Leon Billings to the Secretary, "The Attached," 5 June 1980
National Security Archive
A June 1980 memo reveals a hidden battle inside the State Department over whether to loosen U.S. control of plutonium amid tense Vienna talks.
Source: Leon Billings to the Secretary, "The Attached," 5 June 1980 Date: Jun 5, 1980 Archive: RG 59, Muskie Subject Files, box 3, Non-Proliferation Collection: Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials Jun 8, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Tense Summer of Nuclear Diplomacy
In early June 1980 Leon G. Billings, a senior aide in the Secretary of State’s office, forwarded a terse note to Secretary Edmund Muskie that lay bare the internal clash over U.S. plutonium policy. The memo, titled simply “The Attached,” was a cover for a longer briefing from Berl Bernhard, a senior non‑proliferation official, recommending that the administration hold back any change to the restrictive case‑by‑case approval regime for reprocessing U.S.–origin plutonium. Bernhard’s counsel was explicit: postpone a signal of presidential flexibility to Ambassador Gerard Smith until late fall, and, if flexibility were to be offered, bring Senator John Glenn onto the negotiating team.
The exchange occurred against the backdrop of the Vienna talks on non‑proliferation, where the United States was to meet its NATO allies and the European Community on the fate of the “plutonium overhang” – the stockpile of weapons‑grade material left over from the 1970s commercial reprocessing programs. Japan, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom were all pressing for greater leeway to reprocess and recycle U.S.‑origin plutonium for civilian power, a move that risked spreading the very material the 1977 Presidential statement had vowed to keep under strict control. The stakes were high: a policy shift could ease allied access to nuclear fuel but also undercut the credibility of the non‑proliferation regime that the United States had championed at the 1975 Non‑Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
The Actors and Their Calculus
Bernhard, a career diplomat with deep ties to the State Department’s arms‑control bureaus, framed the debate in terms of “quids” and “quos” – a shorthand for what the U.S. could extract from allies versus what they would demand in return. His assessment that the proposed “quids” would be “technical, abstract and without real substance” reveals a suspicion that allied concessions would be more symbolic than substantive, a suspicion shared by many in the administration’s hard‑line non‑proliferation camp.
Ambassador Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator in Vienna, is depicted as “less than forthcoming,” perhaps masking a more aggressive push for policy flexibility. Smith’s position reflects a pragmatic strain within the State Department that feared alienating European partners and jeopardizing the commercial viability of U.S. reprocessing contracts. The memo notes that Smith’s approach could lead to a “generic approval of U.S. origin plutonium,” a phrase that hints at a feared erosion of the case‑by‑case regime.
Senator John Glenn, a former astronaut turned legislator, emerges as the political wildcard. Bernhard argues that his inclusion on the negotiating team would lend “intelligent diplomacy” and placate congressional critics, especially those on the Hill who had invoked the President’s 1977 statement as a shield against any policy drift. Glenn’s known environmental concerns and his recent conversation with Bernhard underscore the administration’s awareness that any overt policy shift would ignite domestic opposition from arms‑control advocates and environmental groups.
What the Memo Reveals Beyond the Text
The document’s subtext is a portrait of a government trying to balance three competing imperatives: maintain alliance cohesion, protect the non‑proliferation image, and manage domestic political fallout. Bernhard’s recommendation to delay a “presidential indication of flexibility” until late fall signals an acute awareness that the Vienna negotiations could become a public flashpoint, especially if the press learned of a pending policy change. By urging the Secretary to give Ambassador Smith an early indication of flexibility, Billings’ note reflects a counter‑current within the State Department that favored a more proactive, perhaps opportunistic, diplomatic posture.
The memo also betrays a subtle power struggle between the Secretary’s office and the National Security Council, which was increasingly involved in nuclear policy after the 1979 Three‑ Mile Island incident heightened public sensitivity to nuclear risks. The reference to “the entire group finally agreed” on avoiding a PRC (policy review conference) suggests that the senior leadership was coalescing around a cautious, consensus‑driven approach, even as individual diplomats like Smith pushed for a more agile stance.
