U.S. Embassy Tokyo telegram 02669 to State Department, "Bilateral Nuclear Consultations with Japan," 3 February 1979, Secret
National Security Archive
A 1979 secret telegram reveals how a friendly Tokyo‑Washington meeting set the stage for Japan’s plutonium policy and U.S. non‑proliferation strategy.
Source: U.S. Embassy Tokyo telegram 02669 to State Department, "Bilateral Nuclear Consultations with Japan," 3 February 1979, Secret Date: Feb 3, 1979 Archive: RG 59, Access to Archival Databases (AAD) Collection: Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials Jun 8, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Quiet Pivot in the Nuclear Dialogue
On 3 February 1979 the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo sent a secret telegram to Washington outlining a full‑day, informal nuclear consultation between Assistant Secretary of State William Pickering and senior Japanese officials, notably Ambassador Niizaki of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). The timing is crucial: it follows the 1975‑1978 “Tokai‑Mura” joint communiqué that set a three‑year timetable for Japan’s plutonium‑recycling program, and it precedes the 1979 U.S. decision to tighten export controls on re‑processing technology. The telegram therefore captures a moment when both governments were trying to reconcile Japan’s burgeoning civil‑nuclear ambitions with the United States’ non‑proliferation agenda.
The document belongs to the broader episode of the “Japan plutonium overhang” debate, a Cold‑War‑era controversy that pitted U.S. strategic concerns about plutonium stockpiles against Japan’s energy security needs. After the 1974 oil shock, Japan accelerated its nuclear power program, planning to recycle spent fuel at the Tokai‑Mura re‑processing plant. Washington, wary of any civilian plutonium stockpile that could be diverted, pressed for a “subsequent arrangement” under the 1970 Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Agreement (NNPA) that would bind Japan to strict IAEA safeguards and limit the use of plutonium to research reactors.
Pickering’s proposal, as recorded in the telegram, was to extend the Tokai‑Mura terms through April 1980, effectively re‑classifying the arrangement as a “subsequent arrangement” and thereby giving the United States a legal lever to monitor Japan’s plutonium. The Japanese side, represented by Ambassador Niizaki, signaled willingness in principle but deferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for review. This diplomatic dance reveals the delicate balance: the United States needed Japanese cooperation on fuel‑cycle management, yet it could not appear to dictate policy to a key ally.
Two substantive issues emerge from the text. First, the discussion of a Pacific‑island interim spent‑fuel storage facility underscores how both Washington and Tokyo were already envisioning regional solutions to the growing inventory of high‑level waste. The suggestion of a shared storage site reflects a strategic calculation: by anchoring the facility in the Pacific, the United States could both alleviate domestic storage pressures and extend its influence over other basin nations, a point Pickering emphasized as a “device to support the use of nuclear energy in both countries.”
Second, the telegram records Japan’s admission of a $200 million investment in centrifuge research and its intent to develop a national uranium‑enrichment capability. This was a red line for U.S. non‑proliferation officials, who feared that a sovereign Japanese enrichment plant could set a precedent for other technologically capable, but politically less stable, states. Pickering’s response—advocating a multinational enrichment plant under strict IAEA safeguards—mirrored the U.S. push for a “fuel bank” model that would supply low‑enriched uranium to developing nations while containing the spread of enrichment technology.
The participants themselves are telling. Pickering, a career diplomat with a reputation for technical fluency, framed the dialogue in terms of “harmonization of non‑proliferation views,” positioning the United States as a collaborative partner rather than an imposing regulator. Niizaki, described as a “commissioner” of the JAEC, projected a cooperative stance, yet his insistence on IAEA‑based international control of plutonium reveals Japan’s sensitivity to domestic anti‑nuclear sentiment and its desire to retain a veneer of independence.
The telegram’s tone—“most cordial and frank, with no major surprises”—belies the high stakes beneath the surface. Both sides were testing the limits of a partnership that would later be strained by the 1995 Joint Statement on the “Plutonium Stockpile” and the 2010 U.S. decision to halt re‑processing technology transfers to Japan. The 1979 meeting therefore marks a quiet pivot: it is the last documented instance where the United States entertained a Japanese enrichment trajectory without overtly conditioning aid, before the post‑Cold‑War recalibration of the bilateral nuclear relationship.
