Department of State telegram 298150 to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, "U.S.-Japan Consultations on Non-Proliferation: Non-INFCE Subjects," 15 November 1979, Secret
National Security Archive
A 1979 State Department telegram shows how the U.S. tried to bind Japan’s plutonium program to a wider non‑proliferation strategy amid regional crises.
Source: Department of State telegram 298150 to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, "U.S.-Japan Consultations on Non-Proliferation: Non-INFCE Subjects," 15 November 1979, Secret Date: Oct 15, 1979 Archive: RG 59, AAD Collection: Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials Jun 8, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
U.S.-Japan Nuclear Dialogue in the Shadow of the Three‑Mile Island Crisis
The telegram dated 15 November 1979 is a routine‑looking diplomatic dispatch, but it records a pivotal moment when Washington and Tokyo were trying to align their non‑proliferation strategies amid a cascade of regional flashpoints. The message follows a September meeting of senior officials—Assistant Secretary of State William Pickering and Japan’s Director‑General of the Science and Technology Agency, Masahiko Yatabe—who were reviewing “post‑INFCE” (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation) issues. The INFCE, a 1977‑78 multilateral conference, had produced a set of recommendations on spent‑fuel management, reprocessing, and safeguards, but the United States and Japan remained at odds over how to translate those ideas into bilateral practice.
The telegram’s agenda items reveal the breadth of the concerns that dominated late‑1970s nuclear diplomacy. First, the United States offered a draft for a joint feasibility study on Pacific‑basin spent‑fuel storage, a proposal that Pickering framed as “informal” pending further authorisation (Circular 175). Japan’s cautious response—still studying the material the U.S. had supplied—signals Tokyo’s reluctance to commit to a storage regime that might lock it into a de‑facto reprocessing pathway.
Second, the discussion of the Tokai‑Mura reprocessing plant underscores the technical and political deadlock. The United States pressed for a “full‑scale coprocessing” conversion as stipulated in the 1974 Tokai Communiqué, yet Yatabe warned that scaling up from experimental work would take considerable time. Pickering’s suggestion to extend the Communiqué’s deadlines and embed a new arrangement in a renegotiated U.S.–Japan cooperation agreement reveals a strategic pivot: rather than forcing a rapid technical solution, Washington was prepared to use the bilateral treaty framework to keep Japan’s plutonium stockpile under American oversight.
Third, the telegram references the Kemeny report on Three‑Mile Island, a domestic U.S. accident that had reignited global fears about civilian nuclear safety. By noting that the report had been shared with the Japanese government and that the MITI representative (Kodama) urged the United States to weigh “international repercussions as well as the US domestic situation,” the document captures how the accident forced both capitals to recalibrate the political calculus of any expanded reprocessing or fuel‑cycle cooperation.
The later sections shift from bilateral technicalities to broader geopolitical concerns. Pickering thanks Japan for curtailing nuclear‑related supplies to Pakistan and outlines a U.S. warning that a Pakistani test would have a “drastic effect” on bilateral relations. Yatabe’s request for a definition of that term, and his caution that any punitive measures must preserve the delicate India‑Pakistan balance, expose the limits of U.S. leverage and Japan’s own regional sensitivities.
Finally, the telegram touches on the South Atlantic event (the 1979 Vela satellite detection of a possible nuclear test), the Niger NPT ratification effort, and the need to involve China and the Soviet Union in any pressure on Pakistan. These references illustrate how the United States was trying to coordinate a global non‑proliferation strategy while relying on Japan as a regional partner capable of diplomatic outreach in Africa and South Asia.
What the telegram does not say, but which the subtext betrays, is the growing unease in Washington about Japan’s plutonium “overhang.” By coupling technical talks on spent‑fuel storage with diplomatic overtures on Pakistan and Niger, the State Department was weaving a narrative that Japan’s cooperation on the fuel cycle could be leveraged to bolster broader non‑proliferation objectives. The phrase “new element” regarding Tokai‑Mura hints that the United States was contemplating a more formalized, perhaps legally binding, mechanism to monitor Japanese reprocessing—an early echo of later agreements such as the 1991 US‑Japan Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
The significance of this document lies in its snapshot of a transitional period. Within a year, the United States would shift from the INFCE‑driven optimism to a more constrained approach after the Three‑Mile Island accident and the Iranian Revolution reshaped security priorities. The telegram therefore marks the last phase of a U.S. policy that sought to integrate Japan’s civilian nuclear program into a broader non‑proliferation architecture before the post‑Cold War era forced a retreat to more bilateral, security‑focused arrangements. Its legacy endures in today’s ongoing debates over spent‑fuel storage, trans‑Pacific nuclear cooperation, and the limits of diplomatic leverage in non‑proliferation.
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Message Text
SECRET
PAGE 01 STATE 298150 ORIGIN SS-30
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /030 R
DRAFTED BY OES/NEP:RDEMING:DJR APPROVED BY OES:LBROWN S/S:SSTAPLETON ----------------073805 170721Z /10 P 162342Z NOV 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 298150
EXDIS
E.O. 12065 RDS-1 11/15/99 (LES BROWN) OES
TAGS: ENRG, TECH, PARM, JA
SUBJECT: US-JAPAN CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION: NON-INFCE SUBJECTS
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION ON POST-INFCE ISSUES REPORTED SEPTEL, US AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS LED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING AND DIRECTOR GENERAL YATABE RESPECTIVELY DISCUSSED FOLLOWING TOPICS:
A. PACIFIC BASIN SPENT FUEL STORAGE: THE US SIDE HANDED OVER A DRAFT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR A JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY. PICKERING EMPHASIZED THAT THE DRAFT WAS INFORMAL AND THAT WE STILL HAD TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER AND CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS (CIRCULAR 175), BUT THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON IT DURING HIS STOPS IN TOKYO IN JANUARY. YATABE SAID THAT THE GOJ WAS STILL STUDYING THE SECRET
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PAGE 02 STATE 298150
MATERIAL THE US HANDED OVER IN SEPTEMBER, BUT WILL BE PRE- PARED FOR DISCUSSIONS IN JANUARY, LOOKING TO CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT IN THE SPRING.
