“Memo on conversation with Humphrey, Executive Office Building, January 4, 1967”
National Security Archive
A 1967 White House memo reveals Vice President Humphrey’s private turn against the bombing of North Vietnam and his push for a political reset ahead of the 1968 election.
Source: “Memo on conversation with Humphrey, Executive Office Building, January 4, 1967” Date: Jan 4, 1967 Collection: The Murrey Marder Papers at the National Security Archive Jul 20, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A backstage glimpse at the Johnson‑Humphrey rift
The memo dated 4 January 1967 is a terse briefing prepared by Murray Marder, a senior aide in the White House’s Executive Office, for two political operatives, Chot and Phil Geyelin. Its purpose was to distil the latest private conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and senior staff, and to translate that dialogue into actionable political advice for the 1968 election. The document was produced at a moment when the Vietnam war had entered its third year, the bombing of North Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder) was under intense domestic criticism, and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s political capital was eroding.
The memo’s immediacy is evident in its references to “the first phase of Westmoreland’s battle strategy” and to a “cordon sanitaire” proposal that Humphrey had championed a year earlier. Marder’s notes capture a shift in Humphrey’s tone: once a vocal supporter of expanded air strikes, he now appears “no longer sure he was right” and is urging a scaling‑back of the bombing to “key military targets.” The language—“poisoned the atmosphere,” “gave credibility to North Vietnamese propaganda”—mirrors the growing public discourse that linked the aerial campaign to civilian casualties and to a loss of moral authority at home.
The political calculus behind the war
The memo does not merely report policy preferences; it reads like a strategic memo for a campaign. Marder notes that Humphrey is “waiting it out for the 1968 elections” and suggests that Johnson should use a televised address to “defuse” the bombing‑civilian issue. This reflects a broader pattern in 1967: senior officials were increasingly treating the war as a domestic political problem as much as a foreign‑policy one. The document cites the Pentagon’s rejection of Humphrey’s “cordon sanitaire” on cost grounds—$2‑3 billion a year—yet points out that the same resources were already being poured into the war, implying that a modest re‑allocation could be politically palatable.
Marder also records Humphrey’s criticism of Johnson’s handling of the Manila summit, a reference to the September 1966 meeting with Asian leaders where Johnson publicly down‑played any expectation of progress in Vietnam. Humphrey’s remark that “we lost this election in the last week” underscores how the Vice President linked diplomatic setbacks to electoral vulnerability. The memo’s recommendation that the Democratic National Committee be led by a technocratic figure (O’Brien) further reveals an internal debate about whether to present the party as a “campaign‑machine” capable of winning back public confidence.
What the memo reveals about decision‑making
The most telling passages are those that expose the gap between official statements and private assessments. Marder writes that Robert McNamara “knew all along” that high‑speed bombing would be imprecise because Vietnamese villages were interwoven with rail lines, yet “never told anyone outside government.” The leak to “Salisbury” (presumably a senior aide) and the suggestion that Johnson should go on TV indicate a growing frustration within the administration that the war’s technical logic was being weaponised for political ends rather than honest appraisal.
The memo also hints at an emerging “quiet diplomacy” approach: “try to put together a package in secret that can be sold to the American people.” This foreshadows the back‑channel negotiations that would later culminate in the 1968 peace talks at Paris. Humphrey’s idea of a “quasi‑military civic action program” to replace the draft with volunteer labor reflects an attempt to re‑brand the war effort as nation‑building rather than pure combat, a theme that would surface in the Nixon administration’s “Vietnamization” policy.
Legacy of the January 4 memo
Although the memo was never intended for public consumption, its declassification illuminates how the Johnson administration internalised the war’s political costs months before the 1968 election turned into a referendum on Vietnam. The document shows that high‑level officials were already contemplating a de‑escalation strategy, but were constrained by the need to maintain credibility with hawkish elements in Congress and the military. The tension between “quiet diplomacy” and the public’s demand for decisive leadership would shape the later decision to pursue a partial bombing halt in October 1968 and to open formal peace negotiations.
In short, the memo is a snapshot of a pivotal moment when the war’s military logic collided with electoral calculus, and when Vice President Humphrey began to distance himself from the Johnson‑style escalation. Its insights help explain why the 1968 campaign became the first American presidential race in which the Vietnam question dominated the national conversation, and why the eventual shift toward negotiation was as much a political necessity as a strategic one.
