“Marder Interview with Henry Kissinger Re Wiretapping, May 14, 1973”
National Security Archive
Kissinger denies ordering FBI wiretaps, framing them as routine security measures amid the Watergate fallout.
Source: “Marder Interview with Henry Kissinger Re Wiretapping, May 14, 1973” Date: May 14, 1973 Collection: The Murrey Marder Papers at the National Security Archive Jul 20, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Kissinger, the Wiretap Controversy, and the Shadow of Watergate
On May 14, 1973, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sat down with Murrey Marder, a senior aide to Senator Howard Baker, to field questions about a series of FBI wiretaps that had been authorized during the Nixon administration. The interview was recorded for the Murrey Marder Papers, which the National Security Archive later released. The timing is crucial: it came just weeks after the Senate Watergate Committee began public hearings and months after the “Saturday Night Massacre” that saw Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy AG William Ruckelshaus forced out. By then, the press was already linking the wiretaps to the broader scandal over illegal surveillance of political opponents, and Kissinger’s reputation as the architect of U.S. foreign policy was under intense scrutiny.
The document is not a transcript of a formal testimony but a private, off‑the‑record interview. Marder presses Kissinger on whether he personally ordered the taps, whether he suggested specific targets, and whether he was comfortable with the FBI’s methods. Kissinger repeatedly denies initiating any wiretap, insisting his only concern was “the security of classified information.” He frames the taps as a routine security measure, not a political weapon, and distances himself from any suggestion that the FBI acted on his behalf to monitor officials, journalists, or members of his own staff. The language is careful, almost evasive, and he repeatedly invokes the “complex affair” of the era, noting that the Watergate context makes a clear assessment difficult.
The Wider Episode: Surveillance in the Age of Vietnam and Watergate
The interview sits at the intersection of two historic currents. First, the late‑1960s and early‑1970s saw an unprecedented expansion of domestic intelligence gathering, justified by the perceived threats of the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and a growing anti‑government movement. The FBI’s COINTELPRO program, for example, already demonstrated a willingness to surveil dissenters. Second, the Watergate break‑in and ensuing cover‑up revealed that the executive branch was willing to weaponize law‑enforcement agencies against political enemies.
Kissinger’s remarks illuminate how the foreign‑policy establishment tried to insulate itself from the fallout. He mentions that the taps were “cumulative” and that some lasted as long as 21 months, suggesting a systematic, long‑term operation rather than a series of ad‑hoc investigations. Yet he also stresses that no one in his “jurisdiction” was dismissed as a result, a thinly veiled reassurance that the surveillance did not translate into personnel purges.
Actors, Motives, and What the Record Reveals
Key figures surface in the conversation: William Ruckelshaus, then Deputy Attorney General, is cited by Marder as having claimed Kissinger initiated the taps. Kissinger flatly rejects this, arguing that Ruckelshaus’s statements are “contradictory” to the facts. J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI Director, is referenced as the person with whom Kissinger discussed “safeguarding classified information.” The interview also names Mort Halperin, a senior aide on the National Security Council staff, and Gerry Smith, a journalist who allegedly requested an FBI probe of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) leaks.
The subtext is telling. Kissinger’s insistence that he never asked for a specific method of investigation, coupled with his admission that “some wiretap reports were coming to me,” suggests a degree of plausible deniability. He acknowledges that staff members may have supplied names, but he distances himself from the operational details—who was tapped, for how long, and why. This reflects a common pattern in executive‑branch surveillance: senior officials set broad security goals while delegating the gritty work to agencies that retain the paper trail.
Legacy and Contemporary Resonance
Why does a 1973 interview matter today? First, it provides a rare glimpse into how the Nixon administration internally rationalized domestic surveillance that would later be condemned as unconstitutional. Kissinger’s language—“my duty,” “security of classified information,” “complex affair”—mirrors the justifications later used by post‑9/11 policymakers to expand electronic monitoring under the Patriot Act.
Second, the document underscores the difficulty of assigning responsibility in a bureaucratic system where orders are often indirect. Kissinger’s refusal to admit any direct role, despite evidence that the taps were coordinated through the FBI and that the total number of taps (17) was known to the NSC, illustrates how accountability can be diffused across agencies.
Finally, the interview contributes to the historiography of Watergate by showing how the scandal’s fallout seeped into other policy arenas. The mention of SALT leaks, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Korea indicates that the surveillance apparatus was not limited to domestic political opponents but was also used to protect sensitive diplomatic negotiations.
In sum, the Marder‑Kissinger interview is a microcosm of the Nixon era’s tangled web of security, secrecy, and political survival. It reveals a senior statesman intent on shielding his office from leaks while refusing to own the means by which that protection was achieved. The document reminds us that the legal and moral debates over wiretapping, privacy, and executive power that erupted in the 1970s are far from resolved, echoing in today’s discussions of digital surveillance and government overreach.
Marder interview with Henry Kissinger re wiretapping May 14, 1973
Marder reads Caliborne lead. K: The first thing to remember is that Ruckelshaus doesnt sai I asked him to wiretap. I expressed my great concern to the FBI director about the security of caissified information.
