AND 52 PEOPLE KILLED IN DARFUR; THE REFUGEES WERE ALSO ABLE TO NAME EACH OF THESE VILLAGES IN TURN, LENDING SOME CREDENCE TO THIS REPORT. A GROUP OF REFUGEES THERE ALSO POINTED TO SMOKE ACROSS THE WADI KAJA BORDER, AND STATED THAT THAT WAS ONE OF THE VILLAGES BURNING. NOTE: WE WERE NOT ABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRM EITHER OF THESE REPORTS. END NOTE
WHEN ASKED WHAT HAD CHANGED NOW, AFTER LIVING TOGETHER WITH ARAB SUDANESE FOR SO MANY YEARS WITH MAINLY LOWER-LEVEL CONFLICTS, THE REFUGEES NOTED THAT PREVIOUSLY, IF THEIR CATTLE WERE RAIDED OR THE PASTORALISTS' ANIMALS ATE THEIR CROPS, THEY FELT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SENSE OF JUSTICE, AS THE GOS WOULD COMPENSATE THEM. NOW, THE REFUGEES SAID, THE ARAB COMMUNITIES WERE VIOLENTLY TAKING OVER THEIR LAND WITH GOS SUPPORT AND WEAPONRY BECAUSE THE REFUGEES WERE PERCEIVED TO BE "REBEL SYMPATHIZERS"; THEY THUS HAD NO OPTION BUT TO FLEE.
COMMENT: APPARENTLY THE IRONY IS LOST ON THESE ARAB "PESHMERGA" OF CHOOSING A NAME SYNONYMOUS NOT ONLY WITH FIERCE FIGHTERS, BUT ALSO WITH KURDISH PATRIOTS FIGHTING SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST ARAB DOMINANCE. END COMMENT JMARKS, JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER
SYSTEMATIC "ETHNIC CLEANSING"?
9 30. A NUMBER OF UNHCR OFFICIALS DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN DARFUR AS "ETHNIC CLEANSING", IN ORDER TO EXTERMINATE OR EXPEL THE BLACK, MUSLIM BUT NON-ARABIZED POPULATIONS THERE. NEARLY ALL THE REFUGEES COULD RELATE HOW THEY HAD SEEN FAMILY MEMBERS OR FELLOW VILLAGERS KILLED, AND THEIR FARMS BURNED, OR HAD AT LEAST HEARD ABOUT NEIGHBORING VILLAGES RAZED AND DECIDED TO FLEE. THE REFUGEES HAVE CLEARLY EXPERIENCED A GREAT DEAL OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, WHICH THEY SAID WAS BEING FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE GOS.
THE ANTONOV BOMBINGS AND VICIOUS ARAB MILITIA ATTACKS ALSO WERE PART OF THE TACTICAL PATTERN THE GOS EMPLOYED, UNTIL ONLY RECENTLY, FOR YEARS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN, AS AN ATTEMPT TO PUT DOWN INSURRECTION THERE. SOME SPECULATE THAT THE IMPENDING PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE SPLM HAS NOW ALLOWED THE GOS A FREER HAND TO PROSECUTE ITS CAMPAIGN MORE VIOLENTLY AGAINST THE DARFUR REBELLION.
THE REFUGEES IN CHAD COME MAINLY FROM AREAS IN DARFUR WITHIN FIFTY KM OF THE BORDER, AND THEY REPORTED THAT A MUCH LARGER NUMBER OF THOSE BEING ATTACKED HAD FLED IN OTHER DIRECTIONS TO WHAT ARE PERCEIVED AS "SAFE AREAS", INCLUDING LARGER TOWNS, IN DARFUR. THIS SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT EXTERMINATION OR ERADICATION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE GOS' GOAL, BUT RATHER AN EXTREME ATTEMPT TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE AREA UNDER ASSAULT BY ARMED REBELS. THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES SAID THAT THEY WERE BEING HEAVILY PERSECUTED AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF THEIR PERCEIVED SUPPORT FOR THE SLM/A.
THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH THE REFUGEES, IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT MANY NON-ARABIZED POPULATIONS IN DARFUR ARE BEING KILLED OR FORCED OFF THEIR LAND, AND THEIR VILLAGES RAZED. HOWEVER, IT IS SOMEWHAT LESS CLEAR WHETHER THE GOS IS SYSTEMATICALLY TRYING TO RID ITSELF COMPLETELY OF AFRICAN TRIBES, ESPECIALLY WHEN MOST OF THOSE DISPLACED REMAIN IN DARFUR.
WHETHER THE VIOLENT CAMPAIGN BEING PROSECUTED IN DARFUR IS ACTUALLY A SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT AT ETHNIC CLEANSING, OR A TERRIBLE ESCALATION OF TRADITIONAL TRIBAL ANIMOSITIES CARRIED OUT AGAINST CIVILIANS DUE TO PERCIEVED REBEL SYMPATHIES, THE RESULT IS PAINFUL TO HEAR IN THE REFUGEES' STORIES OF VICTIMIZATION.
CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
10 35. WHILE THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL WOUNDS REMAIN UNDIAGNOSED, THE SUDANESE REFUGEES' PHYSICAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT CURRENTLY OF CRISIS PROPORTIONS, LIVING AS THEY ARE WITHFUS STATE FOR AF/E:DRAAD USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:RWINTER, BGARVELINK, THALMRAST-SANCHEZ, JBORNS, DRHOAD, KFARNSWORTH, JMARKS, JKIMBROUGH, CTHOMAS-JENSEN USAID FOR SUDAN TASK FORCE:KALMQUIST, AHENSON, BDSILVA USAID FOR DCHA/FFP:SBRADLEY, RWAGNER USAID FOR DCHA/OTI:LMESERVE USAID FOR DCHA/DG:WMARSHALL USAID FOR AFR/EA:SWISECARVER, RNIEC, JSCHNEIDER NAIROBI FOR KSMITH, BKAUFFELD, MBEERS, SGREEN, AREED ROME FOR FODAG GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NSC FOR JDWORKEN REDSO FOR E
THEIR CHADIAN CLANSMEN OFF A RECENT BOUNTIFUL HARVEST. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE EXTREME VICTIMIZATION STILL OCCURRING IN DARFUR, THE SITUATION MAY WELL WORSEN BEFORE IT IMPROVES -- WITH GROWING NUMBERS OF REFUGEES LIVING IN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS AS THE HARVEST DIMINISHES. WFP, UNHCR AND MSF ARE WORKING EXTREMELY WELL TO SERVE THE REFUGEES, BUT ARE LOGISTICALLY HEAVILY PRESSED.
THE SFO STRONGLY SUPPORTS UNHCR'S CURRENT PLANS TO OPEN TWO CENTRAL CAMPS SOME FIFTY KILOMETERS FROM THE BORDER IN ORDER TO REDUCE INSECURITY, ACCESS POPULATIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUAL REFUGEES. IF THE GOC CONTINUES TO STALL ON ALLOWING THE NORTHERN CAMP, WE RECOMMEND INCREASED POLITICAL SUPPORT TO UNHCR TO ENSURE THE CAMP'S ESTABLISHMENT.
THE SFO FURTHER RECOMMENDS AN APPROPRIATE DCHA/FFP CONTRIBUTION TO WFP'S UPCOMING EMOP IF THE TWO CAMPS CAN BE ESTABLISHED, OR IF THE REFUGEES' CONDITIONS ALONG THE BORDER SHOULD WORSEN.
GIVEN THE CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN DARFUR REGION, COMBINED WITH THE INABILITY OF AGENCIES TO ACCESS THE AFFECTED AREAS ADEQUATELY FROM GOS TERRITORY, THE BORDER TOWN OF TINE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE ENTRY POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE INTO SLM/A AREAS OF DARFUR. THIS WOULD NEED TO BE ASSESSED FOR ITS LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY, AS WELL AS TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF POTENTIAL POPULATIONS AND AREAS THAT COULD
11 BE EFFECTIVELY ACCESSED IN SUCH A CROSS-BORDER OPERATION. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT WOULD NECESSARILY ENTAIL A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER CONDITIONS ON THE SUDANESE SIDE OF THE BORDER WOULD PERMIT SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. ROWE
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