“Background Lunch with McGeorge Bundy on 7 th Floor, Mr. [Alfred] Friendly in chair July 13, 1964”
National Security Archive
A private lunch in July 1964 reveals how the Johnson administration juggled the Multilateral Force, Cuban overtures, and election politics.
Source: “Background Lunch with McGeorge Bundy on 7 th Floor, Mr. [Alfred] Friendly in chair July 13, 1964” Date: Jul 13, 1964 Collection: The Murrey Marder Papers at the National Security Archive Jul 20, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Lunch with the National Security Adviser, July 13, 1964
The memo records a private working lunch on the seventh floor of the State Department between National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, senior State Department official Murrey Marder, and the newly appointed Deputy Secretary of State Alfred Friendly. It was taken just weeks after President Lyndon B. Johnson’s landslide victory and amid a flurry of “mid‑term” foreign‑policy calculations. The note was intended as a briefing for senior staff and for the historical record, not as a public statement, which explains its candid tone and the inclusion of speculative intelligence (“private indications,” “rumors”) alongside policy pronouncements.
The broader stakes: the Multilateral Force, Cuba, and the 1964 election
The document is a snapshot of three interlocking crises that defined the summer of 1964. First, the Multilateral Force (MLF) – a proposed NATO‑controlled fleet of nuclear‑armed submarines crewed by American, British, French, German, and Italian personnel – had moved from a vague suggestion under Eisenhower and Kennedy to a concrete policy push under Johnson. Bundy’s remarks reveal the internal logic: the MLF was framed as a “safety valve” to keep West German rearmament under NATO control and to blunt the political appeal of the right‑wing “Strauss” faction in Germany. The memo notes that the administration now treats the MLF as “on a par with the European Defense Community” debate of the early 1950s, signalling a willingness to gamble on a costly, politically sensitive weapons program.
Second, the Cuban question resurfaces. The note records that “private indications” suggested Fidel Castro was seeking a modest rapprochement, but that the Johnson administration could not respond because of the “election period.” This reflects the reality that the 1964 presidential campaign – pitting Johnson against Barry Goldwater – forced the White House to avoid any diplomatic overture that might be portrayed as soft on communism. The memo also hints at the broader context: Castro’s failed Venezuelan venture, a cooling of Soviet support, and his desire to reduce dependence on the Soviet “umbilical cord.” Bundy’s blunt assessment that the administration’s refusal to deal with Castro was driven by domestic political calculus rather than strategic necessity underscores how electoral concerns overrode diplomatic flexibility.
Third, the memo touches on the looming Southeast Asian and Laotian crises, the Cyprus dispute, and the Soviet peace‑keeping offer. Each item is mentioned only in passing, but together they illustrate the “dirty campaign” Johnson anticipated: nuclear issues, Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia would dominate the 1964 electoral debate. Bundy’s comments on the Soviet peace‑keeping proposal – that the United States should treat any Soviet overture as a “opening move” rather than dismiss it outright – reveal a subtle shift from the hard‑line stance of the Dulles era toward a more nuanced, if still skeptical, diplomatic posture.
What the lunch tells us about decision‑making
The memo’s informal tone betrays the tension between long‑term strategic planning and short‑term political imperatives. Bundy’s repeated emphasis on “our constituency – the U.S. electorate” as the ultimate arbiter of policy shows a senior adviser openly acknowledging that democratic politics can dictate the contours of Cold War strategy. His willingness to “minimize the military case” for the MLF while simultaneously arguing that it is essential to prevent German nuclear independence demonstrates the administration’s attempt to balance deterrence with alliance management.
The document also reveals internal disagreements that were not public. For example, Bundy acknowledges “mixed views inside Administration” on the Soviet peace‑keeping offer, and he concedes that the MLF could be used by the Soviets for anti‑MLF propaganda in Eastern Europe – a “minus” the United States could “live with.” These admissions indicate that the Johnson team was aware of the propaganda value of its own initiatives, a nuance rarely captured in official speeches.
Finally, the memo’s reference to Goldwater’s openness to security briefings hints at the early stages of what would become a stark partisan divide over Cold War policy. Bundy’s “laughingly encouraged speculative stories” about a Goldwater cabinet suggests that the administration was already mapping out a political narrative to pre‑empt a Republican challenge.