Why does this matter today? The legacy of the 1979 talks echoes in contemporary debates over Japan’s fast‑breeder reactor (FBR) program and its recent interest in small modular reactors. The same arguments about multinational safeguards, regional storage, and the balance between energy independence and non‑proliferation reappear in policy circles. Moreover, the telegram provides a rare, contemporaneous glimpse into the diplomatic choreography that shaped the architecture of the modern nuclear non‑proliferation regime in the Pacific, a region still grappling with waste disposal and the geopolitics of nuclear technology.
The Bigger Picture
The 1979 Tokyo‑Washington exchange is more than a routine diplomatic cable; it is a snapshot of a turning point where the United States sought to embed its non‑proliferation priorities into Japan’s civil‑nuclear expansion, while Japan tried to secure the technical autonomy it needed for energy security. The subtle concessions and lingering ambiguities recorded in the telegram foreshadowed the complex, sometimes contentious, nuclear partnership that continues to shape East Asian security and global non‑proliferation policy.
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
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E.O. 12065: RDS 2/15/85 (SHERMAN, WILLIAM) OR-M TAGS: MNUC, ENRG, TECH, JA SUBJECT: (S) BILATERAL NUCLEAR CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN
(S) ENTIRE TEXT.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS NOSENZO, DOE DAS HANDYSIDE, AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS SPENT FULL DAY FEBRUARY 13 IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH GOJ ON BROAD RANGE OF NUCLEAR ISSUES. ATMOSPHERE WAS MOST CORDIAL AND FRANK, WITH NO MAJOR SURPRISES DEVELOPING.
COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR NIIZEKI (JAEC COMMIS- SIONER) PROVED TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANCE. NIIZEKI SECRET
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LISTENED TO AMBASSADOR PICKERING'S PROPOSAL THAT TOKAI- MURA JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND ALL CONDITIONS THEREIN BE EX- TENDED TO APRIL 1980 (WHICH WOULD MAKE IT A "SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT" UNDER NNPA) AND AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PRO- POSAL, SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY MOFA. PICKERING THEN OUT- LINED AN APPROACH TO FUEL CYCLE MANAGEMENT FOR THE 1980S AS CONTAINED IN THE US ILLUSTRATIVE ELEMENTS FOR HAR-
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
MONIZING NUCLEAR POLICY AMONG KEY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND PRESENTED TO THESE COUNTRIES LAST NOVEMBER IN MARGIN OF INFCE PLENARY. PICKERING NOTED THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD PROSCRIBE USE OF PU IN LWR RECYCLE BUT WOULD PROVIDE PU FOR R&D FOR FBRS AND ADVANCED THERMAL REACTOR R&D. PICKERING SAID THAT SUCH AN APPROACH, IF AGREED, WOULD FORM A BASIS FOR MORE ROUTINE US APPROVAL OF MB-10S. THIS APPROACH ALSO WOULD NECESSITATE ADDI- TIONAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE; FOR THE US AND JAPAN, A PACIFIC ISLAND INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN MEETING MUCH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' NEEDS AS WELL AS OTHER PACIFIC BASIN COUNTRIES OVER NEXT 35 YEARS. PICKERING SAID THAT US TEAM WAS HERE TO DISCUSS SUCH A BILATERAL PROJECT AND SUGGESTED THAT IT BE