Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Secretary of State, "Post-INFCE Explorations by Jerry Smith," 18 June 1980, with attached memorandum by Warren Christopher to the President, "Post-INFCE Explorations," n.d., Secret
National Security Archive
A 1980 secret memo shows Carter’s team weighing the optics of a nuclear fuel‑cycle move against the need to keep allies from forging their own reprocessing deals.
Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Secretary of State, "Post-INFCE Explorations by Jerry Smith," 18 June 1980, with attached memorandum by Warren Christopher to the President, "Post-INFCE Explorations," n.d., Secret Date: Jun 18, 1980 Archive: State Department FOIA release Collection: Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials Jun 8, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Secret Memo in the Heat of the INFCE
On 18 June 1980 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski forwarded to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie a copy of a memorandum drafted by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and a provisional telegram concerning “post‑INFCE explorations” by a junior official, Gerry Smith. The memo was not a policy paper but a decision‑point note: President Carter had given Smith permission to begin exploratory talks with allies on how to apply the conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) while simultaneously telling Brzezinski to keep the President’s ultimate judgment in reserve. The document was produced in the narrow window between two crises that were reshaping U.S. non‑proliferation strategy – the contentious Tarapur decision on U.S. fuel supplies to India and the final report of the INFCE, a massive multilateral review of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.
The INFCE, convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1977‑78, was the most ambitious attempt to reconcile the competing goals of nuclear energy expansion and non‑proliferation. Its final report, released in early 1979, left many technical questions open, especially regarding reprocessing of spent fuel and breeder‑reactor development. The United States, under Carter, had pledged to oppose “premature” reprocessing and to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Yet domestic political pressure – notably from the nuclear industry and congressional committees – and allied expectations forced a more nuanced approach.
The Tarapur episode provides the immediate backdrop. In late 1979 the Carter administration decided to lift a U.S. export restriction on low‑enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant in India, a move that many non‑proliferation advocates interpreted as a retreat from full‑scope safeguards. Christopher’s memo flags exactly that risk: proceeding with post‑INFCE talks now could be read as a double‑whammy – a weakening of the U.S. stance on both the Tarapur deal and the broader non‑proliferation regime. He warns that allies and domestic audiences might view the two actions as mutually reinforcing retreats, thereby eroding the credibility of U.S. leadership at the upcoming 1980 NPT Review Conference.
Yet the same memo lists compelling reasons to move forward. European and Japanese partners were already pressing the United States to incorporate INFCE findings into bilateral fuel‑supply agreements. Australia, for example, was negotiating with Euratom and Japan on reprocessing arrangements that could undercut U.S. leverage. Christopher argues that a proactive, low‑key exploratory effort – limited to NPT parties with full‑scope safeguards and to France, a recognized nuclear‑weapon state – would preserve U.S. influence, secure fuel‑supply assurances, and pre‑empt unilateral moves by allies. The memo therefore frames the decision as a strategic trade‑off between short‑term political optics and long‑term control over the nuclear fuel market.
The actors in the document are emblematic of the Carter administration’s internal tug‑of‑war. Brzezinski, as the chief architect of U.S. foreign‑policy strategy, is the conduit for the President’s tentative approval, emphasizing a “let Gerry do this exploration … I may not wish to go forward with it.” Christopher, a career diplomat with a reputation for cautious pragmatism, lays out a balanced risk‑benefit analysis, acknowledging both the perception problem and the operational necessity. The junior official, Gerry Smith, remains a peripheral figure, but his designation as the point‑person underscores the administration’s desire to keep the process insulated from high‑level political fallout.
Reading between the lines, the memo reveals a deeper anxiety: the United States was losing its monopoly on nuclear fuel supply, and the INFCE had produced a set of technical standards that could be used to bind allies into a tighter non‑proliferation regime – if the U.S. could steer the negotiations. The reference to “low‑key, non‑committal and confidential” talks suggests an attempt to test the waters without triggering a public debate that could embolden anti‑nuclear constituencies in the 1980 election year.
The significance of this document lies in its illustration of how non‑proliferation policy was negotiated in real time, not in abstract treaty language. It shows the Carter administration grappling with the paradox of wanting to limit the spread of sensitive technology while simultaneously needing to keep allies satisfied and its own nuclear industry viable. The memo also foreshadows the more aggressive fuel‑cycle diplomacy of the Reagan era, when the U.S. would later adopt a “golden share” approach to reprocessing contracts.
