“Secretary Rusk November 22, 1962 Deep Background”
National Security Archive
Rusk’s 22 Nov 1962 memo shows how urgency forced public, not private, talks and reveals early U.S. insight into Soviet miscalculations and the budding Sino‑Soviet split.
Source: “Secretary Rusk November 22, 1962 Deep Background” Date: Nov 22, 1962 Collection: The Murrey Marder Papers at the National Security Archive Jul 20, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Rusk’s “Deep Background” in the Heat of the Missile Crisis
On 22 November 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a memoranda marked “Off‑record – Deep background” to senior officials, attempting to make sense of the chaotic diplomatic fallout after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The note was drafted just days after President Kennedy’s televised address on 22 November, which announced the discovery of Soviet medium‑range ballistic missiles in Cuba and the imposition of a naval quarantine. The United States was still negotiating the removal of the missiles, while Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was simultaneously sending mixed signals through public letters, private messages, and the removal of missiles from Soviet ships. Rusk’s memo captures the sense of urgency that prevented the usual back‑channel talks and forced policymakers to speak in public, even when the language was deliberately vague.
The document’s place in the broader Cold‑War drama
The memo belongs to the final, frantic week of the Cuban Missile Crisis—a turning point that reshaped superpower relations. The crisis had already demonstrated that the world could survive a nuclear standoff, but it also exposed the limits of crisis management when both sides were compelled to act under domestic pressure. Rusk’s reflections reveal how the crisis spilled over into other arenas: Berlin, NATO force levels, and the emerging Sino‑Soviet split. By linking Cuba to Berlin and to NATO’s burden‑sharing, the memo underscores the crisis’s systemic impact on the entire Cold‑War architecture.
What Rusk’s words expose about the players
Rusk repeatedly stresses the “urgency” that made private diplomatic channels impossible, implying that the Soviet side was similarly constrained. He notes that Khrushchev’s public letters “were such that there were all sorts of impressions,” suggesting that Soviet messaging was deliberately ambiguous to maintain leverage. The memo also hints at internal Soviet discord: Rusk writes that “there have been real differences between Mikoyan and Castro and the Soviet Union has not been able to get Castro to go as far as the Soviets would go.” This assessment aligns with later scholarship that portrays Khrushchev as walking a tightrope between satisfying Cuban revolutionary zeal and avoiding a direct clash with the United States.
Rusk’s attitude toward the Soviet bomber issue is telling. He downplays the bomber threat initially—"as long as the missiles were moving out we did not make an issue"—but later acknowledges that the United States could not ignore low‑level bomber attacks. This shift mirrors the real‑time intelligence that revealed Soviet strategic bombers were being staged on Cuban airfields, a fact that heightened U.S. alarm and contributed to the decision to demand a full Soviet withdrawal.
The memo also reveals how the United States framed its hemispheric commitments. Rusk declares that the U.S. will not “guarantee the Castro government” nor provide a “haven” for attacks, reinforcing the principle that the Rio Pact obliges the United States to defend the hemisphere but does not bind it to any particular regime. This language foreshadows the later decision to support a covert invasion plan (Operation Mongoose) while publicly maintaining a stance of defensive deterrence.
Reading between the lines: strategic calculations and miscalculations
Rusk’s reference to “a great many involved…some may not be resolved for some time yet” hints at the lingering diplomatic dead‑ends that would later surface in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). His speculation that Khrushchev might be seeking a “detente” to buy time for re‑arming suggests that the Soviet leader was already planning a post‑crisis reset, a view corroborated by the subsequent 1963 Vienna Summit where both sides agreed to a limited nuclear test ban.
The memo’s assessment of the Sino‑Soviet split is unusually prescient. Rusk notes that “the split is worse than we had supposed” and that Moscow is “worried about China becoming a nuclear power.” This anticipates the 1969 border clashes and the eventual realignment of U.S. policy toward China that culminated in Nixon’s 1972 visit. By linking the Cuban episode to the broader “Moscow‑Peking” rift, Rusk signals that the United States saw an opportunity to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities beyond the Western Hemisphere.
Legacy: why the memo still matters
Rusk’s “deep background” memo is more than a snapshot of a crisis‑week; it is a window into the decision‑making mindset that shaped the United States’ Cold‑War strategy for the next decade. The document illustrates how senior officials balanced public posturing with private uncertainty, how they interpreted Soviet intentions, and how they linked seemingly discrete flashpoints into a coherent strategic picture. Historians continue to rely on such internal assessments to understand why the United States chose a naval quarantine rather than an immediate air strike, why it pursued a limited arms control agenda soon after, and why it later embraced a policy of “strategic détente” with both Moscow and Beijing. In an era when declassification still reveals new layers of the crisis, Rusk’s candid appraisal reminds us that the line between war and peace often hinged on how quickly leaders could translate raw intelligence into a coherent diplomatic narrative.