CONSIDERED AS A DEVICE TO SUPPORT THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN BOTH COUNTRIES. NIIZEKI REITERATED JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY PU ECONOMY WHILE RECOGNIZING NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS EN- TAILED. HIS SOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS TO RELY ON INTER- NATIONAL CONTROL OF FLOW OF PU IN ACCORDANCE WITH IAEA STATUTE. HE POINTED OUT THAT JAPAN HAS BEEN WAITING FOR INFO ON PACIFIC ISLAND STORAGE AND HE PROMISED TO STUDY ANY US PROPOSAL CAREFULLY. HE THEN RAISED SUBJECT OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT, SAYING THAT JAPAN ALREADY HAD INVESTED DOLS. 200M IN CENTRIFUGE R&D OVER PAST SIX YEARS AND PLANNED TO HAVE SOME NATIONAL ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY. HE NOTED DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT BE ENCOUNTERED IN SAFEGUARDING SECRET
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COMMERCIAL SCALE ENRICHMENT PLANT AND PROPOSED US/JAPAN COOPERATION IN R&D ON CENTRIFUGE PLANT SAFEGUARDS. AT SAME TIME, HE SAID THAT JAPAN HELD VIEW THAT THE ALTERNA- TIVE OF A MULTINATIONAL ENRICHMENT PLANT DID NOT PRECLUDE SPREAD OF ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY, FAVORING LIMITED NUMBER OF NATIONAL PLANTS UNDER STRICT SAFEGUARDS, AND WITH NEEDS OF LDCS BEING MET BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION SUCH AS FUEL BANK. (PAPER FROM WHICH NIIZEKI READ WAS HANDED TO PICKERING AND HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO DEPARTMENT BY SEP- TEL.) PICKERING DISCUSSED RATIONALE FOR MULTINATIONAL PLANT CONCEPT, ASKED FOR JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR STUDYING IT, AND POINTED OUT PRECEDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE NATIONAL ENRICHMENT PLANT ON LDCS WITH ENRICHMENT ASPIRA- TIONS. PICKERING STRESSED THROUGHOUT IMPORTANCE US PLACED ON HARMONIZATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION VIEWS OF JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS.
- PLENARY MORNING SESSION WAS ATTENDED BY REPRESENTA- TIVES OF MOFA, STA AND MITI/ANRE ON GOJ SIDE, WITH MOFA'S S&T DIRECTOR-GENERAL YATABE LEADING DISCUSSION. PICKERING REPORTED ON US BILATERALS WITH FRANCE, UK AND FRG, NOTING THAT FRANCE AND UK VIEWS ON NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
ISSUES WERE CLOSE TO THOSE OF US, WITH EXCEPTION OF TIMING OF INTRODUCTION OF FBR AS COMMERCIAL POWER SOURCE. HE STRESSED THAT COMMITMENT TO FBR WAS MATTER OF NATIONAL DE- CISION BUT SHOULD NOT BE MADE PREMATURELY OR WITHOUT CARE- FUL ANALYSIS AND R&D. IN US VIEW, HE SAID, USE OF THE FBR SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE ELECTRI- CAL GRID WOULD JUSTIFY INTRODUCTION OF BREEDERS. MAJOR
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POINT OF ISSUE WAS WITH FRG OVER THERMAL RECYCLE, WHO HAVE TACITLY AGREED THAT THEIR RATIONALE FOR GOING AHEAD WITH THERMAL RECYCLE WAS POLITICAL AND NOT TECHNICAL (I.E., RESOURCE NEEDS AND ECONOMICS DO NOT JUSTIFY NEAR- TERM THERMAL RECYCLE). FRG DID, HOWEVER, APPRECIATE PRO- LIFERATION DANGER OF PRECEDENT OF THERMAL RECYCLE FOR COUNTRIES WITH SMALL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. HE INFORMED GOJ OFFICIALS THAT FRG WAS ALSO THINKING ABOUT BUILDING SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY IN NORTH RHINE/WESTPHALIA REGION WITH CAPACITY OF 1500 TONS TO COMPLEMENT PLANNED STORAGE AT GORLEBEN REPROCESSING FACILITY.