Legacy of the June 5 Dispatch
While the Vienna talks ultimately produced only modest concessions and the United States maintained its restrictive plutonium policy through the early 1980s, the Billings‑Bernhard exchange foreshadowed later debates over the “plutonium surplus” that would dominate U.S. non‑proliferation policy in the 1990s. The memo’s emphasis on “political risks” and the need to manage congressional scrutiny presaged the heightened congressional oversight that followed the 1991 end of the Cold War, when the U.S. finally began to down‑blend and dispose of excess weapons‑grade plutonium.
In contemporary terms, the document is a reminder that policy shifts on nuclear material are never purely technical; they are mediated through diplomatic bargaining, domestic politics, and the ever‑present fear of proliferation. The June 5, 1980, memorandum thus remains a valuable case study for scholars examining how the United States navigated the delicate balance between alliance management and non‑proliferation commitments during a pivotal moment of the Cold War.
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 486058
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON
June 5, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY FROM: Leon G. Billings SUBJECT: The Attached
In sum Berl recommends no PRC; a delay in giving Ambassador Smith an indication of Presidential willingness to be flexible (perhaps until late fall); and a suggestion that, if you do give the Ambassador the o.k. that John Glenn be asked to join the negotiating team.
Note: The Department has prepared an agenda item on this subject which is included in this briefing book for your breakfast with the President. As you will see, it supports giving Gerry Smith an indication of Presidential flexibility now, rather than later.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 48608
June 5, 1980
MEMORANDUM
TO: Leon Billings
FROM: Berl Bernhard
RE: Non-Proliferation
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Please look over the following suggestions and, if you
think them appropriate, submit them to the Secretary. In my
judgment they are right and important.
1. There should not be a PRC to clarify our policy. The
entire group finally agreed on that position.
2. The preparation of "quids" is under way regarding what
we can expect to extract from our Allies. Unless the
"quids" are different from what I anticipate, they will
probably be technical, abstract and without real substance.
3. The upcoming Vienna discussions with our Allies on non-
proliferation are politically important and contain the
seeds of political problems at home. Regardless of how
Ambassador Smith (and Tom Pickering) dismiss Hill criticism
about the proposals advanced by Ambassador Smith, they
are real and strong. Senator John Glenn (with whom I had
a short discussion) believes that any modification of our
current position is inconsistent with the President's
1977 statement and would see to it that nothing is done
until there has been a complete review of our non-proliferation
position nationally.
4. None of us should be deceived by the talk that we are simply
opening up discussions of future possibilities. We are,
in fact, moving toward a change of policies if we modify
instructions to Ambassador Smith. When we ask for "quids"
they have a right to ask for "quos". When we put those
"quos" on the line and tentative agreement is reached that
when we do "X", they will do "Y", this will necessarily lead
to ultimate pressure for a policy change on the theory that
we have already made tentative commitments to do so. This
is the nature of negotiation and "diplomacy".
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 48608
MEMORANDUM June 5, 1980 Page Two
I regret to say that Ambassador Smith was less than forthcoming in articulating what he is about. Either he is camouflaging policy with rhetoric or he is, with design, understating his intent to lead to a more generic approval of U.S. origin plutonium.
Anything done in Vienna must be assumed to be a public matter which will lead to public debate here and abroad. There is opposition to a change in policy from many in the arms control area and among environmentalists. Why fuel these engines of discontent when everybody agrees that nothing will reasonably be done until 1981?
Most important, the strongest suggestion I can make, considering the complexity of the issue and its delicacy and the concern voiced on the Hill, is to have Senator John Glenn designated as part of the negotiating team to go to Vienna with Ambassador Smith. To me this makes self-evident sense. It is his area and he is politically sensitive. Until recently, having a representative from the Hill in negotiations was not an uncommon form of intelligent diplomacy.