Legacy and relevance
The lunch memo is a rare, unfiltered glimpse into how the Johnson administration negotiated the intersection of alliance politics, nuclear strategy, and domestic electoral pressure. The MLF debate eventually collapsed in 1966 after French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew support, but the memo foreshadows the later NATO debates over “dual‑key” nuclear control and the enduring tension between burden‑sharing and non‑proliferation.
In contemporary terms, the document offers a template for understanding how U.S. foreign policy is still shaped by electoral cycles. The same calculus that barred a rapprochement with Castro in 1964 reappears whenever presidents weigh diplomatic overtures against the risk of appearing weak on national security. Moreover, the memo’s candid assessment of Soviet propaganda strategies anticipates today’s information‑war environment, where every policy move is evaluated for its psychological impact on adversaries.
For scholars of the Cold War, the lunch record is a reminder that high‑level decision‑making often occurs in informal settings, where the constraints of politics are as decisive as the imperatives of strategy.
July 13, 1964 Background lunch with McGeorge Bundy on 7th floor; Mr. Friendly in chair:
Discussion centered on foreign policy implications of MLF, plus these additional points--
Cuba: Private indications have been received that Castro will not act rash on overflights. Why wasn't Administration more responsibve to his overtures about rapprochement in recent N.Y. Times interview? Impossible for Administration to do so in this election period, and Castro knew that for he mentioned it. Part of his motive presumably was to offset impending action against him by OAS ministers. But Castro also obviously wanted to try to keep a line out toward us. Life has not been going to well for him. We know he was spanked by the Russians for his Venezuelan subversion venture. He also thinks what he inflatedly looks on as his Brazilian potentialities have collapsed. He would like more flexibility of maneuvering area in the world, less tied to Soviet umbilical cord. Told that U.S. reasons given for refusal to deal with Castro were not too logical, Mac retorted that they were convincing enough for "our constituency--the U.S. electorate," and that's what counts. Said would be insane to start anything with Castro in election period. LAOS-VIETNAM- Said he could not confirm published report that N.Viets running air shuttle to Tchepone in Southern Laos and funneling troops and supplies from there to both Laos and S.Viet-Nam. Said air reconnaissance of area is limited, and there is also problem of being unable to get accurate reconnaissance through foliage. Clear that Tchepone is a supply point, but extent unclear. Also, said he had seen nothing directly of Khanh report that North Viet battalions are moving into South.
CYPRUS- Still very clouded, still concern about Greek-Turk buildup. Acheson still in early stages of his operation at Geneva, is supposed to see Greek there today or tomorrow.
POLITICS- Before going in to lunch, said he believes Goldwater left his position open to consider accepting security briefings from Administration if he is nominated. This will be offered again. Mac's own work, while keeping eye on Cyprus, SEAsia, etc., is centered on upcoming political campaign. President sees dirty campaign coming, platform assures that; lots of foreign policy in store, on basic simplicities rather than subtleties. Nuclear issue will get kicked around a lot, along with Berlin Wall, Cuba, S.E.Asia, etc. Mac, with many Republican friends, knowns no one venturing to defend Goldwater. He laughingly encouraged speculative stories about Goldwater's cabinet. Soviet Peacekeeping Offer: Mixed views inside Administration on this (actually more sharply mixed than he indicated) but Presidents position is that it should be treated as opening move, as Harlan Cleveland says, Soviets appearing over the horizon of negotiations. It is basic position in Johnson
Bundy-2-July 13, 1964
this as in Kennedy Administration, in contrast to Dulles, that what the Sovs. toss up that contains in it any seeming opportunity for serious discussions should be treated seriously, rather than being automatically rejected because it includes some curves. This doubly so in this case as it was response, awaited for four months, to U.S. probe at U.N. (Interesting to note that President has taken Cleveland line here, rather than considerably harder line of most Soviet experts in State and also more tractable line than has publicly come out of either U.S. delegation at U.N. or out of London)
MLF: Discussions too extensive to recall or reproduce in detail, but highlights were: Administration now firm on pressing ahead with MLF. Mac said position has "evolved," when point was raised that Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration raised MLF only as a suggestion, and not as firm policy. Questioned on pros and cons, Mac first said the fundamental issue is wrapping in Germans to head off any independent German nuclears. First he rather minimized military case for MLF, then tried to make that too. When it was pointed out that McNamara in past said no military requirement for MLF and that it was "political gesture," indicated that McNamara position has also intensified for MLF. Agreed that "deep in their hearts" both German Erhard group and Socialists probably would prefer leaving nuclear situation as it is, in our hands, but need it as safety valve to head off danger of Strauss and his wing eventually taking separate course. No chance of French ever really sharing nukes with Germans; Germans only would be in position of dependency on French. Whole history of our postwar European policy has been based on tieing Germans in to responsible role in Atlantic Community. Said MLF is not becoming crux issue in our policy toward Europe, but agreed it was "about on a par with European Defense Community" debate of 1950s in its significance. Minimized real Soviet concern about MLF; said that view reinforced by private talks with some. Stuck to that when Marder noted that private Soviet line to other American officials is that Soviets say they agree with U.S. intention to tie in Germans and prevent nuclear proliferation, but disagree with U.S. assumption that it can work. Mac sought to reinforce his position by stressing that no danger that U.S. ever would give nuclear capacity to Germans, if we wouldn't give aid to France. He indicated, however, more concern about East-West implications than he actually stated by saying he personally would favor--after German elections next spring--giving assurances that Oder-Neisse dividing line would be maintained, to calm Polish fears of German revanchism.