I found an FBI man (on duty to the NSC adviser to... thereis no doubt it is true I expressed my concern to the FBI about making sure we had adequate security ... and to be sure there would be no unauthorized ... (leaks?) of information ... were conducted by appropriate authorities, some organized by the FBI on the basis of security files they had, some from lists of those who had documents that were being investigated.
marder: lede on story says K initiated wiretaps/ K: That's incorrect. You cannot report that from what Ruckelshaus said and it's also incorrect.
... the 17 (taps) were cumulative.
Marder: two were for as little as 30 days and one as long as 21 months.
K: It's totally incorrect to say I initiated that ... dont think ...
Marder: Did you ask for any wiretaps?
K: If I remember that conversation (and then he said something like it was not the most important thing in his life) it concerned safeguarding sai classified info I did not ask for wiretaps or any particular method of investigating.
Marder: Did he suggest it - meaning did hoover suggest taps?
K: I do not remember that conversation concerning any individuals ... files were not kept in this office... some wiretap reports were coming to me ... individuals in my jurisdiction or individuals with documents in my jurisdiction, in the early part of the administration.
Marder: Did you have any compunction abo t the use of wiretapping?
K: This is an extremely complex affair and if it were not mixed up in Watergate it could be seen in a much clearer context particularly who was the target of it. You don't have to assume I was out to get anyone. No one in my jurisdiction was dismissed because of this... I don't want to get into the human aspect ... with every individual engaged in the public ...
add 1 - marder/kissinger - wiretaps May 14, 1973 Marder: Your statement saturday created the contrary impression that you were unassociated with any initiation K: Nothing Ruckelshaus said is contradictory to that. Marder: The time factor...it would seem to have more relation to vietnam than salt: K: yes and other problems, the Middle East, Korea Marder: involving NSC, State: K: That would be my impression but since I didn't see all I cannot judge that... I did not .... the taps and after some period I did not receive the reports. Marder: Was the information helpful, did it facilitate any ... K: I discharged no one nor transferred anyone as a result. Marder: Did it result in buttoning up any leaks ... what weIre going to need is some kind of ax description from you K: Why should it come from me I... Marder: Ruckelshaus said you initiated it K: I did not ... it was after a conversation with me... my object was to save classified information... that wasx my duty... I do not think Ruckelshaus said I asked him to do any particular form of investigation... my conversation with J. Edgar Hoover concerned safeguarding of information and not the iniation of any particular form of investigation. Marder: You did not request wiretapping? K: I think the first statement makes it clear.. Marder: What are your views, if any, on the use of wiretapping on officials or newsmen? Do you have any second thoughts about the process? K: I have said what I will say... I will stand on what I've done which I believe will stand ... both moral and legal ... and it is simply incorrect to... Marder: Your views are understood to be that it started in May 69 at a particularly sensitive time when issues concerned Middle East Korean diplomacy, vietnam....
add 2 - marder-kissinger -wiretaps May 14, 73 Marder: Salt came later: K: Salt was later ... Marder .. That you were not involved in determining the length of time on the taps or placing the taps... K: qualify in the sense that it is quite conceivable members of my staff gave names on my staff of persons who handled particular documents Marder: Was this essentially from your standpoint an attempt to demonstrate the bona fides of your own staff? K: If you want to say this on your own that this was one of the motives you would not be far wrong ... you can assume (NOT?) Mort Halperin was/on my staff because I wanted to persecute him nor t hat Mort would feel he was not taken care of... the newsmen end of it was not in my jurisdiction ... may have stimulated it but the subjects were not determined Marder by me.../the reports were cut off earlier...? K: I'm terrified someone will drag out one document that floated through my office ... but sometime in '70 or earlier ix Marder - the Beecher SALT thing was later (in 71) K: Gerry Smith asked for an FBI investigation of SALT leaks ... until everything can be seen in its right perspective ... I don't even exclude some names were put on the list for handling classified information Marder:was there any discussion of wiretaps on newsmen? Brandon: Everyone knows H. Brandon was a close friend of mine and I was on the phone with him Marder: Was he tapped? K: Some of the reports said some of the (wiretap) reports were going back to me
add 3 - marder/kissinger wiretaps May 14, 1973
murrey urged Henry to call back if he wanted to add anything particularly on attribution
About half hour later Henry called back to say:
For your reflection and not for any attribution:
- The idea that I was instigator of it -- how would it explain that the files were in Erlichman's office
2nd, by considerin the fact that correctly or incorrectly my staff was considered a vestige of the previous period it would not follow that my incentive was to get my staff in trouble or ...
Marder : If newsmen were instigated b Erlichman, Haldeman or FBI it would be clear
K: The 1 were requests initiated by me in terms of concern about the security problem ... I can just tell you this is not the way it was ... I don't care what Ruckelshaus said all the more so since I haven't seen him...
Marder: Were there others in ACDA, Pentagon
K: I dont think so to the best of my information I RECEIVED over the weekend this is the total govt number as far as I know
Marder: was the bulk NSC staff - he left the implication that the totality was in NSC staff plus newsmen
K: That's much too sweeping
Marder: When this process was completed did it not recur subsequently?
K: Before it was completed I no longer xx received reports. If it started again I was unaware of it.
Marder: Lie detectors in State
K: I did not permit my staff to take them. Any subseq tapping I am unaware of. It is obvious the plumber op was done without knowledge of my office. It's my own
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