B. TOKAI MURA: PICKERING SAID THAT OUR EXPERTS WERE STUDYING THE MATERIAL MADE AVAILABLE DURING THE TECHNICAL
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
TALKS IN OCTOBER BUT THAT WE CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE MAIN PLANT WOULD BE CONVERTED TO FULL SCALE COPROCESSING AS CALLED FOR IN THE TOKAI COMMUNIQUE. HE SUGGESTED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO EXTEND AGAIN THE COMMUNIQUE SINCE IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT JAPAN WOULD BE ABLE TO REPROCESS THE AUTHORIZED 99 TONS BY APRIL 30, 1980, AND PERHAPS INCORPORATE THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR TOKAI IN A RENEGOTIATED US-JAPAN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. YATABE RESPONDED THAT THE GOJ HAD EXPLAINED IN THE OCTOBER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS THAT THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF DIFFICULTY IN CONVERTING THE MAIN PLANT TO COPROCESSING AND THAT IN ANY EVENT CONSIDERABLE TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO SCALE UP FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK AT THE OTL TO COPROCESSING AT THE MAIN PLANT. AS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF INCORPORATING A NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR TOKAI IN A RENEGOTIATED AGREEMENT, YATABE SAID THAT THIS WAS A "NEW ELEMENT" ON WHICH HE COULD NOT COMMENT AT THIS POINT.
C. KEMENY REPORT ON THREE MILE ISLAND: PICKERING NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE THE REPORT AVAILABLE TO THE GOJ. THE MITI REPRESENTATIVE (KODAMA) SAID THAT HE HOPED THE US WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AS WELL AS THE US DOMESTIC SITUATION IN ANY DECISIONS IT MADE ON THE BASIS OF THIS REPORT. THE US SIDE RESPONDBD THAT WE WOULD BE MINDFUL OF THIS.
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D. PAKISTAN: PICKERING THANKED THE GOJ FOR ITS EFFORTS TO CURTAIL SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND REVIEWED OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GOP. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TOLD FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BY PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE "A DRASTIC EFFECT" ON US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. YATABE ASKED FOR A DEFINITION OF "DRASTIC EFFECT". PICKERING RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT SPELL THIS OUT BUT NOTED THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE HAD A NUMBER OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD COME INTO EFFECT. YATABE SAID THAT WHILE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MIGHT DELAY A STATE FROM DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE THE PROBLEM WAS FINDING AN EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DETER A COUNTRY SUCH AS PAKISTAN FROM PURSUING ITS CHOSEN COURSE. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS REALLY POSSIBLE TO MAKE DRASTIC CHANGES IN ONE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN AFTER AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED IN A MANNER THAT PRESERVED A BALANCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT EACH GOVERNMENT HAD TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHAT IT WAS PREPARED TO DO IN SUCH AN EVENT, BUT IN THE US THERE WOULD BE A STRONG REACTION. YATABE ASKED IF WE WERE PROPOSING CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN THAT IT WOULD FIND IT DISADVANTAGEOUS TO CONDUCT
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
A TEST. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT WE WERE NOT MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL BUT WANTED EACH STATE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT STEPS IT MIGHT TAKE. YATABE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR CHINA AND THE SOVIETS TO BE INVOLVED ALSO. IF ONLY THE WEST TOOK ACTION, THE EFFORT WOULD FAIL.
E. SOUTH ATLANTIC EVENT: PICKERING SAID THAT DESPITE PRESS REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE (FYI THIS WAS BEFORE REPORT FROM NEW ZEALAND ABOUT POSSIBLE FALLOUT IN RAIN WATER END FYI), WE HAD NO CORROBORATING EVIDENCE OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND OUR EXPERTS WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE DATA. HE NOTED THAT WE WOULD FACE A PROBLEM AT THE UN AND THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING THE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE SECRET
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ON ANY RESOLUTION DIRECTED AT SOUTH AFRICA.
F. NIGER: YATABE NOTED THAT AT US URGING THE GOJ HAD APPROACHED THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGER LAST SUMMER TO ASK THAT IT RATIFY THE NPT. YATABE SAID THAT THE GON HAD REACTED STRONGLY AND THAT THE TIMING OF THE JAPANESE APPROACH WAS CLEARLY POOR. HE ASKED IF THE US HAD HAD A SIMILAR REACTION FROM NIGER. PICKERING RESPONDED THAT NIGER DID APPARENTLY RESENT THIS OUTSIDE PRESSURE AND THAT WE WERE NOT NOW PLANNING FURTHER APPROACHES. HE EXPRESSED REGRET IF US SUGGESTION HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR JAPAN BUT NOTED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO NIGER'S ADHERANCE TO TH NPT. VANCE
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NNN
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
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