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
- YATABE REPLIED THAT HE SHARED US OPINION THAT BREEDER SECRET
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R&D SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ADVANCED NATIONS WHICH HAVE ECO- NOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR PROGRAM. HE PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT OF BREEDER R&D AMONG SUCH COUNTRIES, EVEN AT PRESENT STAGE, NOTING THAT JAPAN'S PROGRAM WAS NOT AS ADVANCED AS THAT OF FRANCE BUT DID INCLUDE PLAN TO START PROTOTYPE CONSTRUCTION (MONJU) IN 1980 AND TO COMPLETE A DEMO PLANT BY 1990S, FOLLOWED BY INCREASING NUMBER OF FBRS SO THAT BY YEAR 2010 ALL NEW REACTOR STARTS WOULD BE FBRS. WHILE PLUTONIUM RECYCLE IN JAPANESE LWRS COULD BE RULED OUT FOR THE 1980S, THE SUPPLY/DEMAND SITUATION ON URANIUM RE- SOURCES WAS UNCERTAIN ENOUGH SO THAT JAPAN COULD NOT YET EXCLUDE PU RECYCLE IN THE FOLLOWING DECADE. R&D OR PU RECYCLE WOULD, THEREFORE, BE REQUIRED WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RESTRICTING SPREAD OF THIS TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUN- TRIES. CONSISTENT WITH PU RECYCLE/FBR PHILOSOPHY, HE SPOKE OF JAPAN'S STRONG NEED FOR REPROCESSING CAPABILITY AT COMMERCIAL LEVEL IN 1990S BUT WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME IN THIS RESPECT.
AMBASSADOR PICKERING WELCOMED YATABE'S PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDED FBR COOPERATION AND SAID THAT US SIDE WOULD FOL- LOW UP. HE RECOGNIZED UNCERTAINTIES THAT MIGHT EXIST IN PU/U SUPPLY BY 1990S BUT CALLED FOR A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO REPROCESSING. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES HE HAD FOUND INTEREST IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACH, AND NOTED THAT THE FRENCH EURODIF MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROL MIGHT HAVE MERIT FOR REPROCESSING AS WELL AS EN- RICHMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE WHAT CONSTITUTED "SENSITIVE" TECHNOLOGY FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS, IT BEING MORE OF AN ART THAN A SCIENCE.
ALTHOUGH NO DEFINITE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN YET, YATABE SAID GOJ WAS THINKING ALONG LINES OF A "NUCLEAR SECRET
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PARK", WITH CO-LOCATION OF INTERMEDIATE SPENT FUEL STORAGE, REPROCESSING PLANT, PU CONVERSION PLANT, AND FUEL FABRICA- TION FACILITY.
- YATABE ASKED THAT US RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTY OF PLANNING TOO EARLY TO ACCEPT SPENT FUEL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WERE NOT CONTRIBUTING PARTIES TO A MULTINATIONAL REPROCES-
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
SING PLANT. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE AT A LATER TIME. PICKERING REPLIED THAT US HAD THIS SAME PROBLEM BUT HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE SURMOUNTED.
TURNING TO SUBJECT OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT, YATABE OUT- LINED GOJ PHILOSOPHY: WORLD'S ENRICHMENT FACILITIES SHOULD BE LARGE-SCALE AND LIMITED IN NUMBER BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION FACTORS. GOJ GOES ALONG WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT WORLD SUPPLY CAPACITY HAS TO MATCH DEMAND, BUT HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION--ALONG WITH THE FRG--THAT THE SUPPLY SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT IN EXCESS OF DEMAND TO COPE WITH POSSIBLE EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. JAPAN BELIEVES THAT ITS OWN SITUATION IS UNIQUE, CONSIDERING THE SIZE OF ITS NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM AND ITS LACK OF IN- DIGENOUS ENRICHMENT CAPACITY. THEREFORE, IT PLANS TO COM- PLETE A 500 TONNE SWU/YEAR CENTRIFUGE PLANT BY 1982 AND A 1000 TONNE/YEAR PLANT BY 1990, THEREBY MEETING ABOUT TEN PERCENT OF ITS DEMAND WITH INDIGENOUS CAPACITY.
PICKERING EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANESE NEEDS AND PLANS, BUT ASKED THAT JAPANESE CONSIDER AND MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT ON STUDIES OF MULTINATIONAL PLANT APPROACH. FROM JAPAN'S POINT OF VIEW, THIS CONCEPT COULD BE CARRIED OUT EITHER WITH A DOMESTIC PLANT USING JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY OR WITH A PLANT BUILT IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. CONCERNING STOCKPILES OF ENRICHED URANIUM, HE SUGGESTED THAT CON- SIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE SAFETY NET APPROACH USED BY IEA
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W ----------------057475 151028Z /10 O 150937Z FEB 79 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5161 INFO AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY VIENNA
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 TOKYO 02669 EXDIS FOR OIL STOCKPILING; AND MENTIONED THAT US WAS ALSO STUDY- ING A COMMODITY ARRANGEMENT FOR ASSURING URANIUM SUPPLIES BUT COULD NOT REPORT DETAILS YET.
