Powell’s testimony on Darfur, State Department email conversation
National Security Archive
Powell’s 2004 Senate testimony labeled Sudan’s Janjaweed campaign as genocide; a declassified email shows how Washington’s diplomatic machine turned field reports into a decisive policy narrative.
Source: Powell’s testimony on Darfur, State Department email conversation Date: Sep 10, 2004 Archive: Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Powell’s Darfur Testimony and the Email Trail
On September 9, 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declaring that the Sudanese government and its allied Janjaweed militias were committing genocide in Darfur. The declassified email chain dated September 13, 2004 shows how the State Department’s Washington‑based officials packaged that testimony for internal distribution. George Taft, a senior bureaucrat in the bureau handling Sudan, forwards a concise briefing titled “Powell’s testimony on Darfur: genocide” to senior regional staff, attaching the prepared remarks and a summary of the accompanying State Department report. The email’s distribution list—senior diplomats in Chad, the Sudan desk, and the Office of the Spokesperson—reveals the immediacy with which the administration sought to coordinate messaging across the diplomatic, intelligence, and public‑affairs arenas.
The broader crisis and U.S. policy shift
Powell’s remarks sit at the apex of a rapid U.S. policy evolution that began in late 2003 when reports of mass killings, village burnings, and systematic rape emerged from the western Sudanese region. Prior to 2004, Washington treated the conflict as a civil war spill‑over, but the State Department’s on‑the‑ground fact‑finding mission—conducted with the American Bar Association and the Coalition for International Justice in refugee camps across Chad—produced a forensic dossier that the administration deemed sufficient to label the violence as genocide. This linguistic shift mattered because under the 1948 Genocide Convention, a formal declaration triggers obligations for prevention and punishment, opening the door to sanctions, referral to the International Criminal Court, and heightened diplomatic pressure.
The email’s header notes a “Review Authority: Harry R. Melone,” indicating that the document passed through the senior official responsible for vetting classified material before public release. The inclusion of a link to the State Department’s public report (“Documenting Atrocities in Darfur”) demonstrates the administration’s attempt to synchronize internal briefing with external transparency, a hallmark of the Bush‑era “strategic communications” approach.
Actors, rhetoric, and the limits of diplomatic leverage
Powell’s testimony, as summarized in the email, foregrounds three actors: the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed militias, and the international community (U.N., African Union, United States). By repeatedly pairing “government” with “complicity,” the language signals a shift from earlier, more cautious phrasing that stopped short of direct blame. The email’s distribution to the Deputy Chief of Mission in N'Djamena (Casey Casebeer) underscores the importance of the Chad‑Darfur nexus; Chad hosted the majority of Darfur refugees and was a frontline of humanitarian access. The copy to Robert K. Harris and Gilda M. Brancato, both senior officials in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, signals that the genocide label was intended to inform policy tools—sanctions, aid conditionality, and support for an expanded African Union peacekeeping force.
What the document does not say, but the context reveals, is the tension between the desire for a decisive label and the geopolitical constraints of the time. Sudan was a key player in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that would end the north‑south civil war, and the Bush administration was wary of jeopardizing that broader peace process. Powell’s call for “realistic sanctions” and for the U.N. to “conduct an investigation on the issue of genocide” reflects a calibrated push: enough pressure to compel Sudan to curb the Janjaweed, but not so severe as to derail the forthcoming 2005 referendum on South Sudan’s independence.
Legacy and why it still matters
The September 2004 testimony marked the first time a U.S. Secretary of State publicly used the term “genocide” for Dardar. That declaration set a precedent that shaped subsequent congressional resolutions, the International Criminal Court’s eventual issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al‑Bashir in 2009, and the U.N.’s adoption of Resolution 1556, which demanded the disarmament of the Janjaweed. The email chain itself illustrates how diplomatic messaging was institutionalized: internal memos were quickly turned into public statements, reinforcing a narrative that sustained international attention for years.