For historians, the memo is a rare glimpse into the decision‑making calculus that preceded the 1980 NPT Review Conference and the eventual U.S. shift toward a more flexible, market‑oriented non‑proliferation stance. It underscores that the INFCE was never merely a technical exercise; it was a diplomatic lever that could be wielded—or abandoned—depending on the political winds in Washington and the strategic imperatives of its allies.
UNCLASSIFIED ...8013743 xr-8013426 SECRE 368$ N67
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON
SECRET
June 18, 1980
RELEASED IN FULL
S/P S/AS-Action OES S/S S/S-I
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Post-INFC Explorations by Gerry Smith
Attached is a copy of Warren Christopher's memorandum to the President and draft telegram on post-INFC explorations. Note that the President has approved letting Gerry Smith go ahead with explorations now. Note also, however, the President's instruction on the draft telegram:
"Let's let Gerry do this exploration of the idea on his own and report back to me. I may not wish to go forward with it. I'll discuss some in Venice."
(The President has also eliminated the info addressees from the draft telegram.)
Zb. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Smith: Post INFC Consultations #990575 Box# 4;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J GEHRON DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2005 200502152
SECRET Review on June 14, 2005 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED IN FULL [N67a] DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Attachment Classification TO: [OES]
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT SENSITIVE
The attached document may be seen only by the addressee and, if not expressly precluded from doing so, by those officials under his authority who he considers to have a clear-cut "need to know."
The document is not to be reproduced, given any additional distribution or discussed with others in the Department of State, or in other Departments, Agencies, or Bureaus without the express prior approval of the Executive Secretary.
Addressees outside the Department of State should handle the document in accordance with the above instructions on SENSITIVE.
When this document is no longer needed, the recipient is responsible for seeing that it is destroyed and for mailing a record of destruction to Mr. Elijah Kelly - S/S-I, Room 7241, NS.
Executive Secretary
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT SENSITIVE
Attachment Classification
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J GEHRON DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2005 200502152 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 8013426 SECRET RELEASED IN FULL [N67b]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting [W.C.]
SUBJECT: Post-INFCE Explorations
At the Friday foreign policy breakfast, I promised to send you an analysis of advantages and risks to Gerry Smith's proceeding with post-INFCE explorations now, as opposed to after Tarapur is resolved by the Congress.
Reasons for Not Going Ahead Now
-- Movement on this approach now could create public perceptions that "the Carter Administration is proposing to weaken its non-proliferation policy" or "the Carter Administration is changing signals on breeder reactor programs."
-- The Tarapur decision complicates our moving forward now with post-INFCE in two ways. First, both decisions will be characterized by some as U.S. non-proliferation retreats--Tarapur as a fall off of our commitment to full-scope safeguards, and post-INFCE as a retreat from our opposition to premature reprocessing and plutonium use. Second, it could be argued that our Tarapur decision is inconsistent with our post-INFCE explorations. That is, the Tarapur decision is based on the rationale of preserving controls over U.S.-origin material to prevent its reprocessing in India, whereas our post-INFCE explorations are designed to relax such controls where we have them in Europe and Japan outside of EURATOM.
-- The approach could be characterized as helping European and Japanese nuclear programs (in particular breeder, advanced reactor and reprocessing programs) that might otherwise fail. And, our approach may not in fact achieve greater allied cooperation in improving the non-proliferation regime.
SECRET UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J GEHRON RDS-3 6/14/00 DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2005 200502152 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED -2- -- The precedent of this approach could undercut our effort to prevent the spread of sensitive technology and material to countries outside Europe and Japan, or result in charges of discrimination by countries which we assert do not meet the necessary criteria.
Reasons for Going Ahead Now
-- Other countries expect us to take INFCE results into account, and key Allies have already approached us on harmonizing policies. If we do not move soon, the Australians (who are actively negotiating with EURATOM and Japan) could make agreements which would undercut our ability to limit reprocessing and plutonium use. We also need greater fuel supply assurances to meet anticipated criticism at the NPT Review Conference.
-- Our supply leverage is diminishing and our reliability is in question. Failure to commence explorations now would risk our Allies' going their own way in their nuclear programs and making the issue an even greater irritant in our relations. We could also lose their cooperation in improving the non-proliferation regime, in particular deterring commercial thermal recycle.