Secretary Rusk Nov. 22 1962
Off Record "DEEP BACKGROUND"
On Cuba. The exchange of letters on 27/28 were such that there were all sorts of impressions. There was no time for systematic and detailed negotiations. There was no basis for a law suit. We had our own theory . They had their theory. Wae public exchanges were in themselves a reflection of the urgency of the situation. Communications simply could not take place through private channels, at the rate events were moving. One of most damaging reports that came out implied that more violent action was advocated--that we were ourselves urging escalation . The fact that answer of 28th was given in public was in large part due to urgency of the time factor. Situation was so tight that a complete meeting of minds was not possible. We did not know whether K understood what the President said in his teleyhshen address. We were talking about both missiles and bombers. As far as we were concerned, offensive weapons included bombers. They were not all that obsolete that they were not dangerous, especially in low level attack. For first few days we did not make much of an issue over the bombers, as long as the missiles were moving out we did not make an issue. When we saw that they were on ship board and saw them from the air we could turn again to the bombers. The fact that we had a slow reaction to the bombers was not an accident. K has agreed to take the bombers out and we will be able to see if they are leaving. The President said that some difficult problems remain yet. Are a great many involved. Some may not be resolved for some time yet. Until there are some safeguards about what is going on in Cuba we will have to get in formation by our own methods. The Sov. U. has made a considerable effort to get safeguards. It is our impression there ha e been real differences between Mikoyan and Castro and Sov U. has not been able to get Castro to go as far as Sov Un would go. Castro has forces on island which make it difficult for Sov U to say what he must do or else. Castro has 50,000 militia. There was a limit on what Sov Un could produce in Cuba. Catro has not come trough on safeguards and we must keep our freedom of action. As to invasion pledge--we are not going to give any assurances that modify our responsibility for hemispheric defense under the Rio Pact. Anything we do will be conditioned by the security requirements of hemisphere.
We will not guarantee the Castro government. We do not guarantee any government,--including our own. Not going to guarantee Castro. Not going to guarantee a haven from which Castro can launch an attack on the rest of hemisphere.
One of troubles in making this clear at the time was that by the time we go t through putting reservations on any statement of our position it would sound as though we were declaring war. We cannot leave the door open for the Soviet Union to build a base in Cuba. We cannot acknowledge the right of extra hemispheric country to have a foothold. Cannot sanction Castro putting into other countries agents of suversion. But insurance against in vasion is the only think K gets out of the whole affair. What comes next is of a lower order of danger but is stickin in terms of negotiating out anything that has remotest chance of being sat isfactory to both sides.
K had to make a case out that he is a man of peace. We willing to go along with the gag. He did pull missiles out. He has gotten himself committed to the idea of a or necessity of a detente. We have been unwilling to talk about anything else until Cuba and Berlin were settled. But S U is flying flag of detente. Hints are that there may be some important development fairly soon...some important agreement on some other subject. Maybe disarmament and nuclear testing. Not much we can negotiate in Berlin. But K seems to be interested in creating the impression that there is a detente--a pause for rearming maybe. Until they build up their ballistic missiles. It may be he has been sobered. Maybe has economic problems. Maybe defenses in bloc worry them. Maybe differences in bloc worry them. But maybe he really wants detente for a period.
[Sino-Soviet] Has been sketchcial of differences between Moscow and Peking. Feel neither could accept the idea of seeing the other seriously injured. But there are signs that split is worrse than we had suppoed. Believe Moscow now geneinuel worried about China and India. About China becoming nuclear power. About danger that China will get involved in war with West that will drag Sov Union in. Worried about having to get into China's wors or denounce its relations with China. My impression Russia has been trying to restrain China on Indian affair. (Pointed out 1/3 of oil comes from Russia) Will be intrstg to see if Stalinists are checked in Est Germany and Czechoslovakia as in Bulgaria. We must always bear in mind that we maybe set up for a draw play by the impression of detente. May be serious action in some other point.
We must not generalize about Cuban experience. Soviet U has enormous military power and nuclear potential. Enough to inflict massive damage on U. S.. They can bring enormous power to bear on other parts of world. Unless they had been prepared to use nuclear power they were at enormous disadvantages in Cuba. Great mistake to think measures we found useful in Cuba would work in some other situation.
Was there Soviet miscalculation in Cuba? Will be long time before we know. I am convinced they surprised by our reaction to Cuba, by NATO and OAS reaction. Also by fact that Afro-Asian block gave them no support. They made a misjudgement. This ime they were able to correct it. One element in our ction was that they had made a miscalculation and we ought to give them time to correct it before it escalated very far or very fast. We must be concerned from preventing them from making such miscalculation again.
(3)
On Nato
Only the US has really met its Nato goals fully. If you were in Moscow the action of Nato countries might put you in doubt about what the reaction of Nato would be. Have been trying for years to get Nato countries to maintain force levels in Nato agreed on in Eisenhower administration--not just because of real military requirements but because of the kind of signals this gives to Moscow. We must avoid tempting thieves.