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 48608
May 30, 1980
[ESM]
MEMORANDUM
TO: Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie FROM: Berl Bernhard SUBJECT: Options Paper re Non-Proliferation
THE ISSUE
Ambassador Gerard Smith, with the apparent concurrence of most relevant United States agencies, proposes to change U.S. non-proliferation planning assumptions, and hence negotiating instructions, to eliminate the current U.S. policy of restrictive case-by-case approvals of the reprocessing and use of U.S.-origin plutonium.
CONCLUSION
The subject matter is complex. I do not attempt to address the merits. I deem it unnecessary because the timing is poor and the approach piecemeal. I recommend strongly that no new planning assumptions or negotiating instructions should be given along the lines recommended by Ambassador Smith at this time.
The changes proposed are troubling, are unnecessarily controversial and little will be lost by delaying any change until early 1981 when the entire matter can be considered as part of a new or revised policy, if it is then deemed desirable. I would make three observations:
- Piecemeal Approach
The Smith proposal has serious implications for overall U.S. energy and non-proliferation policy. It should not be made in the context of the rather narrow negotiations scheduled for this summer but should await an opportunity for higher level and more comprehensive negotiations. While Ambassador Smith, as any good negotiator, would prefer to have maximum flexibility, a U.S. concession regarding the principle of restrictive treatment of plutonium reprocessing should not be made until you are comfortable with an overall U.S. strategy for non-proliferation and the international development of nuclear energy.
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 48608
- 2 -
- Poor Bargaining
The United States would more likely gain leverage with its Allies by adhering to its present plutonium policy than by modifying it. To the extent that the Allies seek U.S. flexibility and predictability on plutonium, they can be accommodated on a case-by-case basis. Thus the evils that Ambassador Smith describes -- such as the Allies going it alone on plutonium breeders or refusing to cooperate on other non-proliferation measures -- can be avoided without the United States retreating on the principle of restricting plutonium reprocessing. We are likely to strike a better bargain with our Allies if we do not use the "evolutionary" and "consensus" approach advocated by Ambassador Smith but instead hold back until we are confident we can achieve concrete concessions from the Allies. Your recent entry into this matter provides an ideal opportunity to keep the pressure on the Allies without adverse repercussions.
- Political Risks
The timing of the change proposed is exquisitely inappropriate. It would probably become public sometime in September or October. To be sure, the change is subtle and complex -- planning assumptions enmeshed in complicated international negotiations. The arms control community, which is tied closely to Senator Kennedy, may not be able to make a major issue of such an arcane change. Nevertheless, the change is likely to be perceived as a move to encourage the development of nuclear energy worldwide and hence could antagonize environmentalists and others deeply skeptical about nuclear energy. Criticisms from these groups would be difficult to refute and why be put to the burden?
OVERVIEW
To make the change now is piecemeal. It gives away leverage in dealing with our Allies with little in return except tenuous good will. Ambassador Smith relies principally on the assertion that present U.S. policy is undermining U.S.-Allied cooperation in non-proliferation and nuclear power development. Therefore, he concludes that the change he suggests will enable the United States to exert greater leverage on our Allies with respect to other and more serious non-proliferation problems. His PRC options paper does not contain either a factual or political justification for this statement. It appears to me that there are basic issues that go beyond
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 48608 SECRET -2- that Ambassador Smith raised the question of modifying US policy to permit the use of plutonium for demonstration programs. Several American allies are embarked on full-scale commercial demonstration of breeder reactors. These countries consider US non-proliferation policy to be completely contrary to those demonstration programs. Ambassador Smith wishes to change that policy and meet the demands of these countries. There ought to be a full public discussion of the extent to which the United States wants to become involved in the question of breeder reactor development around the world. It ought not be a policy which is derived as a result of negotiations -- the primary purpose of which is either to make life easier for our allies, or because the negotiators are committed to advanced nuclear power development.
Leon Billings
S:LB:ch:jm
SECRET
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