Jerry Oplinger to Leon Billings and Berl Bernhard, "PRC Options Paper re Non-Proliferation," 29 May 1980, Secret
National Security Archive
A hastily drafted NSC memo reveals how Cold‑War alliance pressures forced Washington to reconsider its strict anti‑reprocessing stance.
Source: Jerry Oplinger to Leon Billings and Berl Bernhard, "PRC Options Paper re Non-Proliferation," 29 May 1980, Secret Date: May 29, 1980 Archive: RG 59, Muskie Subject Files, box 3, Non-Proliferation Collection: Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials Jun 8, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Draft Born of Crisis
The memorandum dated May 29 1980 is a rough‑draft options paper prepared by Jerry Oplinger, then a senior staff member on the National Security Council, for two fellow NSC aides, Leon Billings and Berl Bernhard. It was written in the immediate aftermath of the 1979‑80 “Plutonium Overhang” debate that roiled Washington as the United States grappled with a growing stockpile of weapons‑grade plutonium and mounting pressure from its key allies—Japan, the European Community (EURATOM) and the United Kingdom—to ease restrictions on reprocessing U.S.‑origin fuel. The memo was intended to inject a contrarian viewpoint into an internal policy battle that had already produced a series of formal memoranda (the President’s PD‑8 decision of April 1977, the “Smith memo” of early 1980, and the Bingham/Zablocki letter of May 8 1980). Oplinger’s draft is explicitly labeled “very rough” and “thrown together under pressure of time,” signaling that it was a rapid response to an urgent decision point: whether to liberalize U.S. policy on reprocessing and plutonium use before the summer session of the NSC and the upcoming Reagan transition.
The Bigger Picture: Cold‑War Non‑Proliferation at a Crossroads
The memo belongs to the broader episode of U.S. non‑proliferation policy in the late 1970s, a period when the Carter administration attempted to institutionalize a “non‑proliferation first” stance through the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Presidential Decision Directive‑8 (PD‑8). Those instruments codified a strict “no‑reprocessing” rule for U.S.‑supplied fuel, reflecting fears that civilian reprocessing would create a global market for plutonium and accelerate the spread of breeder technology. By 1980, however, the policy was straining relationships with allies who had already invested heavily in fast‑breeder programs and who argued that the U.S. double standard—allowing its own reprocessing while denying them access—was jeopardizing the alliance and undermining the credibility of the non‑proliferation regime.
Who Is Speaking, and What Their Words Reveal
Oplinger’s tone is pragmatic to the point of blunt. He frames the existing policy as “not seriously prejudicing foreign nuclear programs” and suggests that the United States can “retain a meaningful policy” while granting a “very generous concession” (Option 2(a)). The memo lists three arguments for liberalization: diplomatic tension relief, the belief that EURATOM and Japan pose no proliferation threat, and the hope of leveraging the concession into a stronger overall non‑proliferation framework. Notably, the analysis is thin on empirical evidence; Oplinger admits that “no assessment is provided of the relative importance of the nuclear issue within the broader relationships.” This omission hints at a bureaucratic impulse to move the discussion forward rather than to resolve it analytically.
The document also reveals internal contradictions. While it warns that a blanket reprocessing approval could generate “enormous pressures” to resume commercial thermal recycle after a deferral period, it simultaneously proposes exactly that deferral without specifying its duration. The language oscillates between “surrendering to allied preferences” and “maintaining a meaningful policy,” exposing the tension between alliance management and the strategic imperative to contain plutonium.
What the Draft Tells Us Beyond Its Text
Reading between the lines, the memo underscores how the NSC was wrestling with a looming policy vacuum. The fact that Oplinger felt compelled to circulate an unpolished paper suggests that senior officials feared a decision stalemate that could spill over into the upcoming presidential transition. The inclusion of PD‑8 and the “Smith memo” as background material indicates that the staff were aware of the historical weight of the original non‑proliferation decision and were trying to re‑anchor the debate in that legacy, even as they considered a reversal.
Furthermore, the draft’s emphasis on “economic pressures” to export surplus breeder technology hints at an emerging recognition that U.S. non‑proliferation policy could no longer be divorced from commercial nuclear market dynamics. The memo’s vague “motherhood” items—such as “strengthen supplier state cooperation” without concrete mechanisms—reflect a bureaucratic habit of padding policy options with aspirational language to make them palatable to both political leaders and foreign partners.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
Although the Options Paper never became official policy, its contours resurfaced during the Reagan administration’s eventual shift toward limited reprocessing allowances and the 1991 “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement” with the United Kingdom. The memo foreshadows the pragmatic turn that U.S. non‑proliferation strategy would take in the post‑Cold War era: balancing strict non‑proliferation ideals with the realities of allied nuclear ambitions and commercial interests.