Today, as Sudan descends again into conflict and the International Criminal Court seeks to enforce its remaining warrants, the 2004 Powell testimony remains a reference point for advocates demanding accountability. The declassified email reminds scholars that high‑level policy statements are not spontaneous pronouncements but the product of coordinated bureaucratic processes, inter‑agency negotiations, and on‑the‑ground fact‑finding. Understanding that machinery helps explain why the genocide label, once applied, became a durable element of the Darfur discourse and why it continues to influence diplomatic calculations in Africa and beyond.
UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED IN PART B5 L22 Ramish, Timothy E
From: Taft, George (SBU) Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 4:59 PM To: Harris, Robert K (L-HRR); Brancato, Gilda M (L-HRR) Cc: Ramish, Timothy E (SBU); Taft, George (SBU) Subject: FW: Request for Talking points: Powell's testimony on Darfur: genocide
B5
Cheryl "Casey" Casebeer Deputy Chief of Mission U.S. Embassy N'Djamena, Chad tel: (235) 51-70-09 fax: (235) 51-56-54 email casebeerc@state.gov
This message, with all attachments, is UNCLASSIFIED under E.O. 12958.
-----Original Message----- From: Maurer, Marissa Sent: Friday, September 10, 2004 8:12 AM To: Wall, Marc M; Casebeer, Casey; FitzGibbon, Kathleen A; Spera, Vincent D; Mitchell, Tim D; Mcbride, Leslie E Subject: Powell's testimony on Darfur
09 September 2004
Powell Reports Sudan Responsible for Genocide in Darfur
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE DATE/CASE ID: 06 SEP 2006 200502016 1 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED Calls for continued pressure, action from U.N., U.S. and AU In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 9, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the actions of the Sudanese government and its proxies, the Jingaweit militias, against the people of Darfur to be genocide.
Citing the recently completed State Department investigation that was conducted in the refugee camps in Chad with the assistance of the American Bar Association and the Coalition for International Justice, Powell identified "a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by Jingaweit and government forces against non-Arab villagers" from which "we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility -- and genocide may still be occurring."
The secretary made copies of the evidence the State Department team compiled available to the committee.
Powell opened his testimony with a review of recent history of the region and the continuing fighting. He also recounted the recent investigative and diplomatic missions and actions that have been undertaken by the United States, the United Nations and the African Union to halt the genocide, to bring those responsible to justice and to restore the displaced to their homes.
Despite strong pressure from the United States, including a personal visit by the secretary of state to warn the leadership in Khartoum of potential repercussions, and a U.N. Security Council resolution (Resolution 1556) that set deadlines for the Sudanese for clearing the Jingaweit from the area, providing security and allowing humanitarian aid access, the Sudanese government has taken insufficient steps to avoid threatened sanctions.
Powell acknowledged that some progress had been made in allowing African Union troops in to monitor the cease-fire between the Khartoum government and the rebels and in providing greater access for humanitarian aid. But, he said, Sudan continues to throw obstacles in the way of aid workers and has done little or nothing to rein in the Jingaweit.
The key issue, he said, is to provide real security in the region so those displaced can return to their homes -- when their houses and towns are rebuilt. "What is really needed is for the Jingaweit militias to cease and desist their murderous raids against these people -- and for the government in Khartoum to stop being complicit in such raids. Khartoum has made no meaningful progress in substantially improving the overall security environment by disarming the Jingaweit militias or arresting its leaders."
Powell called on the United Nations to bring further pressure to bear, including conducting an investigation on the issue of genocide, increasing the African Union peacekeeping force, and taking realistic sanctions against the Sudanese government for failure to comply with Resolution 1556.
The report cited by the secretary, "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur," was released September 9 by the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and Bureau of Intelligence and Research. It may be reviewed at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm
The secretary's remarks as prepared for delivery follow:
(begin text)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman September 9, 2004
As Prepared
2 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN L. POWELL THE CRISIS IN DARFUR WRITTEN REMARKS SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE September 9, 2004
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Darfur. Let me start by reviewing a little history.