Question: You said in speech yesterday we might be on thresh hold of great events etc.
What I had in mind was that almost all major problems have been affected by Cuba--Kh is not the Same, the bloc loc is not the same, Nato is not the same etc. Kh has some serious problems. So have we but I would rather have our problems than theirs. [Sino-Sov] Moscow-Peking split is more serious than I have thought hitherto. I think there has been a new spirit in Nato. Nato allies saw two things--that US was able to look into the cannon's mouth without flinching; that Russians are not 12 foot tall. Also the left in SA has abandoned Castro. Was notable serenity in our Allies--governments were as steady as could be. Kennedy was calmest man in Washington. This is such a lonely responsibility that this was a terrible testing period.
Question: If there have been these many changes are we changing any of our policies to take advantage of the shifts?
Well, we have to be careful about overdoing the doctrine of hot pursuit. Cuba has not destroyed the power of the Soviet Union. Have to be careful about a too eager follow up. Patience is called for. We might find ourselves in the embrace of a wounded bear.
Question: What is your appraisal of internal conflict in Sov Union in Kremlin?
We have no indication of any major conflict around K Think he is personally responsible for policy--including Cuba. Sometime in early summer he evidently decided to put missiles into Cuba--to cover it he talked soft--no Berlin issue until after elections etc. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he intended to arrive at UN in November and talk about Berlin--to disclose missiles in Cuba to back up foreign policy.
Question: May we adopt a "softer" policy to encrage detente--missiles in Turkey etc.
R: Independently of the Russians or the Cuban affair we have been reviewing our defense arrangements abroad and it is possible we might alter them--have a Nato deterrent etc. We are talking about new forces in NATO. On Berlin not much we could get soft about--we have sort of run out of margins on our side. Not much we can give on. Two points: our presence and access. Never got to second because Russian never conceded first.
Question: What about the unpublished K letter of 26th?
(4)
R: I have said you couldn't build a law suit on these letters. When President replied in his press conference that there had been a constant flow of letters it was a slip of tongue--he meant of communications. There was a long letter on Oct 26. Before we could reply to it the letter of the 27th was broadcast, including ref to Turkish bases. We elected to reply to letter of 26th because there was in it more possibility of agreement than in the letter of 27th. The letter of 28th--our letter--you will find does not fit snugly with the letter of the 27th.
On Cuba
Two aspects of Cuban situation. First is the military threat to the hemisphere. When it is solved will still have the problem of penetration of this hemisphere by a power from outside the hemisphere. We are back where we were before the middle of Sept. We are rid of the immediate offensive menace but still have to deal with Castro.
Q: What type of mil action did we intend to take in Cuba.
A: Better not go into that. We had two alternatives---air strike or ground invasion.
Q. How much known in Russia about letters. Have no info about how many in Kremlin knew about letter of 26th. We feel it important for us not to publish letter of 26th because we think it had things in it that would have frozen a situation. It will be out in 25 years.
On China
If this a major attack on India it is something the entire free world would have to do something about. We would hope : first that India would take all possible steps to help itself; (2) that the commonwealth nations would be mobilized to help and "3) we would support India and the commonwealth. Better we not be point of the spear from standpoint of Sov Un. This might force Moscow to back up Peking.
Q. The President said nuclear weapons were taken out Cuba. Were there nuclear warheads there?
R. An intsrg point. We never have seen any warheads for the missiles. Have never had direct info about presence there. We had to assume that at least some were there. We not sure are no missiles left. We know 42 have left. In absence of look see can't guarantee are not some more.
On Mc Mahon line---much clear than Ladakh area. We have never had an official view about L line. Have recognized Mc Mahon line a long time.
Q How can Castro defy Sov Un.
A. The way Phoumi could defy us. etc.
Q. What about India-Pak detente?
A. Some developments on Kashmir in a few days if Chin. advance.
Q. Is it our policy in long run that Castro must go?
Was a portion of Pres. press conf had drct brg on this. Weapons removal not final solution. A regime like that in Cub may not be a direct threat to US but it is a threat to other countries and a threat of penetration which we have to oppose. OAS has this in mind. Will have to turn back to that question when we get offensive weapons set tled. We cannot consent to any Marxist-Leninist regime tied into the Communist bloc in this hemisphere. Situation of Castro at moment unpredictable. More fluid than heretofore.
Q. Who gets credit for OAS response?
A. Ed Martin did great job.
Q. What effect of India on other SE Asia ctrs?
A. Have impression that Moscow really wished settlement in Laos and maybe S Viet nam, but impression that Pekin has moved int power position of influence in Hanoi.
Q. Are you going to stay on the job awhile?
A. Have heard nothing to contrary.
Q. How badly India defeated?
A. Said not to underestimate long run strengt of India. Most forces not committed. Many reserves. Still good fighting forces.
Q. Anything more on China Russia split.
A. Split is real but hard to say if can be patched up. Dont think so deep it could not be repaired, but reports from Europe show it very deep and might be difficult to patch up.
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