For today’s analysts, the document is a reminder that high‑level non‑proliferation decisions are often the product of hurried internal memos, competing bureaucratic priorities, and the pressure to keep alliances intact. Its candid acknowledgment of policy gaps and its tentative solutions offer a rare glimpse into the decision‑making process that shaped the trajectory of the global plutonium market and the architecture of the modern non‑proliferation regime.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority 34735
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 29, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR:
S - LEON BILLINGS
S - BERL BERNHARD
FROM:
JERRY OPLINGER
SUBJECT:
PRC Option's Paper re Non-Proliferation
This is a very rough draft thrown together under pressure of time;
I'm sending it without trying to polish. There is much more that
could be said; this is intended merely to give you a different
perspective than you are likely to get in-house. I hope it's of
some use.
I include a copy of PD-8, the President's original decision memo
on non-proliferation, which people tend to forget and love to
ignore. I'm also including a copy of the original Smith memo,
which you needn't read -- a quick scan will give you an idea of
where this all started.
I have not tried to deal with the other options in the paper (1 and
2(a)) on reprocessing. The essential fact is that we need not
move from where we are now; nobody is hurting and the existing
Presidential guidelines will provide plenty of plutonium for reason-
able R&D programs. If we must move, 2(a) is a very generous conces-
sion and the outer limit of what we can do while retaining a mean-
ingful policy.
SECRET
Review 5/29/86
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3
NW 34735
By ZDS, NARA, Date 3-9-16
[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735]
Non-Proliferation PRC Options Paper
The inscrutability of the PRC Options Paper results from several things: obfuscation, poor drafting, the skewing of its analysis to support a set of policy pre-judgments, and the editing down of a series of previous papers to protect positions rather than clarify issues.
The paper is intended to deal with three distinct issues. They are the survivors of a bureaucratic negotiation, not a coherent selection of the most important non-proliferation issues before us; differences in their importance, immediacy, and potential consequence are very large:
I. Whether the US should now broadly liberalize its policy on approving the reprocessing of US-supplied nuclear fuel, and the use of the extracted plutonium in foreign breeder programs;
II. The position we should take with respect to a proposed International Plutonium Storage regime (IPS);
III. A proposal to issue long-term fuel export licenses instead of single reactor reloads.
I. Reprocessing and Plutonium Use Policy
The heart of the Options Paper is the proposal (Option 2(b)) that we move now to a sweeping settlement of the continued differences between the U.S. and other advanced countries on the development of plutonium fuel cycles. We would do this by granting them blanket,
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SECRET 2. advance approval to reprocess US-origin fuels and use the resulting plutonium in their programs. In short, we would end the fuel-cycle controversy by surrendering to their views. In doing so, we would step sharply away from the policies set forth in one of the President's earliest foreign policy decisions (PD-8 of April 1977, copy attached). The paper, implicitly or explicitly, makes essentially three arguments for such a change: [DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 486008]
- The need to resolve the political tensions which continued disagreement on nuclear issues produces in our bilateral relationship with key allies. No assessment is provided of the relative impor- tance of the nuclear issue within the broader relationships; there is little evidence that the governments concerned (as opposed to their nuclear bureaucracies) regard the nuclear issue as critically important or urgent. Moreover, despite accumulating evidence that the premises underlying the President's original policies are correct, and the fact that those policies are not seriously prejudicing foreign nuclear programs, the unspoken assumption is that the disagreement must be ended, ended now, and ended by US capitulation to allied preferences and choices.
- That EURATOM and Japan are our allies; that they represent no proliferation threat; and that constraining their nuclear energy programs punishes our friends without affecting real proliferation problems. What Europe and Japan does matter, not because they are a direct proliferation threat, but because what happens there will set an extremely influential example in the rest of the world. It will also create large economic pressures to export surplus materials, and to recoup large R&D investments by exporting breeder technology and hardware to the rest of the world. SECRET
[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735] 3. That by resolving the fuel-cycle disagreement, we can achieve allied cooperation in building a better non-proliferation regime.
While the paper scrupulously avoids setting forth an explicit bargain, it clearly posits the advantage of accommodating Europe and Japan in order to achieve the objectives listed on pp. 5-6.
The ambiguity and fuzz surrounding these listed objectives has been sufficiently pointed out in the Bingham/Zablocki letter to Smith of May 8, 1980. The objectives are loosely described, and decisions as to which would be minimally acceptable as a trade-off for the specific and concrete US concessions are left for a later stage, after we may be locked into a negotiating process from which it may be almost impossible to withdraw.
Specifically, the paper calls for us to "seek:"
- Deferral of commitments to commercial thermal recycle for a specified period. (Thermal recycle is the recycle of reprocessed plutonium in present-day reactors.)