The violence in Darfur has complex roots in traditional conflicts between Arab nomadic herders and African farmers. The violence intensified during 2003 when two groups -- the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement -- declared open rebellion against the Government of Sudan because they feared being on the outside of the power and wealth-sharing agreements in the north-south negotiations. Khartoum reacted aggressively, intensifying support for Arab militias, the so-called jinjaweid. The Government of Sudan supported the jinjaweid, directly and indirectly, as they carried out a scorched-earth policy towards the rebels and the African civilian population.
Mr. Chairman, the United States exerted strong leadership to focus international attention on this unfolding tragedy. We first took the issue of Sudan to the United Nations (UN) Security Council last fall. President Bush was the first head of state to condemn publicly the Government of Sudan and to urge the international community to intensify efforts to end the violence. In April of this year, the United States brokered a ceasefire between the Government of Sudan and the rebels, and then took the lead to get the African Union (AU) to monitor that ceasefire.
As some of you are aware, I traveled to the Sudan in midsummer and made a point of visiting Darfur. It was about the same time that Congressman Wolf and Senator Brownback were there, as well as Secretary General Kofi Annan. In fact, the Secretary General and I were able to meet and exchange notes. We made sure that our message to the Sudanese government was consistent.
Senator Brownback can back me up when I say that all of us saw the suffering that the people of Darfur are having to endure. And Senator Corzine was just in Darfur and can vouch for the fact that atrocities are still occurring. All of us met with people who had been driven from their homes -- indeed many having seen their homes and all their worldly possessions destroyed or confiscated before their eyes -- by the terrible violence that is occurring in Darfur.
During my visit, humanitarian workers from my own Agency -- USAID -- and from other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), told me how they are struggling to bring food, shelter, and medicines to those so desperately in need -- a population of well over one million.
In my midsummer meetings with the Government of Sudan, we presented them with the stark facts of what we knew about what is happening in Darfur from the destruction of villages, to the raping and the killing, to the obstacles that impeded relief efforts. Secretary General Annan and I obtained from the Government of Sudan what they said would be firm commitments to take steps, and to take steps immediately, that would remove these obstacles, help bring the violence to an end, and do it in a way that we could monitor their performance.
There have been some positive developments since my visit, and since the visit of Senator Brownback, Congressman Wolf, and the Secretary General.
The Sudanese have met some of our benchmarks such as engaging in political talks with the rebels and supporting the deployment of observers and troops from the AU to monitor the ceasefire between Khartoum and the rebels. Some improvements in humanitarian access have also occurred though the government
3 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED continues to throw obstacles in the way of the fullest provision of assistance.
The AU Ceasefire Commission has also been set up and is working to monitor more effectively what is actually happening in Darfur. The general, who is in charge of that mission, a Nigerian general by the name of Okonkwo, is somebody that we know well. He is the same Nigerian general who went into Liberia last year and helped stabilize the situation there.
The AU's mission will help to restore sufficient security so that these dislocated, starving, hounded people can at least avail themselves of the humanitarian assistance that is available. But what is really needed is enough security so that they can go home. And what is really needed is for the jinjaweid militias to cease and desist their murderous raids against these people -- and for the Government in Khartoum to stop being complicit in such raids. Khartoum has made no meaningful progress in substantially improving the overall security environment by disarming the jinjaweid militias or arresting its leaders.
So we are continuing to press that Government and we continue to monitor them. We continue to make sure that we are not just left with promises instead of actual action and performance on the ground. Because it is absolutely clear that as we approach the end of the rainy season, the situation on the ground must change, and it must change quickly. There are too many tens upon tens of thousands of human beings who are at risk. Some of them have already been consigned to death because of the circumstances they are living in now. They will not make it through the end of the year. Poor security, inadequate capacity, and heavy rains (which will not diminish until late September) continue to hamper the relief effort.