AMBASSADOR PICKERING THEN HANDED OVER TO GOJ SIDE CHARTS OF PROJECTED GENERATION OF SPENT FUEL IN JAPAN, PO- TENTIAL PLUTONIUM SUPPLY FROM REPROCESSING OF THIS FUEL, AND POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR PLUTONIUM, AND EXPLAINED SIGNIFICANCE OF CHARTS (WHICH INDICATED THAT JAPAN WOULD GENERATE MORE SPENT FUEL--AND, WYETA, PLUTONIUM -- THAT IT WOULD HAVE NEEDS FOR) IN TERMS OF A PACIFIC BASIN STORAGE SITE FOR SURPLUS SPENT FUEL. GOJ SIDE TOOK CHARTS FOR STUDY AND LATER REVIEW WITH US DELEGATION.
SUBJECT OF MB-10 APPROVALS FOR TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL FROM JAPAN TO EUROPE WAS RAISED NEXT BY AMBASSADOR PICKERING. HE MADE POINT THAT USG ABILITY TO BE FORTH- COMING ON MB-10 APPROVAL WAS RELATED TO ABILITY OF TWO SECRET
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COUNTRIES TO HARMONIZE OVERALL NUCLEAR POLICIES ON ISSUES SUCH AS AVOIDANCE OF THERMAL RECYCLE, AT LEAST FOR NEXT DECADE. US ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT ABILITY OF JAPANESE TO HARMONIZE POLICIES DEPENDED ON MEETING JAPANESE ENERGY NEEDS AS WELL AS MUTUAL NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS. PICKERING SAID THATUS WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH JAPAN IN NUMBER OF AREAS THAT WOULD BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE OF RES- PECTIVE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THIS COULD INCLUDE, IN ADDITION TO PACIFIC BASIN SPENT FUEL STORAGE, AREAS SUCH AS CO- OPERATION IN WASTE MANAGEMENT AND WASTE DISPOSAL RD&D, ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS R&D (PROPOSED EARLIER BY AM- BASSADOR NIIZEKI) AND LMFBR R&D. YATABE REPLIED THAT SPENT FUEL STORAGE IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO REPROCESSING IN JAPAN'S VIEW, BUT AT THE SAME TIME ADDITIONAL STORAGE IS REQUIRED BY JAPAN AND IT WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE PACIFIC BASIN CONCEPT, AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS OF CO- OPERATION, IN A POSITIVE MANNER. IT WAS AGREED THAT US WOULD FOLLOWUP WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETING TO DISCUSS SUCH COOPERATION.
- PICKERING THEN PROCEEDED TO PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF THE DOE STUDY OF THE PALMYRA ISLAND SITE, MAKING IT CLEAR OTHER ISLANDS SUCH AS MIDWAY AND WAKE WERE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES, THAT FINAL DECISION ON SITE SELECTION HAD NOT BEEN MADE AND THAT JAPANESE VIEWS WERE BEING SOLICITED. HE ADDED THAT USG HOPED THAT JAPAN WOULD JOIN US AS FULL PARTNER IN THREE-PHASED PROGRAM: (A) FULL
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
FEASIBILITY STUDY OF CONCEPT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED SITE; (2) DESIGN ENGINEERING OF SITE AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES AND SITE DEVELOPMENT; AND, (3) SITE CONSTRUCTION, WITH GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS AFTER EACH PHASE ON WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO NEXT PHASE. HE TOLD GOJ SIDE THAT US DELEGATION WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE FULL TEXT OF SECRET
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REPORT THE NEXT DAY. (SCRIBNER (STATE) AND BRAY (ACDA) PRESENTED MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF STUDY IN AFTER- NOON.) PICKERING PROPOSED THAT IF GOJ WERE INTERESTED IN CONCEPT OUTLINED, IT SHOULD DESIGNATE APPROPRIATE CONTACTS FOR FURTHER EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND SHOULD THINK IN TERMS OF A JOINT MEETING TO PREPARE A PLAN BY LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAKING A SITE SE- LECTION BY END OF CY-1979. HE EMPHASIZED THAT US HOPED JAPAN WOULD DECIDE TO JOIN US IN THIS EFFORT AND THAT IT WOULD DO SO IN EVERY SENSE: THE TECHNICAL EFFORT, FINANC- ING AND PARTICIPATION. HE ASKED WHETHER US AND JAPAN MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER INVITING OTHER COUNTRIES OF PACIFIC REGION TO JOIN AS WELL.
- YATABE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED BY THE DETAIL OF PICKERING'S PRESENTATION, BUT WISHED TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS.
Q: WHAT IS THE TIMING OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE US ON THE PACIFIC BASIN STORAGE SITE?
A: DRAFT LEGISLATION FOR AFR STORAGE IN US IS NOW IN OMB AND MIGHT GO TO CONGRESS BY END OF FEBRUARY. PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION IS TO MEET NEAR-TERM NEED TO RELIEVE CONGES- TION IN REACTOR STORAGE POOLS IN US, AS WELL AS ACCEPT LIMITED AMOUNT OF SLREIGN SPZ IT FUEL IN SUPPORT OF US NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. PACIFIC BASIN STORAGE, ON OTHER HAND, IS CONCEPT FOR 1985 AND BEYOND. MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACT
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W ----------------057590 151039Z /10 O 150937Z FEB 79 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5162 INFO AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY VIENNA
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 TOKYO 02669 EXDIS AS WELL AS OVERALL FEASIBILITY. FACT THAT PALMYRA ISLAND SITE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION NEEDS TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL TO MINIMIZE RISK OF LAND SPECULATION BY OWNERS OF ISLAND.
Q: IS ISLAND LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE A COMMERCIAL RE- PROCESSING PLANT?
A: ISLAND HAS ABOUT 500 ACRES OF DRY LAND. EVALUATION HAS NOT INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF BUILDING A REPROCESSING PLANT THERE. CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF COSTS FOR PLANT WOULD BE REQUIRED SINCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS ON REMOTE ISLAND WULD BE VRY HIGH. IT MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE TO RETURN SPENT FUEL TO ANOTHER PLACE FOR REPROCESSING.
Q: WHAT ABOUT PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF PACIFIC BASIN CONCEPT IN US?
A: GAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE WILL NOT BE EASY, SINCE SOME SECRET
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GROUPS IN US ARE AGAINST ANY ACTIVITY THAT WILL MAKE NUCLEAR POWER MORE VIABLE IN US. THESE GROUPS MIGHT BE FOR STORAGE OF FOREIGN SPENT FUEL ON ISLAND BUT AGAINST STORAGE OF US FUEL. Q: IS A SIMILAR ISLAND STORAGE SITE BEING SOUGHT IN CARIBBEAN OR ATLANTIC FOR USE BY EUROPE AND EASTERN US?
A: YES, BUT STUDY IS ABOUT NINE MONTHS BEHIND THAT FOR PACIFIC BASIN.
- ANSWERING PICKERING'S EARLIER QUESTION, YATABE SPECU- LATED THAT KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES MIGHT BE LOGICAL
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
ADDITIONAL PARTNERS FOR PACIFIC BASIN STORAGE FACILITY, FROM BOTH AN ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION VIEW. ON OTHER HAND, THEY AND OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE TREATED SIMPLY AS CUSTOMERS. YATABE SAID HE COULD NOT PROVIDE EXPLICIT ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY PICKERING, SUCH AS WHETHER JAPAN WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HAVING A FUEL ENCAPSULATION FACILITY (TO PREPARE SPENT FUEL FOR SHIPMENT TO ISLAND) ON ITS OWN TERRITORY, OR WHAT THE JAPANESE PUBLIC'S VIEWS WOULD BE ON THE CONCEPT.