The President is not told how long the deferral should be; only commercial recycle is banned (everything will then be called research); only commitments are prohibited (and mere experimenting on any scale may be allowed). More important, as discussed above, the stockpiling of plutonium during the deferral, if we permit unconstrained reprocessing of US fuel, will create enormous pressures to go ahead with thermal recycle as soon as the deferral is over.
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735] 4. 2. Avoidance of excess national stockpiles of plutonium. But the relaxation will create incentives to produce just such stockpiles. 3. Obtaining from EURATOM controls over spent fuel. But we would define them so as to render them ineffective, as the price of getting them. 4. Continued restraint in the export of sensitive nuclear technology. We already have a commitment; this would simply confirm it. 5. Strengthen supplier state cooperation in dealing with problem countries. No specifics are provided. This is recognized as a "hope," not a concrete objective. 6. A miscellany of vague "motherhood" items.
The paper does not attempt to assess the additional proliferation
risks which relaxation of US policy would create, and whether, even if
all of the objectives listed were obtained, they would adequately
contain those additional risks. An understanding of this question
requires a quick look at European and Japanese plans.
Because we lack control over the disposition of materials supplied
to EURATOM, there is little we can do to affect their breeder programs
short of an embargo on further fuel supply. Nobody contemplates such
an embargo, which is why our diminishing share of the European fuel
market is not very relevant to the choices before us.
But the Europeans also plan activities which have large prolif-
eration implications and which involve the reprocessing of spent fuel
we do control. France and the UK each plan to build very large
reprocessing plants in the next several years which are not needed
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735] 5. to produce plutonium for their breeder R&D programs, and whose primary purpose is to reprocess spent fuel as a commercial service to other countries, whose spent fuel is under our control. Japan is their biggest customer, and is putting up the front-end money to build these plants as well as providing a large share of their future business. Moreover, Japan itself plans to build an additional large reprocessing plant of its own.
Any one of these three projected plants would more than swamp the projected plutonium needs of all the breeder R&D programs in the world. Three of them will produce a vast surplus of pure, weapons- grade plutonium amounting to several hundred tons by the year 2000. Not only would that stockpile of separated plutonium constitute a danger in itself, it would eventually drive these nations, and those watching their example, into the recycle of plutonium in today's generation of reactors for economic reasons. Thus the use of plutonium as a fuel may occur whether or not breeders catch on, simply because too much reprocessing and plutonium production takes place in the near future as a means of waste "disposal." The attached graph shows the maximum projected needs for R&D purposes in Europe and Japan until 2000, and the maximum amount of plutonium presently projected to be reprocessed during the same period.
The amount of potential US leverage on this problem is not over- whelming, but it could be extremely important. More than half of the spent fuel which could be reprocessed in the new French and British plants, and virtually all of the fuel for the Japanese plant, is under US control. A rigorous application of our consent rights would deny most of this business, make the completion of these plants a much more dubious commercial venture, and sharply reduce incentives to complete them.
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34725] 6. The stakes in a decision on liberalizing our control rights are thus very large.
II. Fuel Licensing (pp. 18-19) Conventional, current practice is to issue fuel export licenses for one reactor reload at a time. We have told a selected group of countries that we will issue up to five reloads at a time. The proposal here is to license for the fuel needs of the entire lifetime of the reactor -- up to 40 years. That is an extreme position; it gives up the subtle and effective non-proliferation leverage in fuel supply for a period far in excess of our ability to predict the likely future behavior of virtually any country. The paper should include a more limited option -- perhaps a 10- year license, and only for countries who have renegotiated their agreement with us to the non-proliferation standards set forth in the NNPA.
III. International Plutonium Storage (IPS) The basic notion here is to set up a decentralized storage regime for separated plutonium under some kind of international control. Plutonium would be released for any "peaceful" purpose. The hope is that international involvement would increase the political barriers to misuse. But an IPS is also an international distribution regime for plutonium, which implies that it is now safe, and gives international sanction to its release for national purposes so long as they are declared peaceful. The risk is that this would catalyze widespread reprocessing and use of plutonium in any participating country. The President, in PD-8, directed that IPS should be discouraged. There should be an option sticking with that position.
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DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735 7. Evolution of the Paper It should be understood that the positions put forth in the paper represent a considerable degree of compromise. Some of the rationale and intention behind it can be judged from the February 16 memorandum attached, which represents the strategy Ambassador Smith originally recommended. It went much further than the current paper. It would have, for example, made no pretext of attempting to limit reprocessing in Europe and Japan, and would have accepted explicitly the proposed 1500-ton reprocessing plant in Japan as well as the two big plants in France and the UK.