Bundy-3-July13, 1964
Agreed under questioning that Sovs now can use Anti-MLF propaganda to psychological advantage on Eastern Europeans to try to tighten its hold over them, based on their German fears. Conceded that this is a "minus," but one we can live with.
Disagreed that MLF proposal contradicts U.S. policy on advocating East-West freeze on nuclear production and delivery systems. Said both can be done.
Denied that MLF is nuclear "addition". Said we had to meet problem of Soviet MRBMS targeted on Western Europe, and this is efficient way to do it, with additional boon of getting Europeans to pay part of the cost.
Denied that we are doing what sovs. tried to do to us in Cuba, changing nuclear status quo; maintained that we are simply using means of meeting Soviet MRBM threat that exists in Europe.
Brushed aside argument that MLF may impel Sovs to build seagoing nuclear force off our shores, by saying they have that capacity anytime.
Also brushed off alternative suggestion of multilateralizing some of existing Minutemen in U.S. with European participation to alleviate demands for voice in U.S. domination of Allied nuclear policy. Said for one thing, security requirements would prohibit that.
Said German participation in MLF could enhance, rather than inhibit, German position in bargaining over its fate with Soviets. Never fully developed this, but M seemed to be saying they might someday bargain out of MLF if advantageous.(??) When asked if he meant German reunification, smiled and said he was not one who sees that likelihood; said most he can envision is East German regime and operation that West Germans could tolerate. (Assume that Mac, in part, here was alluding elliptically to fact that none of Allies has real drive or desire for reunification).
Mac said Administration is taking seriously British proposal for adding to MLF control the Pershing MRBM missiles and the planned British TSR-2 strike aircraft. When it was noted that while that is official U.S. position, many officials are highly suspicious of offer as a curve to put off the MLF, M said he knew some difference of views exist here on it, but he thought best to treat it as serious offer.
He was fuzziest on key question of "evolution" of MLF. Said he does not know what it will evolve into, but was not fearful of outcome because any change would have to come back to Congress. He sidestepped comment that different officials are saying different things; some that it will evolve into European nuclear force free of U.S. veto, others saying they don't believe that will ever happen.
BUNDY - 4-July 13, 1964
When it was noted that Bob Bowie, one of architects of MLF, said logical conclusion is eventual withdrawal of American veto, M strongly dissented; said on that he completely disagrees with Bowie (yet that is exactly what many officials, including President himself, have implied).
M said we have [illegible] now gotten away from unfortunate "advertising council" kind of presentation of MLF that was going on in the spring. (meaning over-selling, arm-twisting, etc.) to him At one point he indicated that most important thing/in this operation was to convince Germans that we tried our utmost to get MLF into the water, & even if the plan collapses.
He specifically ducked discussing whether we would go ahead [illegible] without [illegible] Britain or Italy or without Britain and Italy, (official posture seems to be aimed at saying the former and [illegible] suggesting the latter. As he was going [illegible] down elevator, Mac seemed to confirm that that is the [illegible] ploy, by saying he was aware of the danger of pushing present "year-end deadline" too far that it [illegible] could mean loss of a potential "major" participant. He earlier had said he saw possibility [illegible] that British Labor Party could swing around to supporting MLF if they win election).
In summation, to me, Mac was dutifully arguing MLF case, but hedging his own bets on outcome.
Marder
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