- WORKING LUNCHEON ATTENDED ON GOJ SIDE BY YATABE AND HIS STAFF ONLY COVERED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND A FEW BILATERAL MATTERS. PICKERING BRIEFED JAPANESE ON HIS ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE INDIA TO ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REVIEW COMMITTEE, NOTING THAT CLARIFICATION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE IAEA DG EKLUND COULD BE CONVINCED TO CHAIR COMMITTEE. HE ALSO BRIEFED JAPANESE ON HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW ON SUPPLIER ISSUES INCLUDING SUPPLY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTORS TO CUBA AND LIBYA, HEAVY WATER TO ARGENTINA, AND SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT TRANSFER OF ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY SECRET
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AND EQUIPMENT. YATABE ASKED FOR BACKGROUND ON USG DECISION TO SUPPORT FRENCH SALE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO CHINA, SAYING THAT GOJ WAS SURPRISED AT SPEED WITH WHICH DECISION WAS MADE. AMBASSADOR PICKERING EXPLAINED THAT MATTER HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY USG FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, THAT US HAD PRESSED FRANCE TO GET PEACEFUL USES ASSURANCE, LIMIT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SEEK SAFEGUARDS. FRANCE HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING FIRST TWO BUT NOT SAFEGUARDS AND THAT ON BALANCE USG HAD DECIDED THAT NON-PROLIFERATION ASSURANCES OBTAINED FROM PRC BY GOF WERE BETTER THAN THOSE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY US HAD ANOTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY (I.E., FRG) BEEN THE SUPPLIER. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY YATABE, PICKERING SAID THAT US INFLUENCE OVER FRG ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WAS NOT AS STRONG AS MIGHT BE IMAGINED. PICKERING NOTED THAT INDIANS DID NOT RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT FRENCH REACTOR SALE DURING HIS VISIT. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE LOCATION OF A MULTI-LATERAL ENRICHMENT PLANT IN AUSTRALIA, OR IN JAPAN USING AUSTRALIAN URANIUM, EVINCED COMMENT BY YATABE THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT SEEM TO BE VERY INTERESTED IN OR CAPABLE OF BUILDING A PLANT, CONSIDERING GENERAL INDUSTRIAL LEVEL OF THE COUNTRY. PICKERING COMMENTED THAT HIS OWN EXPERIENCE IN AUSTRALIA INDICATED THE CONTRARY, AS DEMONSTRATED BY PREVIOUS ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN STEEL MANUFACTURE, COAL CONVERSION, AND OIL REFINING. DISCUSSION OF "JAPAN INITIATIVE", (PREVIOUSLY "FUKUDA INITIATIVE"), ON BILATERAL ENERGY R&D COOPERATION, ENABLED PICKERING TO EX-
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
PLAIN THAT RESOLUTION OF SRC I/SRC II BUDGET PROBLEM PROBABLY WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL SUMMER,WHEN CONGRESSIONAL
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 02669 05 OF 05 151054Z ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W ----------------057697 151107Z /16 O 150937Z FEB 79 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5163 INFO AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY CANBERRA AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY OTTAWA AMEMBASSY VIENNA
S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 TOKYO 02669 EXDIS COMMITTEES WOULD COMPLETE HEARINGS ON FY-1980 BUDGET. HANDYSIDE WAS SKEPTICAL THAT AGREEMENT OR INITIATIVE COULD BE CONCLUDED PRIOR TO FIRM MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO COAL CONVERSION PROJECT. ON EXTENSION OF TOKAIMURA JOINT COM- MUNIQUE, GOJ SIDE AGREED WITH US PROPOSAL TO EXTEND TO APRIL 1980 BUT NOTED THAT GOJ FY-1979 BUDGET WHICH WILL BE APPROVED BY APRIL 1, 1979, WILL CONTAIN FUNDS FOR BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION OF PLUTONIUM CONVERSION PLANT. GOJ WOULD PREFER TO DELAY ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL AFTER THIS DATE.
- AFTERNOON PLENARY SESSION WAS DEVOTED TO DETAILED BRIEFING ON PALMYRA SPENT FUEL STORAGE SITE BY SCRIBNER AND BRAY. JAPANESE SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AND ASKED MANY DETAILED QUESTIONS. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENTS OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT SUCH DETAILED AND FRANK CONSULTA- TIONS WERE MOST PRODUCTIVE AND SHOULD BE SCHEDULED AGAIN IN NEAR FUTURE.
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
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- THIS REPORT NOT CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR PICKERING. MANSFIELD
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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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