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735] Dr. [illegible]
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 1603X
SECRET/CDS March 24, 1977 [illegible stamp]
Presidential Directive/NSC-8
TO: The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration
ALSO: The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Assistant to the President for Energy Policy
SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
It shall be a principal U.S. security objective to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive -- or near explosive -- capabilities to countries which do not now possess them. To this end U.S. non-proliferation policy shall be directed at preventing the development and use of sensitive nuclear power technologies which involve direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or other weapons useable material in non-nuclear weapons states, and at minimizing the global accumulation of these materials.
Specifically, the U.S. will seek a pause among all nations in sensitive nuclear developments in order to initiate and actively participate in, an intensive international nuclear fuel cycle re-evaluation program (IFCEP) whose technical aspects shall concern the development and promotion of alternative, non-sensitive, nuclear fuel cycles. This program will include both nuclear supplier and recipient nations.
For its part the United States Government will:
-- Indefinitely defer the commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium in the U.S.
SECRET/CDS
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3 NWN 34735 By ISDS NARA, Date 3.9.16
DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735
SECRET/CDS 2 Copy for Dr. Jessica Tuchman
-- Restructure the U. S. breeder reactor program so as to emphasize alternative designs to the plutonium breeder, and to meet a later date for possible commercialization. As a first step the need for the current prototype reactor, the Clinch River project, will be reassessed.
-- Redirect the funding of U. S. nuclear research and development programs so as to concentrate on the development of alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve access to weapons useable materials.
-- Provide incentives, in the area of nuclear fuel assurances and spent fuel storage, to encourage the participation of other nations in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program. Detailed studies of these programs shall be carried out by the NSC Ad Hoc Group established herein, and submitted to me as directed in the accompanying memorandum.
-- Initiate a program of assistance to other nations in the development of non-nuclear means of meeting energy needs.
-- Increase production capacity for nuclear fuels.
- It shall also be U. S. policy to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime: by encouraging the widest possible adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to comprehensive international safeguards; by strengthening and improving the IAEA; and by providing stronger sanctions against the violation of nuclear agreements. Therefore the U. S. will announce its intention to terminate nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear weapons state that hereafter
-- detonates or demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive device; or
-- terminates or materially violates international safeguards or any guarantees it has given to the United States.
- In order to implement these policies to perform the necessary studies, and to coordinate departmental activities in the non-proliferation field, I hereby establish an NSC Ad Hoc Group, to be chaired by the Department of State, and to include the Presidential Assistant for Energy. This group shall establish task forces, chaired by the appropriate agencies, to perform, among others, the tasks detailed in the accompanying memorandum.
Jimmy Carter
SECRET/CDS
[DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735]
SECRET/CDS Copy for Dr. Jessica Tuchman
The NSC Ad Hoc Group, established in PD- , is directed to:
-- prepare and submit by March 31 a comprehensive list of all activities, facilities and technologies related to nuclear power, which involve direct access to weapons useable materials;
-- prepare and submit by April 1, a review of the Fiscal 1978 budget with appropriate recommendations to implement the policies set forth in the accompanying Presidential Directive;
-- prepare and submit by April 5, proposed nuclear export policies, including: a summary of current applications for export of Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium; criteria which should be applied to nuclear exports at the licensing stage; a list of criteria and conditions which should be required for new and amended agreements for cooperation, and necessary revisions in existing agreements; explicit options covering U. S. policies on consent to retransfer, reprocess, reexport and reuse U.S.-supplied fuels, Highly Enriched Uranium, plutonium, and materials irradiated in U.S.-supplied facilities; and legislative proposals to implement these recommendations;
-- prepare and submit by May 1, a detailed study of measures the U.S. might take so as to be able to offer nuclear fuel assurances to nations participating in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program, including: rigorous revised estimates of future nuclear energy demand; measures to expand U.S. enrichment capacity; analysis and justification of U.S. stockpile programs; recommendations for appropriate terms and conditions for future toll enrichment contracts; assessments of the benefits of declaring an open season on enrichment contracts; exploration of international undertakings and agreements; and other short and long-term options for providing nuclear fuel assurances and collaborating with other suppliers;
-- prepare and submit by May 1, a thorough study of measures the U.S. might take concerning nuclear fuel storage including: measures to expand U.S. spent fuel storage and transportation capacity; proposals for meeting the storage needs of those participating in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program; analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of international spent fuel storage (but not plutonium storage which the U.S. shall discourage and measures to accelerate the development, demonstration and licensing of long-term spent fuel storage, both retrievable and terminal...
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600 Supply 500 400 300
- amount projected to be produced Metric Tons Plutonium 200 Demand 100
- amount needed for projected R&D programs 80 85 90 95 2000 DECLASSIFIED Authority 34735 Projected Cumulative Plutonium Supply and Demand Situation For Western Europe and Japan - Base Case Figure III-1
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