The UN estimates there are 1,227,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Darfur. In July, almost 950,000 IDPs received some form of food assistance. About 200,000 Sudanese refugees are being assisted by UNHCR and partner organizations in Chad. The World Food Program (WFP) expects two million IDPs will need food aid by October.
U.S. Government provision of aid to the Darfur crisis in Sudan and Chad totaled $211.3 million as of September 2, 2004. This includes $112.9 million in food assistance, $50.2 million in non-food assistance, and $36.4 million for refugees in Chad, $5 million for refugee programs in Darfur, and $6.8 million for the African Union mission.
The U.S. also strongly supports the work of the AU monitoring mission in Darfur. In fact, we initiated the Mission through base camp set-up and logistics support by a private contractor. The Mission is staffed with 125 AU monitors now deployed in the field and has completed approximately 20 investigations of cease-fire violations. The AU monitoring staff is supported by a protection force of 305, made up of a Rwandan contingent of 155 (they arrived on August 15) and a Nigerian contingent of 150 (they arrived on August 30). Recognizing the security problems in Darfur, the UN and the U.S. have begun calling for an expanded AU mission in Darfur through the provision of additional observers and protection forces. Khartoum appears to have signaled a willingness to consider an expanded mission.
I am pleased to announce, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department has identified $20.5 million in FY04 funds for initial support of this expanded mission. We look forward to consulting with the Congress on meeting additional needs.
As you know, as we watched through the month of July, we felt more pressure was required. So we went to the UN and asked for a resolution. We got it on July 30.
Resolution 1556 demands that the Government of Sudan take action to disarm the jinjaweid militia and bring jinjaweid leaders to justice. It warns Khartoum that the Security Council will take further actions and measures - UN-speak for sanctions - if Sudan fails to comply. It urges the warring parties to conclude a political agreement without delay and it commits all states to target sanctions against the jinjaweid militias and those who aid and abet them as well as others who may share responsibility for this tragic situation. Too many lives have already been lost. We cannot lose any more time. We in the international community must 4 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED intensify our efforts to help those imperiled by violence, starvation and disease in Darfur.
But the Government of Sudan bears the greatest responsibility to face up to this catastrophe, rein in those who are committing these atrocities, and save the lives of its own citizens. At the same time, however, the rebels have not fully respected the ceasefire. We are disturbed at reports of rebel kidnappings of relief workers. We have emphasized to the rebels that they must allow unrestricted access of humanitarian relief workers and supplies and cooperate fully, including with the AU monitoring mission.
We are pleased that the Government of Sudan and the rebels are currently engaged in talks in Abuja, hosted by the AU. These talks are aimed at bringing about a political settlement in Darfur. The two sides have agreed on a protocol to facilitate delivery of much-needed humanitarian assistance to rebel-held areas, and are now engaged in discussions of a protocol on security issues. We are urging both sides to intensify negotiations in order to reach a political settlement.
At midsummer, I told President Bashir, Vice President Taha, Foreign Minister Ismail, the Minister of Interior and others, that the United States wants to see a united, prosperous, democratic Sudan. I told them that to that end we are fully prepared to work with them. I reminded them that we had reached an historic agreement on June 5 -- an agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). That agreement covered all the outstanding issues in the north-south process.
Since then, the parties have been engaged in final negotiations on remaining details. However, the parties are stuck on the specifics of a formal ceasefire agreement and have not yet begun the final round of implementation modalities. Special Envoy Sumbeiywo met recently with the parties, but could not resolve the remaining ceasefire-related issues. Khartoum appears unwilling to resume talks at the most senior level, claiming it must focus on Darfur. That would be fine if its focus were the right focus. But it is not. The SPLM is more forward leaning, but still focused on negotiating details. We believe that a comprehensive agreement would bolster efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur by providing a legal basis for a political solution (decentralization) and by opening up the political process in Khartoum.
President Bashir has repeatedly pledged to work for peace, and he pledged that again when we met in midsummer. But President Bush, this Congress, Secretary General Annan and the international community want more than promises. We want to see dramatic improvements on the ground right now. Indeed, we wanted to see them yesterday.