Memo on conversation with Humphrey Executive Office Building January 4, 1967
- Murray Marder For distribution to Chot & Phil Geyelin.
- Jan Krane
Viet Nam: HHH originally favored the decision to bomb the North in his talks with Johnson, et al. But he is no longer sure he was right. I got the feeling that HHH wanted the bombing stopped, or, at the very least, confined to key military targets such as staging points and materiel depositories. The bombing, he felt, has "poisoned the atmosphere." It has hurt the Administration at home with persons who otherwise support our Viet actions and it has given credibility to the North Vietnamese propaganda.
McNamara, with his "computer thinking," knew all along that planes flying at better than 1500 miles an hour would not only hit what they were supposed to. He further knew that the North Vietnamese live in such a way that peasants' huts abut the railroad tracks. But he never told anyone outside government. Then Salisbury spilled the beans. Johnson should have gone (or should go) on national television and explain our position. The American people want a leader, they like to be rallied, to have a cause. This is not being done and this is the core of the problem.
About a year ago, Humphrey advocated a cordon sanitaire, i.e., placing the American Army and the Marines along the 17th parallel and down the Ho trail to restrict the flow of men and munitions from the North. The Pentagon rejected this idea as too expensive: in the order of $2-3 billion a year. Now they are doing just that. "What the hell, when you're spending what we're spending out there, what a couple of billion to stop the infiltration, especially when that may help -- really help -- to win the war."
The first phase of Westmoreland's battle strategy was the massive "search and destroy missions. This came right after the big buildup. They were successful in that the sweeps accomplished what they set out to do, namely to break up the battalion-sized units of the DRV and the big staging points. The new phase is called "accelerated pacification." Too early to see whether it will work. One problem is that the ARVN army is totally unprepared for this sort of work. Perhaps it would be a good idea to put young Americans to work in Viet Nam in lieu of the draft. Humphrey was thinking in terms of a sort of quasi-military civic action program. But the Peace Corps itself must be kept pure and free of this "dirty war."
It is probably too late, in political terms, to stop the bombing without first receiving a quid pro quo from the other side. We are "locked in." U.S. public opinion, the Air Force, the Senate "hawks" -- they would not stand for a pause or a halt without some reciprocity. The best thing now is to persue quiet diplomacy, try to put together a package in secret that can be sold to the American people. He is waiting it out for the 1968 elections. He thinks perhaps Johnson's policy will be repudiated and the war can end that way. This is the big problem. Meanwhile, though, we should de-escalate, in tiny stages. Change the bombing targets away from centers of civilian population. Give them an indication we're willing to do business without having to lose face. That could work.
(MORE)
2 -- Humphrey memo: Jan. 4, 1967
Lansdale was back a few days ago and say HHH. He was hopeful that the village elections would begin the process of winning the people back. These elections went rather well. The big need now is to elect a civilian government in which the southerners assume control. Ky has come along fast and should be given a role to play, but not the top job. The trouble is that many of the VC are fighting against what they regard as an oppressive military directorate. If a civilian government was elected, many of the VC, Lansdale thinks, would have a good and sufficient reason to stop fighting.
Democratic Politics: Lot of ideas, battle plans floating around, but nothing has been hatched. Thinks it would be a good idea to make O'Brien chairman of the DNC. Lyndon must still be convinced that the DNC are technicians armed with techniques of winning an election and pose no threat to him.
For the first time in my private talks with him since he became Veep, HHH attacked Johnson. He said the President was wrong to have gone to Manila, in advance, telling everyone that nothing would be accomplished. He was wrong to have kept his mouth shut while he was threre. Americans want a leader. Then, when he came back and failed to campaign, the press unloaded on him and thought up all the other times that Johnson had buffaloed them. "I think we lost this election in the last week."
Johnson could lose in '68. If things -- the Negroes, the economy (which is right now shakey), the war and the "confidence" issue -- all happen to go wrong, the Republicans could take it. Our posture should be that we are behind. Johnson should go before the American people, tell them what is on his mind: he should, for example, have had a formal TV report after Manila. The bombing-civilian issue could be defused with such a Presidential address.
Johnson is sending Humphrey to Africa, probably in February. This is off-the-record.
Humphrey ended the interview at 1:30, meeting LBJ for lunch.
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