-- Going ahead with Tarapur and the post-INFCE explorations is entirely consistent. Both actions are designed to support the non-proliferation regime--in the case of Tarapur, to preserve safeguards and controls over U.S.-origin material in India; in the case of post-INFCE, to obtain limits and controls on U.S.-origin material in EURATOM (which we currently do not have) and greater non-proliferation cooperation generally including full-scope safeguards as a condition of future supply. Both decisions also serve broader foreign policy objectives.
-- Post-INFCE explorations will be less sensitive politically than Tarapur, especially since they will be low-key, non-committal and confidential and would be only with Allies who are either NPT parties with full-scope safeguards or, in the case of France, a nuclear weapons state. USG consideration of post-INFCE options has already had some press play (particularly in the trade press). We have had extensive consultations with those most concerned in Congress, and no one has objected to further explorations.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
-3-
Options Let Gerry Smith go ahead with explorations now. Postpone Gerry Smith's explorations until after Congress acts on Tarapur.
(A copy of proposed instructions for Gerry Smith is attached for your convenience.)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED D R A F T T E L E G R A M [N67C] RELEASED IN FULL ACTION: VIENNA INFO : LONDON, PARIS, BONN, TOKYO USIAEA FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM SECRETARY NODIS DECAPTIONED SUBJECT: POST-INFCE EXPLORATIONS
- SECRET (ENTIRE TEXT)
- The President authorizes you on an absolutely non-committal basis (and in a low key and confidential manner) to explore with the major European governments and Japan arrangements by which they would agree to cooperate in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and limit the reprocessing of spent fuel and use of plutonium. Your purpose is to clarify what we might expect from our allies in return for greater predictability in the exercise of consent rights over the use of US-origin spent fuel. Based on these explorations, we would be better able to develop positions for the statutorily mandated renegotiation of our agreements with EURATOM, Japan, and certain other countries.
- In your explorations, you should be guided by the following elements: A. What we would seek:
- Deferral by the involved countries of commitments to commercial thermal recycle for a specified period. SECRET UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM J GEHRON DATE/CASE ID: 06 DEC 2005 200502152 UNCLASSIFIED.
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
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- Limiting new reprocessing capacity to that required for breeder and advanced reactors and restraint in the separation of plutonium to avoid unnecessary stockpiling and pressures for thermal recycle.
- Support for development of an effective IPS and avoidance of excess national stockpiles of plutonium.
- Agreement by EURATOM and Japan to US consent rights called for in the NNPA.
- Continuing limits over US-origin material after use in breeder and advanced reactor RD&D programs.
- Increased commitments to spent fuel storage as our alternative to reprocessing.
- Improved cooperation in dealing with countries of proliferation concern, including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on exports of sensitive technology and material to such countries.
- Commitments to condition significant new nuclear supply commitments on NPT-type safeguards on future, as well as existing, facilities.
- Cooperation to make reprocessing associated with breeder reactors more proliferation resistant.
- Cooperation on improving the "once-through" cycle.
- Dedication of future enrichment capacity to produce low-enriched uranium only.
- Greater commitments of financial and technical resources and political support for development and implementation of improved IAEA safeguards.
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET UNCLASSIFIED -3-
we would consider offering:
- The United States would adopt predictable ground rules for the exercise of US consent rights and control over reprocessing and use of plutonium in certain RD&D programs for breeder and advanced thermal reactors. Specifically, you may explore advance agreement to reprocessing of US-origin material in mutually agreed facilities for use of the resulting separated plutonium in certain agreed breeder and advanced reactor RD&D programs in advanced NPT or equivalent countries that meet certain criteria.
- You may indicate willingness to consider generic agreement to reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France for other countries that have good non-proliferation credentials, or no spent fuel storage alternatives, or where it is in our non-proliferation interest to remove spent fuel.
- You should also indicate the US is reviewing in the context of preparations for the NPT Review Conference, licensing of export of low-enriched fuel for a longer term than now, as well as backup assurances and increased technical assistance, to NPT parties with good non-proliferation credentials.
- You should make clear that in return for flexibility on reprocessing and plutonium use we would expect agreement to improvements in the present non-proliferation regime, particularly a more helpful active role in dealing with problem countries. You should stress that no final policy decisions have as yet been made.
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