In the meantime, we are doing all that we can. We are working with the international community to make sure that all of those nations who have made pledges of financial assistance meet those pledges. In fact, the estimated needs have grown and the donor community needs to dig deeper. America has been in the forefront of providing assistance to the suffering people of Darfur and will remain in the forefront. But it is time for the entire international community to increase their assistance. The U.S. has pledged $299 million in humanitarian aid through FY05, and $11.8 million to the AU mission, and we are well on the way to exceeding these pledges.
SYG Annan's August 30 report called for an expanded AU mission in Darfur to monitor commitments of the parties more effectively, thereby enhancing security and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The report also highlighted Khartoum's failure to rein in and disarm the jinjaweid militia, and noted that the Sudanese military continued to take part in attacks on civilians, including aerial bombardment and helicopter strikes.
We have begun consultation in New York on a new resolution that calls for Khartoum to cooperate fully with an expanded AU force and for cessation of Sudanese military flights over the Darfur region. It also provides for international overflights to monitor the situation in Darfur and requires the Security Council to review the record of Khartoum's compliance to determine if sanctions, including on the Sudanese petroleum sector, should be imposed. The resolution also urges the Government of Sudan and the SPLM to conclude
5 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED negotiations on a comprehensive peace accord.
And finally there is the matter of whether or not what is happening in Darfur is genocide.
Since the U.S. became aware of atrocities occurring in Sudan, we have been reviewing the Genocide Convention and the obligations it places on the Government of Sudan.
In July, we launched a limited investigation by sending a team to refugee camps in Chad. They worked closely with the American Bar Association and the Coalition for International Justice and were able to interview 1,136 of the 2.2 million people the UN estimates have been affected by this horrible violence. Those interviews indicated:
-- A consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by jinjaweid and government forces against non-Arab villagers;
-- Three-fourths (74%) of those interviewed reported that the Sudanese military forces were involved in the attacks;
-- Villages often experienced multiple attacks over a prolonged period before they were destroyed by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for villagers to return.
When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, along with other information available to the State Department, we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility -- and genocide
UNCLASSIFIED or in part; d) imposing measures to prevent births; or e) forcibly transferring children to another group; -- these acts are committed against members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and -- they are committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, [the group] as such". The totality of the evidence from the interviews we conducted in July and August, and from the other sources available to us, shows that: -- The jinjaweid and Sudanese military forces have committed large-scale acts of violence, including murders, rape and physical assaults on non-Arab individuals; -- The jinjaweid and Sudanese military forces destroyed villages, foodstuffs, and other means of survival; -- The Sudan Government and its military forces obstructed food, water, medicine, and other humanitarian aid from reaching affected populations, thereby leading to further deaths and suffering; and -- Despite having been put on notice multiple times, Khartoum has failed to stop the violence. Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly. So let us not be preoccupied with this designation of genocide. These people are in desperate need and we must help them. Call it a civil war. Call it ethnic cleansing. Call it genocide. Call it "none of the above." The reality is the same: there are people in Darfur who desperately need our help. I expect that the government in Khartoum will reject our conclusion of genocide anyway. Moreover, at this point genocide is our judgment and not the judgment of the International Community. Before the Government of Sudan is taken to the bar of international justice, let me point out that there is a simple way for Khartoum to avoid such wholesale condemnation. That way is to take action. The government in Khartoum should end the attacks, ensure its people -- all of its people -- are secure, hold to account those who are responsible for past atrocities, and ensure that current negotiations are successfully concluded. That is the only way to peace and prosperity for this war-ravaged land. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, the most practical contribution we can make to the security of Darfur in the short-term is to increase the number of African Union monitors. That will require the cooperation of the Government of Sudan. In the intermediate and long term, the security of Darfur can be best advanced by a political settlement at Abuja and by the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan. (end text)
7 UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu